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INTRODUCTION

Customary international law-how to define and determine it-is one
of the great mysteries in the law.' The experts do not agree on a definition. 2 The rules cannot become law unless they are followed, but they
may not become law-even if followed-until anointed as such.' In the
1. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 47 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 1
(1974-1975). See also L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 37-40 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter HENKIN &

PUGH].
2. Compare Akehurst, supra note 1, at 1-3, with A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF

CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1971) [hereinafter A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM].

3. "International law, or the law that governs between states, has at times, like the
common law within states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable
from morality or justice, till at length the imprimaturof a court attests its jural quality."
New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383-84 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
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United States, this mystery has constitutional dimension, because the offenses clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power "to define
and punish ...Offenses against the Law of Nations," 4 permitting Congress to define violations of customary international law as domestic
crimes.5
On the surface, the offenses clause appears to be the framers' resolution of a conflict between two legal regimes. It recognizes a body of law
distilled from the practice of nations that forbids individuals, including
people within the jurisdiction of the United States, to commit certain
acts. Those acts may become international "offenses" without the participation of the political departments of the United States and would be
triable in United States courts,' thereby diminishing this nation's freedom of action by allowing other states to dictate domestic crimes.7 The
offenses clause avoids this problem and asserts the independence of the
United States by permitting the imposition of criminal penalties for those
offenses only when Congress authorizes the penalties. Although the
framers generally accepted the notion that customary international law
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
10. Henkin has observed that this power "has been
little used and its purport is not wholly clear." L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 72 (1972). See generally Comment, The Offenses Clause: Congress' InternationalPenal Power, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279 (1969). This Article will
not consider another complex of constitutional disputes regarding custom-when, if ever,
custom is incorporated into United States law in the absence of a statute and the effect of
such incorporation. Compare Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States,
82 MIcH. L. REv. 1555, 1566 (1984) (customary international law, to which the United
States has not objected, equal in authority to an act of Congress) and Lobel, The Limits
of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw: An
HistoricalPerspective, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1141 (1985) (peremptory norms of customary international law binding on President) with Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REv. 665, 704 (1986) ("Customary international
law is not an appropriate doctrinal vehicle for general restraint of considered political
branch action"). See generally Morgan, Internalization of Customary International
Law: An HistoricalPerspective, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 63 (1987); Agora, May the President Violate Customary InternationalLaw?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986), 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 371 (1987) (collection of essays by various authors).
Issues of customary law also arise outside of international law. See, e.g., D'Amato,
Professor Nagel's Reflections on Cardozo (Distinction between Custom and Law), 2
CARDOZO L. REV. 589 (1981); Nagel, ProfessorD'Amato on Law and Custom: A Rejoinder, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 593 (1981); Watson, An Approach to Customary Law,
1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 561.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 34-59.
6. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100-01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360). But
see United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
7. Morgan, supra note 4, at 70. Rather than "freedom of action," one might use
"sovereignty," but that term carries other, perhaps unnecessary, connotations.
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was a part of the common law of the United States,' this nice symmetry
was not on their minds. International law in 1787 had little direct impact on individuals.9 The framers' real concern was to prevent the thirteen refractory states from disrupting foreign relations.1"
The participants in the debates over the ratification of the Constitution did not overlook the possibility that Congress, acting under the offenses clause, might infringe individual rights."1 But there is no evidence
that this alarmed them generally. Aside from the limited intrusion of
international law into ordinary affairs, the framers viewed custom as, in
part, natural law, which was consistent with the constitutional theory
they were writing. 2 To the extent that custom was positive law,' 3 it
depended on the accumulation of international practice.' The requirement that there be widespread and uniform practice was and is a cautionary mechanism that prevents the formation of customary international law either precipitously or without the agreement of most nations.
Such a mechanism exists precisely to protect states' independence,1 5 an

8. See, e.g., I Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 26 (1791) (Edmund Randolph) ("The law of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation commences and runs with the existence
of a nation, subject to modifications on some points of indifference. Indeed a people may
regulate it so as to be binding upon the departments of their own government. . . ."); id.
at 26-27 (discussing entry into a foreign minister's house and arresting one of his servants; arrest covered by specific federal statute, see infra note 74, but entry covered, "if
at all," by law of nations; assumes prosecution possible under latter); Henkin, The Con-

stitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 865-68 (1987); Lobel, supra note 4, at 1084-90. See also 1

Op. Att'y Gen. 567, 570 (1822).
9. HENKIN & PUGH, supra note 1, at 981-83 (quoting Henkin, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 6 Poc. GEN. EDUC. SEMINAR 7-9 (1977)); R. LILLICH & F.
NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY

1 (1969)

(quoting Humphrey, The InternationalLaw of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth
Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 75

(1973)).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
12, See I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 148-67 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967), reprinted in 3 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 70-78
(1987). Indeed, the basis of much eighteenth century American constitutional theory
rested on the natural law concepts of such international law writers as Pufendorf,
Burlamaqui, Vattel, and Rutherforth. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 860-64
(1978).
13. See I J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 2-3 (1826).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26, 134-39.

15. See Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principleof the Persis-
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independence that encompasses the power to select fundamental values.
The limited evidence available suggests that the framers knew that the
list of international law offenses would expand with time. It is doubtful,
however, that they anticipated several developments which would undermine the balance implicit in the offenses clause. First, United States
courts have become willing to accept much less in the way of practice in
order to prove the existence of an international legal norm, which was
not the case in this country's first century. Rather, as will be discussed,
the trend has been to rely on instruments such as treaties and declarations not only as a distinct source of law between signatory states, but
also as evidence of custom that binds nonsignatory states or that transmutes nonlegal instruments into law. Second, the courts tend to defer to
congressional legislative judgments, especially in the area of foreign affairs. This is particularly true in offenses clause cases: of the very few
cases decided under the offenses clause, in only a handful have the parties raised the question of the existence of an international law offense,
and in none has a court found that there was no offense. This may be
attributed to (1) traditional judicial deference to the legislature, (2) an
unwillingness to look carefully at international practice, and (3) the fact
that congressional powers in addition to the offenses clause often support
the statute at issue. The upshot of these trends is that, with relative ease,
a non-norm can become the basis of a United States criminal statute and
the courts will give it only minimal scrutiny, even though it may infringe
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
A recent case, Boos v. Barry, 6 provides a useful probe for examining
the foregoing problems. Boos involved a statute enacted pursuant to the
offenses clause. The statute at issue, section 22-1115 of the District of
Columbia Code,"7 essentially prohibits the "display [of] any flag, banner,

tent Objector in InternationalLaw, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457, 469-70 (1985).
16. 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988), affig in part, rev'g in part Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d
1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See Note, The Law of Nations' Effect Upon Free Speech: Finzer
v. Barry, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 509 (1987); Note, Regulating Embassy Picketing in the
Public Forum, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REy. 908 (1987).
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981). The statute was repealed in 1986, contingent upon Congress' extending 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1982), a similar federal statute that
operates outside the District of Columbia, to cover the District of Columbia. Protection
for Foreign Officials, Official Guests and Internationally Protected Persons Amendment
Act of 1987, § 3, 35 D.C. Reg. 728-29 (1988). Congress has not yet done that. Nevertheless, the repeal of section 22-1115 would not moot the issues discussed here. Although the
government has apparently adopted a restrictive interpretation of section 112, see
CISPES v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1985) (peaceful picketing not prohibited),
that provision still presents first amendment problems on its face. See infra note 105.

870
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placard, or device designed or adapted to ... bring into public odium
any foreign government" within 500 feet of the embassy of that government without a permit from the chief of police of the District of
Columbia.' 8
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a
lengthy opinion by Judge Bork, held that the government had a compelling state interest in its international law obligations to protect ambassadors.19 Given the "trifling" 20 restriction on first amendment rights and
the deference due by the courts to the political branches in determinations concerning "the conduct of American foreign policy,"'" the court of
appeals upheld the display clause of section 22-1115 as a permissible
regulation of speech. 2 Had the court of appeals' decision stood, the
18. The full statute provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or
adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government,
party, or organization, or any officer or officers thereof, or to bring into public
disrepute political, social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government, party, or organization, or to intimidate, coerce, harass, or bring into public disrepute any officer or officers or diplomatic or consular representatives of any
foreign government, or to interfere with the free and safe pursuit of the duties of
any diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government, within 500
feet of any building or premises within the District of Columbia used or occupied
by any foreign government or its representatives as an embassy, legation, consulate, or for other official purposes, except by, and in accordance with, a permit
issued by the Chief of Police of the said District; or to congregate within 500 feet
of any such building or premises, and refuse to disperse after having been ordered
so to do by the police authorities of the said District.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981). The section preceding the semicolon is known as the
"display clause"; the remaining language is known as the "congregation clause."
19. Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1455-58.
20. Id. at 1463.
21. Id. at 1458-59.
22. Id. at 1477. Adopting a narrowing construction of the congregation clause, the
court upheld that clause of section 22-1115 as well, permitting dispersal only when police reasonably believe there is a threat to the security of the embassy. Id. at 1471-72.
Fifty years previously, the same court had upheld the same statute in Frend v. United
States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939). See also
Zaimi v. United States, 476 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reversing conviction under section 22-1115 for speaking); Jewish Defense League, Inc. v. Washington, 347 F. Supp.
1300 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court) (same); CISPES v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.
1985) (affirming similar, but slightly more limited, restriction in 18 U.S.C. § 112); Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471, 474-76 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 913 (1981) (upholding "bullpen" restriction on protests directed at consulates).
Judge Wald filed a detailed dissent in which she contended that the government had
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in enacting the particular speech restraints at
issue. Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1481-84. Judge Wald therefore subjected section 22-1115 to a
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United States would have been in opposition not only to the trend in
international practice, but also to the first amendment.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, disagreed. 23
The Court found "our national interest in protecting diplomatic person' but
nel powerful indeed," 24
declined to conclude that the interest was
"automatically . . 'compelling' for purposes of First Amendment analysis." 25 Assuming, without deciding, that international law recognizes a
sufficiently compelling "dignity interest" to support a content-based restraint on speech, the majority found that section 22-1115 was not "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest. 6 The Court reasoned that the
analogous federal statute limits only picketing "intended to harass" diplomats within 100 feet of an embassy,27 showing that section 22-1115's

standard first amendment analysis and, largely because it restricted speech based upon
the speaker's viewpoint, found that the statute did not comport with the first amendment.
Id. at 1493-96, 1499, 1500.
23. Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1168 (1988). Justices Brennan and Marshall
concurred. The Chief Justice, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, dissented, stating
that he would have affirmed the opinion below. Id. at 1173 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1165.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1168.
27. The statute reads, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers violence to a foreign
official, official guest, or internationally protected person or makes any other violent attack upon the person or liberty of such person, or, if likely to endanger his
person or liberty, makes a violent attack upon his official premises, private accommodation, or means of transport or attempts to commit any of the foregoing shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a deadly or dangerous weapon
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
(b) Whoever willfully(1) intimidates, coerces, threatens, or harasses a foreign official or an official
guest or obstructs a foreign official in the performance of his duties;
(2) attempts to intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign official or an
official guest or obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his duties; or
(3) within the United States but outside the District of Columbia and within
one hundred feet of any building or premises in whole or in part owned, used, or
occupied for official business or for diplomatic, consular, or residential purposes
by(A) a foreign government, including such use as a mission to an international
organization;
(B) an international organization;
(C) a foreign official; or
(D) an official guest; congregates with two or more other persons with intent to
violate any other provision of this section;
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500 foot limit was literally and legally too broad.28
Boos raises a series of questions about both customary international
law and the interaction between that body of law and the first amendment. The preliminary question is: What did the framers intend when
they drafted the offenses clause? The language of the offenses clause accepts the fact that offenses might not be well defined. Thus, arguably,
Congress has some flexibility in defining "offenses against the law of
nations," both as a way of recognizing existing custom and as a way of
participating in the development of custom. Part II of this Article considers the history of the offenses clause and the framers' intent in giving
Congress the power to define offenses against the law of nations. This
section also examines the few Supreme Court cases dealing with the offenses clause. It concludes that, while Congress was to take account of
developing international law, it could not define such an offense where
none existed. However, this section also concludes that the courts have
been extremely generous in letting Congress decide what an offense is
and that, especially since World War II, the focus in determining the
"law of nations" has shifted from practice to treaties.
The next question is whether customary international law restricts
nonviolent picketing outside an embassy to protect a foreign state's dignity interest. Part III of this Article examines whether customary international law restrains speech in the form of picketing, as embodied in
section 22-1115. That inquiry begins with a brief examination of what
one means by custom. This section then surveys the existing state practice, as well as the effect of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.2 9 Part III concludes that under any acceptable definition of custom, the court of appeals erred in Boos by failing to examine carefully
international practice to verify the contours of custom. There appears to
be no international offense in picketing peacefully. The court of appeals
went astray by following some commentators who have asserted a broad

shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed or applied so as to
abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 112(a), (b), (d) (1982).
28. The Court nonetheless affirmed the court of appeals holding as to the congregation clause. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1168-70.
29. April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered
into force April 24, 1964; entered into force for United States, December 13, 1972)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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duty to hold diplomatic agents and a diplomatic mission "inviolable" 30
and to protect their "dignity," 3 1 without looking at actual international
practice, which does not unambiguously prevent peaceful picketing.
Finally, although Congress might be mistaken in defining an offense,
that does not mean the courts can interfere. The Constitution gives Congress the power to define offenses; if Congress misreads international
law, the remedy may lie in the political process. Part IV, therefore, considers issues of judicial review. This section first examines whether the
courts have any role to play; that is, whether the issue is nonjusticiable
under the political question doctrine. Part IV then examines whether, at
least in situations involving a statute that does not violate other constitutional prohibitions, the courts' deference to the political branches should
tip the scales in favor of the congressional definition.
Part IV next considers the impact of the first amendment on the deference due the political branches' assertion that some peaceful picketing
constitutes an offense against the law of nations. It shows that the standard justifications for judicial deference in the foreign relations area are
inapposite. When the Legislature simply believes that there is an offense
against the law of nations, first amendment considerations argue against
any substantial judicial deference to the political branches.
II.

CONGRESSIONAL DISCRETION TO DEFINE OFFENSES AGAINST
THE LAW OF NATIONS

The President can articulate developing international law.32 Although
one does not typically think of Congress as speaking for the United
States on what custom is, Congress and the President clearly have overlapping areas of authority in international affairs.33 The offenses clause
may explicitly provide Congress and the President with power to define
international law. This section will examine the history of the offenses
clause and judicial decisions interpreting it to determine the scope, if
any, of Congress' discretion under that clause. The conclusion reached in
this section is that Congress possesses some discretion in establishing the

30.
31.

See, e.g., E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 463-64 (J. Chitty ed. 1844).
See, e.g., Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Codification of

International Law, reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter

Harvard Research].
32.

See, e.g., Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945) (proclamation of

President Harry S. Truman entitled "Policy of the United States with respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and the Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf").
33. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PowER 58-60

(1976).
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boundaries of offenses that are unclear, but Congress may not create
offenses where none exist. Nonetheless, it will be evident that the courts
have largely ignored the framers' rather limited conception of the offenses clause in favor of a more expansive view of congressional power.
A.

History of the Offenses Clause

When they drafted the offenses clause, the framers had two concerns.
First, probably with the De Longchamps affair" in mind, they wished
to stop the states from defining and punishing offenses against the law of
nations. Second, the framers wanted to put Congress in a position to deal
with uncertainties as to what the offenses were. There is some evidence,
however, that the framers believed the clause was not restricted to the
"offenses against the law of nations" recognized in 1789.
The Articles of Confederation failed to give the Continental Congress
the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.3 5 To
deal with that vacuum, in 1781, a committee of the Continental Congress recommended that the states enact laws "punishing infractions of
the laws of nations."3 The entire Continental Congress then passed a
resolution recommending, among other things, that the states "provide
expeditious, exemplary and adequate punishment.., for the infractions
of the immunities of ambassadors and other public ministers authorized
and received as such by the United States in Congress assembled."3 Few
states responded and, in August 1785, the Continental Congress again
passed a similar resolution. 8
Most states still did not respond to those repeated recommendations. 9
34. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Phila. 0. & T. 1784) (a
celebrated Pennsylvania case involving an insult to a French diplomat in Philadelphia).

See G.

RowE, THOMAS MCKEAN: THE SHAPING OF AN AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM

209-17 (1978).
35. See Articles of Confederation, art. 9, reprinted in 1 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 81 (2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT]. Congress only had appellate power over

state decisions regarding captures on the high seas. See id.; 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 635-36 (1779) (letter to the Minister Plenipotentiary of France);
Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Oct.
10, 1787), reprinted in 2 H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 86, 88
(1981).
36. The Committee was composed of Randolph, Duane and Witherspoon. 21 JoURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1136 (1781).

37. Id. at 1136-37.
38. 29 JOURNALS OF THE
39.

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

654-55 (1785).

Letter from Edmund Randolph, supra note 35, at 88.
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When the Federal Convention gathered in 1787, one of the reasons for
proposing a new constitution was precisely that failure of the states. For
example, in proposing the Virginia Resolutions, which eventually
formed the basis of the Constitution, Edmund Randolph "proceeded to
enumerate the defects [of the Confederation] .... Of this he cited many
examples; most of whi[ch] tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war without controul ... 2 o
Indeed, James McHenry's notes quote Randolph's criticism of the Confederation: "If the rights of an ambassador be invaded by any citizen it is
only in a few States that any laws exist to punish the offender.""
The phrase "offenses against the law of nations" did not spring forth
from the framers' quills. Many of them would have recalled it from
Blackstone, "a book which," Madison noted, "is in every man's
43
hands."4' 2 In a chapter entitled "Offenses Against the Law of Nations,
Blackstone included violations of safe conducts, violations of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy. Other than piracy,44 however, the prohibited
acts were indefinite. "Offenses against the law of nations" were not completely ascertained. 45 Likewise, the common law did not adequately define "felonies on the high seas." 46
The provision that became the offenses clause first appears in a draft
of the Committee on Detail, probably from July 23, 1787. 4 It refers to
"Punishment of ...Offenses against the Law of Nations." 48 The clause,
somewhat changed, was first debated on August 17, 1787; its initial formulation was "To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies &c." ' 49 Most of the rather limited discussion of the provision dealt
with whether punishment of counterfeiting should be included in the
provision and whether "define &" should be inserted before "punish,"
40. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Farrand ed.
1937) [hereinafter FARRAND] (Madison's notes).
41. Id. at 25.
42. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 35, 501 (Madison's notes).
43.

4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66 (1st ed. 1765).

44.
45.
46.

See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 155 (1820).
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1158 (2d ed. 1851).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 303-04 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961); 2 J.
supra note 45, § 1158.
2 FARRAND, supra note 40, at 129 n.1

STORY,

47.
48.

See id. at 168. The Report of the Committee on Detail, delivered on August 6,

1787, listed the following as a legislative power: "To declare the law and punishment of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting
the coin of the United States, and of offenses against the law of nations. . . ." Id. at 182.
49. Id. at 312 (Journal), 315 (Madison's notes).
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although Madison did point out that "no foreign law should be a standard other than is expressly adopted."'5 0 Gouverneur Morris preferred
"designate" to "define" since the latter was "limited to [its] preexisting
meaning." 5 1 The convention rejected his suggestion. At the end of the
discussion, Oliver Ellsworth "enlarged the motion so as to read 'to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the U. States, and offenses agst. the
law of Nations' which was agreed to, nern con." 52 The measure came up
again on September 14, 1787, in the voting on the report of the Committee of Style in the following form: "To define & punish piracies and
felonies on the high seas, and punish offenses agst. the law of nations." '
The entire reported debate was as follows:
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "punish" before the words "offenses agst. the law of nations" so as to let these be definable as well as
punishable, by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence.
Mr. Wilson hoped the alteration would by no means be made. To pretend to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all
the Civilized Nations of the World, would have a look of arrogance. that
would make us ridiculous.
Mr. Govr The word define is proper when applied to offenses in this
case; the law of (nations) being often too vague and deficient to be a
rule.

54

The motion to strike out the word "punish" passed by a narrow six to
five margin.5
The debates and their conclusion indicate that the framers did not
intend to limit offenses only to those in existence in 1789. Congress
could, apparently, define new offenses if they arose in customary law."6
50. Id. at 315-16. Madison reiterated this point in Federalist No. 42. He wrote that
piracies might "without inconveniency" be defined by the law of nations; felonies, however, were only loosely defined in English law: "But neither the common, nor the statute
law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this,
unless previously made its own by legislative adoption." THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (J.
Madison), supra note 46, at 303-04.
51. 2 FARRAND, supra note 40, at 316.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 614. See id. at 570 (a Committee of Style draft that includes counterfeiting), 595 (a Committee of Style draft that does not include counterfeiting).
54. Id. at 614-15.
55. Id. at 615.
56. Even during the Confederacy, it was understood that, while "offenses against the
law of nations" included the violation of passports and safe conducts, "infractions of the
immunities of ambassadors" and infractions of treaties and conventions to which the
United States was a party, those were "only . . . the most obvious." E. Randolph, J.
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The notion of "define," however, was not that Congress could invent
new offenses, but rather that it could clarify existing offenses.5" Moreover, both Madison's fears about the imposition of foreign law, that is,
the law of an individual foreign state, and Wilson's recognition that "all
the civilized Nations of the World" participate in the development of
custom indicate that the framers did not intend custom to be binding on
this country unless the established custom was substantially uniform in
the international community.
The Convention ended in September 1787 and the process of ratification began. Several themes ran through the ratifying process and debates.
Among these themes were the need for a bill of rights,5" potential abuses
of the treaty power, and the taxing power. 9 By and large the offenses
Duane, & J. Witherspoon, Report to Congress (Nov. 1781), reprintedin 3 P. KURLAND

& R.

LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION

66 (1987). This conception, and the

subsequent history described in this section, appear to cut against Judge Bork's "admittedly speculative" notion that torts against the law of nations were intended to be limited

to the three categories set out. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 815
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1350); see also W.
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 109 (2d

ed. 1829) ("Such acts [offenses against the law of nations] may be of various kinds...
2)).

57.

In July 1865, Attorney General James Speed opined to President Johnson: "To

define is to give the limits or precise meaning of a word or thing in being; to make is to
call into being. Congress has power to define, not to make, the laws of nations ...." 11

Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299 (1865). Professor D'Amato apparently considered the point so
obvious that it did not require discussion. Comment, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Founding of the Constitution,82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 63 n.6 (1988) (offenses clause uses
"define" in sense of "articulate" or "recognize," not "invent").
58. George Mason, one of five delegates to vote against the Constitution, first noted
the issue in his draft of the Constitution on September 12, 1787. 2 FARRAND, supra note
40, at 636-40. The Convention implicitly rejected it. See id. at 632; see also id. at 340-42
(Pinckney proposal) ("The liberty of the Press shall be inviolably preserved"); id. at
617-18 (Pinckney-Gerry motion) ("the Liberty of the Press should be inviolably preserved") (defeated). It appears that Richard Henry Lee and Melancthon Smith also argued for a bill of rights. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Sept. 30,
1787), reprintedin 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 4-8 (Hunt ed. 1904), and in
1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 440-42 (1971)
[hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS]. Mason circulated his objections to the proposed Constitution, one of which was the absence of a declaration of rights. MASON, OBJECTIONS TO
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

(n.p. 1787), reprinted in P.

PHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

1968) [hereinafter

PAMPHLETS],

and in 1

BILL OF RIGHTS,

FORD, PAM-

327-32 (1888 & reprint

supra, at 444-47. See also

Letter from The Federal Farmer (Richard Henry Lee) (Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 471 (expressing concern that no constitutional bounds limited
treaties).
59. Madison commented to Jefferson that "[t]he articles relating to Treaties, to pa-
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clause was lost in the struggles over those larger issues. Reflecting the
lack of conflict over the offenses clause, the Federalist Papers simply
echoed the framers' reasons for adopting it. In Federalist No. 3, John
Jay observed that under a national government the laws of nations
should be "expounded in one sense," as opposed to being interpreted
inconsistently by thirteen states.6 ° The national government could also
minimize the possibility of war by having the power, unencumbered by
local pride, to punish violations of the laws of nations. 1 In Federalist
No. 42, Madison argued that the powers in the offenses clause properly
belong to the "federal government." 2 The Articles of Confederation had
left "it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the confederacy
with foreign nations."6 3
There was little controversy, if any, about the offenses clause in the
debates of the thirteen states. Elliot's Debates contain nothing on the
clause, although at one point they do mention a notorious offense against
the law of nations-the arrest of the Russian ambassador by an English
sheriff. 4 There must have been some dispute about the offenses clause,
however. In a letter of November 1, 1787, "Cincinnatus" 5 responded to
a speech in Philadelphia by James Wilson, complaining that the power
to "define" offenses would include the "power to declare ... all publications from the press against the conduct of government, in making treaties, or in any other foreign transactions, an offense against the law of
nations.""6
In addition, the issue arose obliquely in the federalists' response to
George Mason's Objections.17 James Iredell, who later became a Su-

per money and to contracts, created more enemies than all the errors in the System

positive & negative put together." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 17, 1788), reprintedin 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 58, at
269, 271, and in 1 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at 614-15.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J. Jay), supra note 46, at 98.
61.

Id. at 99.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (J. Madison), supra note 46, at 303. See 3 ELLIOT,
supra note 35, at 532 (Madison's argument at Virginia Convention). See also W.
RAWLE, supra note 56, at 108.
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (J. Madison), supra note 46, at 303.
64. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 507. The incident in question led to the British
adoption of 7 Anne, ch. 12 (1708), repealed by Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964, ch. 81, §
8(4), sched. 2.
65. "Cincinnatus" was thought to be Richard Henry Lee or Arthur Lee. See 6 H.
STORING, supra note 35, at 6 n.2.

62.

66. Id. at 8.
67.

See supra note 58.
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preme Court Justice, gave a point-by-point rebuttal., Iredell argued at
several points that there was no need for a bill of rights. He also dealt
specifically with the fear that Congress would "constitut[e] . . . new
crimes, and inflict unusual and severe punishment,"6 " stating:
[Clertainly the cases enumerated wherein the Congress are empowered
either to define offences, or prescribe punishments, are such as are proper
for the exercise of such authority in the general Legislature of the Union.
They only relate to "counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the
United States," to "piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offences against the law of nations," and to "treason against the United
States." These are offences immediately affecting the security, the honor
or the interest of the United States at large, and of course must come
within the sphere of the Legislative authority which is intrusted with their
protection.7
Iredell said nothing about the intent of the framers regarding the scope
of the offenses clause. He side-stepped the scope of the clause and dealt
only with the need for uniformity.
It would be a mistake to infer too much about the framers' and ratifiers' conception of the offenses clause from these historic excerpts. The
framers understood that certain acts violated the law of nations; they
were aware that the states had failed to deal adequately with those acts
as crimes under their common law and that the law of nations was imprecise'-the new nation needed both a way to treat such offenses and
uniformity. The federalists' arguments-especially those of Madison and
Iredell-rested solely on the need for national, rather than state, laws
and on the law of nations' lack of clarity. Neither the debates at the
Convention nor the limited discussion during the ratification process
evince any intent to give Congress a general warrant to create offenses.
Moreover, neither Madison nor the antifederalist "Cincinnatus" missed
the point that international law could infringe United States citizens'
rights. It would thus extend the clause too far to permit Congress to use
it to define offenses without a clear international law basis.

68.

MARCUS, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEw CONSTrru-

TION (Newbern 1788), reprinted in
OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at 449.

PAMPHLETS,

supra note 58, at 333, and in 1 BILL

69. 1 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at 452.
70. Id.
71. Story later wrote in his COMMENTARIES: "Offences against the law of nations..
cannot with any accuracy be said to be completely ascertained, and defined in any
public code, recognized by the common consent of nations." 2 J. STORY, Supra note 45,
at § 1163.
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B. JudiciallyPermitted Scope of the Offenses Clause
The First Congress passed the Act of April 30, 1790,2 which defines
74
certain acts as piracies7" and others as crimes against ambassadors.
Since then only a few cases have considered issues under the offenses
clause, and only a few of those have expressly or implicitly considered
whether a suitably well-defined international law offense is needed to
support congressional action under the clause.
It would have been anomalous for the framers to have viewed "offenses against the law of nations" as a static grouping. They understood
the law of nations to be, at least in part, positive law derived from the
customs of nations. 5 As common law lawyers, the framers knew that the
law evolved as customs changed. They inserted the congressional power
to define offenses against the law of nations into a document that they
certainly understood would be not for the moment, but for the ages. It
was only thirty years after the Convention that John Marshall, who participated in the Virginia Convention, 8 wrote that "it is a constitution we
17
are expounding.
Courts have permitted Congress to adapt offenses to changing times.
Indeed, no court has ever invalidated a statute enacted pursuant to the
offenses clause on the ground that no offense against the law of nations
existed. The cases, albeit equivocally, seem to give Congress a somewhat
freer hand in defining crimes under the offenses clause than they generally give courts in integrating customary international law into United
States law, in the sense that in some cases less evidence of custom is
needed to establish an offense than is needed to establish custom generally. 8 In some cases, such as United States v. Arjona,71 the Court took

72. 1 Stat. 112.
73. Id. at 113-14. See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
74. 1 Stat. at 112, 117-18. Subsequently, certain of those crimes, largely based on 7
Anne, ch. 12 (1708), supra note 64, were codified at R.S. §§ 4063-66, and then at 22
U.S.C. § 252-54, which were repealed in 1978. Act of Sept. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95393, § 3(a)(1), 92 Stat. 808.
75.

1 J. WILSON, supra note 12, reprinted in 3 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra

note 12, at 70-71. Wilson was a delegate to the Federal Convention, one of the leading
federalists, a justice of the Supreme Court, and a law professor. See generally G. SEED,
JAMES WILSON (1978); C.SMITH, JAMES WILSON (1956).
76. L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 118-19 (1974).
77. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
78. Compare The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (non-offenses clause case;
substantial evidence of international practice) with United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479
(1887) (offenses clause case; only Vattel used as evidence).
79. 120 U.S. 479 (1887) (affirming conviction under act prohibiting the counterfeit-
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into account Congress' authority under the necessary and proper clause"0
as well as its authority under the offenses clause."1 In Frend v. United
States, 2 the court relied on Congress' exclusive power of legislation in
the District of Columbia, 8 in addition to the offenses clause."4 Whatever
the rationale, when Congress has passed laws recognizing new offenses
against the law of nations, the courts have consistently upheld Congress'
authority.8 5
An example of the Court's relaxed view of customary international
law occurs in United States v. Arjona,88 decided in 1886. The issue in
Arjona was whether Congress could punish the counterfeiting of foreign
bank notes under the offenses clause. Chief Justice Waite, writing for
the Court, cited only Vattel to establish (a) that if a nation allows and
protects counterfeiters, it injures the nation whose money is counterfeited, and (b) that nations have a duty to protect "exchange," the traffic
between bankers.87 Extrapolating from these rules, the Court found that
the United States could call upon other nations to protect United States
bank notes, that such an obligation was reciprocal, and that the United
States was bound to protect it.88 The Court did not inquire into the
practice of other nations.
Fifty-five years later, in a case that arose during World War II, the
Supreme Court wrote an opinion that throws light on congressional
power to define offenses. In Ex parte Quirin,8 9 the issue was whether a
spy could be tried by a military commission, rather than by standard
criminal procedures.90 Congress enacted the regulations at issue pursuant to its power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces." 91 Those regulations gave military tribunals

ing of foreign notes, bonds, and securities). See also United States v. White, 27 F. 200
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1886).
18.
80. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
81. Arjona, 120 U.S. at 483.
82. 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.17.
84. Frend, 100 F.2d at 692.
85. In one recent case the court even suggested that Congress define an offense, narcotic trafficking. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 n.16 (11th Cir.
1982). The court cited no evidence of practice.

86. 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
87. Id. at 484-85 (citing 1 E. DE VATTEL,
ed. 1876)).
88. Id. at 486-87.
89. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
90. Id. at 18-19.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, C1.14.

THE LAw OF NATiONS

46-47 (J. Chittey
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jurisdiction over "offenders or offenses that . . . by the law of war may
be triable by such military commissions."92 The Court noted that under
the offenses clause, Congress might properly incorporate the law of nations by reference, without explicit definition. 3 The Court stated that
Congress could use a similar technique for incorporating the law of war.
In defining the relevant law of war, the Court cited, among other things,
the Hague Convention No. IV,"4 British, German and Italian military
manuals,9 5 and pre-Constitutional United States practice. 6 The Court
also cited numerous authors, including Moore, Hyde, Oppenheim,
Bluntschli, Calvo and Halleck.9 7 Quirin seemed to imply that if the evidence of states' practice had been less conclusive, Congress might not
have been able to incorporate it as a "law of war." Such an implication
may, however, read too much into Quirin.
Writing the majority opinion in In re Yamashita,9" Chief Justice
Stone gave a more expansive interpretation to international precedent.
Yamashita had been commander of Japanese troops in the Philippines.
After his army's defeat, he was tried as a war criminal before a military
commission for failing to take steps to prevent troops under his command
from committing atrocities. The commission, established under the offenses clause,9 9 was a proper forum only if Yamashita was charged with
violating the laws of war, part of the law of nations.10 0 Seeking habeas
corpus relief, Yamashita argued that the United States had not charged
him with violating the laws of war. The issue in Yamashita was whether
a military commander violates the laws of war by refusing "to take such
appropriate measures ... to control the troops under his command for
the prevention of" acts which themselves violate the laws of war.' The
Court held that provisions in three international conventions to which
Japan was a party imposed a duty on Yamashita to take affirmative
92. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30 (quoting Articles of War, ch. 418, art. 15, 39 Stat. 619,
653 (1916), repealed by Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, art. 21, 64 Stat. 108,
115 (1950) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1982)).
93. Id. at 29-30 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820)).
94. Id. at 30 n.7 (citing Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (Hague Convention No. IV), Oct. 18, 1907, ann. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295, T.S. No.
539, at 643, 205 Parry's T.S. 277, 289).
95. Id. at 30-31 nn.7-8.
96. Id. at 31 n.9.
97. Id. at 30-31 nn.7-8; see also id. at 35 n.12 (referring to the "unanimous" view of
all authorities).
98. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 7, 13.
101. Id. at 14-15.
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steps to protect civilians and prisoners of war within his jurisdiction. 0 2
Those provisions, however, dealt only tangentially with the issue; no
provision dealt specifically with a commander's obligation to control his
troops. The Court also cited two arbitrations, again tangential, and the
orders of the United States Army. 3 Justice Murphy wrote in dissent:
[T]here was no serious attempt to charge or to prove that [Yamashita]
committed a recognized violation of the laws of war. .

.

. The recorded

annals of warfare and the established principles of international law afford not the slightest precedent for such a charge.'"
Yamashita may be explained mainly by the fact that victors were
judging a vanquished foe whose troops had committed clear atrocities.
The Court played somewhat fast and loose with precedent, although it
purportedly made an attempt to ground its international law holding in
actual state practice.1 0 In doing so, however, it relied principally on a
treaty-not what the framers had in mind as the "law of nations"-and
foreshadowed courts' now frequent reliance on multilateral conventions
both as sources of the law of nations and as evidence of customary international law.' 0 6
As Part III of this Article demonstrates, United States courts in the
nineteenth century were relatively careful when they determined customary international law, apart from the offenses clause. An early example
illustrates the different approaches to Congress' attempt to create international law and domestic law.
In 1825, in The Antelope, 07 Chief Justice Marshall held that al102. Id. at 15-16.

103. Id. at 16 & n.3.
104. Id. at 28 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Rutledge also dissented.
105. But see United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 494 (S.D. Cal. 1960),

affid sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that false
statements abroad to obtain entry document into United States constitutes an offense
against the law of nations; no discussion of practice or opiniojuris);CISPES v. FBI, 770
F.2d 468, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding statute under international law; no evidence

of practice or opiniojuris); Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981).

106. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900-01 (D.D.C. 1988)
(establishing offenses of air piracy and hostage taking pursuant to Convention on Of-

fenses and Certain Other Acts Committed onboard Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T.
2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-

ful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S.
105; and Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil

Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177). See also
infra note 163 (cases using treaties as evidence of custom).
107. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
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though the United States had enacted a statute defining the slave trade as
piracy, the slave trade was not therefore a violation of the law of nations.
Consequently, the capture of a vessel on the high seas was illegal under
that statute. In this case, a privateer, the Arraganta, captured two vessels, one Spanish-the Antelope-and one Portugese, off the coast of Africa."' 8 It took slaves from both vessels and put them aboard the Antelope, with a prize-master and prize-crew. As the Antelope and the
Arragantaproceeded toward Brazil, the Arragantawas lost at sea. After further adventures at sea, including a name change, the Antelope
proceeded to Florida, where Captain Johnson of the United States revenue cutter Dallas, thinking her a pirate, captured her on the high seas...
and "brought her in for adjudication."11 The Vice Consuls of Spain and
Portugal libelled the Antelope, claiming different proportions of the
slaves aboard.1 '
As is relevant here, the principal question for the Court was whether
the slave trade violated the law of nations." 2 If the law of nations did
not render the trade illegal, the visitation and search of the Antelope, a
foreign ship, on the high seas and in peacetime was illegal and the slaves
had to be restored to their owners."' The United States argued that two
statutes legitimized the capture."1 4 One, an 1820 enactment, made the
slave trade piracy when carried on by a United States citizen;" 5 the
other, an 1807 statute, forfeited any ship or vessel "hovering on the coast
of the United States," with "negro[es], mulatto[es] or person[s] of colour"
aboard, intending to sell them as slaves or to land them in the United
States.' Counsel for the Vice Consuls argued that "[tihough the law of
the United States has made this traffic piracy, it has not, therefore, made
it an offense against the law of nations.""'
After surveying the law,"' which showed that many states still did not
forbid slavery, Marshall concluded that international law did not render
the slave trade illegal, that is, the law of the United States did not make
slave trade an offense against the law of nations. He wrote:

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 123.
Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 106-07 (argument of the Attorney General).
Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, § 5, 3 Stat. 600, 601.
Act of March 2, 1807, § 7, 2 Stat. 426, 428.
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 99 (argument of Mr. Berrien).
See infra text accompanying note 149.
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No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the
perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another .... As no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can make a
law of nations, and this traffic remains lawful to those whose governments
have not forbidden it.
If it is consistent with the law of nations, it cannot in itself be piracy. It
can be made so only by statute, and the obligation of the statute cannot
transcend the legislative power of the state which may enact it.11 9
Since the legislative power of the United States did not reach out to the
high seas, the capture was improper. Marshall did not have to consider
whether Congress had properly created a domestic offense. Still, the
principal conclusion that follows from Marshall's opinion is that Congress cannot, by legislative fiat, transmute an act that is not against the
law of nations into one that is.
Apart from its particular and outmoded holding,120 the Court in The
Antelope employed a passive view of the United States' adoption of international law; that is, a nation only recognizes when custom has coalesced into law. In Marshall's view, even if the United States had en-

acted a statute making slave trading a domestic crime, it would have
been derived, at best, from an emerging norm of international law, so
such a statute would not create international law. That formulation
would preclude the United States from participating in the development
of international law by enacting criminal measures under the offenses
clause, in which international law had not fully matured. Arjona and
Yamashita implicitly give Congress a somewhat wider scope in developing customary law, since they found violations of the law of nations
without any specific precedent.12 Thus, Congress might more actively

119. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 122. See also 1 J. KENT, supra note 13,
at 200.
120. Justice Story, sitting as a circuit judge, had earlier reached the opposite result
in United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cases 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No.
15,551). Justice Story believed his earlier decision was proper. Letter from Joseph Story
to Hon. Ezekiel Bacon (Nov. 19, 1848), quoted in B. ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL

309 n.44 (1939). Today, slavery and slave trading are recog-

nized as violative of a peremptory norm of international law. See infra note 471. See also
1 J. KENT, supra note 13, at 181 (three offenses against law of nations: violation of
passports, violation of ambassadors, piracy; slave trade not "absolutely unlawful by the
law of nations, but . . . a trade condemned by the general principles of justice and
humanity").
121. The Nuremberg Tribunals used much the same technique. D'Amato, Gould,
and Woods demonstrate that virtually all of those Nazis convicted under the "innovative
crimes" of waging or conspiracy to wage wars of aggression were also convicted of
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participate in the development of customary law. But even the
Yamashita Court does not, at least explicitly, give Congress broad
enough discretion to characterize an emerging norm as an existing norm.
That is, the Supreme Court has not said that Congress has authority to
create the law of nations; Congress only has authority to define the law
of nations. 22
The limitation on Congress' international law-making power embodied in The Antelope holding may not be so anomalous. The offenses
clause is hardly the most important way the United States Government
contributes to the development of international law. Executive branch
acts and, presently, treaties are probably the principal contributors.
Moreover, a nation helps develop international law by its own practice.
By outlawing slavery under different heads of legislative authority, the
United States joined other nations in establishing the antislavery norm.
Similarly, Arjona's result could have been achieved under the commerce
clause. 123 Finally, an interpretation of the offenses clause that requires
some congruence with international practice appears consistent with the
intent of the framers, who took the power to define offenses against the
law of nations away from the states in order to prevent "indiscretions."
Granting free rein to Congress to do the same thing was probably not
their idea.
At any rate, The Antelope reminds us that while progressiveness and
flexibility are built into the offenses clause, there are limits beyond
which Congress may not go. Those limits consist of two types. There
must be an international law offense, with some reasonable degree of
substance, and the definition of that offense must not transgress other
constitutional restraints.
III.

THE PUTATIVE OBLIGATION UNDER CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW TO RESTRICT PEACEFUL PICKETING

The Constitution contains no formula for defining offenses against the
law of nations. That presumably posed no problem to the framers. They
understood both the limited scope of that body of law and the type of
evidence used to ascertain it. In particular, the framers relied on actual
state practice to demonstrate custom. Things have changed, however, in
the intervening two centuries. Scholars have argued that a wider variety
"traditional" war crimes. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The
"Nuremberg Defense" and the Military Service Resister, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1055, 106163 (1969).

122.

See supra note 57.

123.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 323 n.26.
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of evidence of practice, such as unilateral declarations, is acceptable as
evidence of custom. In addition, especially since World War II, the dominant mode of international law formation has been the multilateral
treaty, rather than custom. Although treaties are only binding on parties,
they can have a broader effect. As will be described below, such treaties
can affect custom in two ways. They may codify and be evidence of existing custom, and they may create new rules that crystallize into customary norms. In either case the norms they evidence may be or may
become binding on non-parties.
To determine whether there is a customary norm that forbids peaceful
picketing that brings "public odium" or "disrepute" on a state, this section examines traditional sources of custom relied on by United States
courts. It then considers the one relevant treaty, the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention),124 to determine if that
instrument indicates that peaceful picketing can constitute an offense.
This section concludes that the traditional sources reveal very little actual practice to support such a notion. In addition, an analysis of the
drafting and interpretation of the Vienna Convention does not suggest
that its drafters believed it embodies a customary norm forbidding peaceful picketing.
A. Customary InternationalLaw Apart From the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations
1 25
Custom has two components. First, there must be state practice,

124. See supra note 29.
125. The leading guide to sources of international law, article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, reads as follows:
Article 38(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
Stat. I.C.J., art. 38, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 (I.
Brownlie 3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]. Article 59 states that decisions
of the International Court of Justice are binding only between the parties and in respect
of a particular case. Id. art. 59, reprinted in BASIC DocuMENTs, supra, at 401.
Akehurst points out that paragraph (b) is backward. M. AxEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 32 (5th ed. 1984). Although the term "source of
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which, while not necessarily universal, must be nearly uniform.1 26 The
core factual question is when does nonbinding practice ripen into binding custom. 1 27 The subsidiary questions include the following: What
constitutes "practice"; how much practice is necessary;12 what must the
duration of the practice be or need there be any duration at all; how
consistent must it be? Second, in addition to those quantitative factors,
there is a qualitative, psychological factor: Western writers generally1 29
assert that states must believe themselves legally bound to adhere to the
practice, opiniojuris sive necessitatis (opiniojuris),3 ° As Brierly stated,

international law" is confusing, see H. KELsEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
437-38 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1966), it should not be confused with evidence.
126. Most writers believe that the practice need not be "universal," but beyond that
the rule is unclear. See Sohn, "Generally Accepted" InternationalRules, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 1073, 1074 (1986); Akehurst, supra note 1, at 20 ("practice must be virtually
uniform, not absolutely uniform") (citation omitted).
127. See generally M. AKEHURST, supra note 125, at 25-29; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-10 (3d ed. 1979); A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM, supra note 2, at 47-72; W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-23 (1964); G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
123 (W. Butler trans. 1974); Kunz, The Nature of Customary InternationalLaw, 47
AM. J. INT'L L. 662 (1953); Sohn, supra note 126, at 1074. One could distinguish
between "usage," which is not binding, and "custom," which is. I. BROWNLIE, supra, at
5. Soviet jurists abjure the term "usage"; they distinguish between "custom" (nonbinding) and "customary norm of international law" (binding). Tunkin, Remarks on the
JuridicalNature of Customary Norms of InternationalLaw, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 419,
422 (1961).
128. See Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DE COURS pt. 1, at 25, 67, 73
(1970).
129. But see H. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 444-45; Guggenheim, Les Deux Elements de la Coutume en Droit International,in I ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE G.
SCELLE 275-80 (1950). Cf H. KELSEN, supra note 125, at 440 (states must believe acts
are "obligatory or right," although not necessarily in response to "legal norm").
130. Akehurst, supra note 1, at 31. The American Law Institute has taken that
position: "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1986) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].

See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nica-

ragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97-98; North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v.
Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 44; Asylum (Colo. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266,
276-77; S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). In
contrast, Tunkin argues that opiniojuris means acceptance or recognition by states as a
juridically binding norm of law. Tunkin, supra note 127, at 422-23. D'Amato rejects the
standard theories of opiniojuris,substituting the "requirement that an objective claim of
international legality be articulated in advance of, or concurrently with, the act which
will constitute the quantitative elements [sic] of custom." A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM, supra note 2, at 74. D'Amato intends to reduce the arbitrariness-and perhaps
the impossibility-of determining a psychological factor from collective acts. Yet many
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"[W]hat is sought for is a general recognition among states of a certain
'1 31
practice as obligatory."
In the present case, one must demand high levels of proof of both state
practice and opiniojuris. Here, and perhaps more generally, the quantitative factors are interrelated. Where the phenomenon is unique and
nonrepetitive, a limited amount of practice may indicate a trend toward
development of a legal norm, and may, if many states express adherence
to the 'norm, have a jural quality. If the phenomenon at issue is one that
recurs frequently, however, such as picketing, one would expect to see a
large number of cases, decided over a substantial period of time, reaching
the same conclusion, if there were really a norm. Thus, one should not
be satisfied with isolated judicial decisions or declarations; one should
also require a substantial amount of consistent evidence. As will be seen,
that is precisely what United States courts did historically.
Likewise, there must be evidence of opinio juris. There is a substantial body of practice regarding diplomatic relations. Much of that practice, however, is a matter of comity, not obligation.'3 2 Given the need for
diplomatic relations, states often extend courtesies to other states' envoys.
Absent opiniojuris, however, these courtesies are not legally required. 33
Most writers agree that contemporary international practice permits
consideration of a wide variety of evidence of custom to help demonstrate
the existence of a practice.' 4 This evidence ranges from diplomatic cor-

acts are responsive to perceived legal obligations, even when the actor does not articulate
the obligation. On the other hand, if the actor need not pronounce the obligatory nature
of the act, it is hard to see how D'Amato's formulation helps.
131. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 61 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963). See W.
FRIEDMANN, supra note 127, at 121; 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGFR, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 17 (2d ed. 1949). On the
difficulty of determining when usage matures into customary international law such that
states believe the usage is obligatory, see generally A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM,
supra note 2.
132. See infra notes 141-78. See also Tunkin, supra note 127, at 421 (article predating the Vienna Convention).
133. One writer has argued that a norm may exist although there is "no usage at all
in the sense of repeated practice" as long as one can "clearly establish[]" the opiniojuris.
Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" InternationalCustomary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 36 (1965). Lambert has taken a marginally less
extreme position in arguing that a single act suffices. LAMBERT, ETUDES DE DROIT
COMMUN LEGISLATIF OU DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARE

140-42 (1903). Here, much of the

practice indicates no opinio juris.
134. See, e.g., I. BROWNUE, supra note 127, at 5. Brownlie states:
The material sources of custom are very numerous and include the following:
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of official
legal advisors, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military law,
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respondence to national and international judicial decisions to treaties
and declarations. Professor Anthony D'Amato takes a somewhat more
restricted view of the evidence of practice, including actual acts and commitments to act (for example, treaties), but excluding claims and unilateral declarations that are not disguised treaties.13 As will be demon3 6 is
strated, the "norm" asserted by the government in Boos v. Barry"
not supported by the broad definition; a fortiori it does not fulfill Profes1
sor D'Amato's criterion.

37

Courts may consider the works of commentators as a source of international law, although such works play only a subsidiary role.1"8 On the

executive decisions and practices, orders to naval forces etc., comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation,
international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations
General Assembly.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Brownlie uses "material source" as synonymous with "evidence."
For examples of various types of evidence, see The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 18687 (1871) (considering domestic legislation of other nations to determine rule of maritime
law); North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4,
32-33, 47, 53 (Truman Proclamation treated as evidence of custom in international case);
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 2, 22 (national laws relied upon for principle
that naturalization exists only when there is a genuine link to that nation); Rights of
United States Nationals in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 175, 200, 209 (diplomatic
correspondence and conference records); Genocide Case, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 25, 34-36 (advisory opinion; practice of United Nations Secretary-General). The evidence may show the
duiation, uniformity, consistency and generality of the practice, as well as opiniojuris.I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 6-7. The International Court of Justice considered,
among other things, support for a conference resolution, ratification of a convention, and
acceptance of the principles of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe as evidence of opinio juris.Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100.
135. A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 2, at 88-91.
136. 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988), affg in part, rev'g in part, Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d
1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
137. It is often difficult to locate examples of practice, especially when they reside in
the archives of foreign offices. Akehurst, supra note 1, at 13; A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM, supra note 2, at 16; see also Stein, supra note 15, at 459 & n.6. But the point
is not purely methodological: if states are not aware or cannot readily become aware of a
practice or of its obligatory character, the "rule" does not meet one of the basic criteria of

legality. L.

FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW

39, 49-51 (rev. ed. 1969).

Much of the practice supporting the existence of the suggested norm dates from the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Even uniform practice that is generally
150 years old, however, could hardly constitute a present day rule if current practice is
nonexistent or contrary.
138. See Stat. I.C.J., supra note 125, art. 38(1)(d), reprintedin BASIC DocuMENTs,

1988J

DEFERENCE AND ITS DANGERS

other hand, in the absence of state practice that meets reasonable tests of
duration, uniformity and generality, it is difficult to see that even "uniform commentary" could create law or be conclusive evidence of customary international law.1" 9
1. Custom in United States Courts
To the framers, who were immersed in the writings of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries' international legal scholars, the idea of custom
was a standard part of their intellectual equipment. 4 International law
was part of domestic law; the structure of custom was the same in both
systems: Usage that "has obtained in any civil society from time immemorial .. . is presumed to have been obtained with consent."' 4 1 The

"customary law of nations,"142 or customary international law, was
a
body of law separate from treaties. The distinction was well known to
the framers' 43 and the Constitution reflects it. For example, the Constisupra note 125, at 397. M. AKEHuRST, supra note 125, at 37. Brownlie observes, "National courts are unfamiliar with state practice and are ready to lean on secondary
sources." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 26.
139. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 ("The Party which relies
on a custom.., must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has
become binding on the other Party ...that the rule invoked ... is in accordance with a
constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the
expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on
the territorial State.")."
140. See Grey, supra note 12, at 852-54.
141. T. RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 396 (2d American ed.
1832). The law of nations, as understood by the framers, encompassed a relatively small
number of subjects, including the international law of the rights and duties of ambassadors. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States
(pt. I), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 30 (1952); see also Trimble, supra note 4, at 690-91,
723-24. The international law of ambassadors was, at least until recently, based upon
international practice. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 345; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 43, at 247 ("[T]he general practice of Europe seems now to have adopted the sentiments of the learned Grotius, that the security of embassadors is of more importance
than the punishment of a particular crime.") (citation omitted). With the entry into force
of the Vienna Convention, much of the prior custom is embodied in a treaty. Higgins,
The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 642 (1985). But see [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 100,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add. 1 (although exemption from customs duties for
personal items is not a customary legal norm, it is of such general practice that the
International Law Commission proposed its inclusion in the Vienna Convention).
142. The phrase is Alexander Hamilton's. Letters of Camillus, No. 20 reprinted in
7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (H. Lodge ed. 1904).
143. In 1793, Chief Justice John Jay, one of the framers, charged the jury in the
trial of Gideon Henfield: "[T]he laws of the United States admit of being classed under
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tution refers specifically both to treaties' 4 and the law of nations. 4 '
Curiously, neither the Supreme Court nor the court of appeals in Boos
acknowledged the complexity of the inquiry into custom or made any
systematic effort to determine either state practice or opinio juris.
Rather, their "custom" comprised an incoherent mixture of United
States constitutional history, United States practice, the writing of Vattel
and, in an undefined way, the Vienna Convention.' 4 6
Earlier American judges were both more cognizant of and more attentive to the quantative issues involved in determining custom."" In 1815,
for example, in The Nereide"'8 the Supreme Court considered whether a
neutral could ship goods in a belligerent vessel without the good's being
subject to capture and confiscation as a prize. On the issue of whether a
treaty that said "neutral bottoms make neutral goods" implied "hostile
bottoms make hostile goods," Chief Justice Marshall for the Court appeared to rely on the actions of other nations, and particularly a declaration by the King of Prussia.149 More important, Justice Story, in dissent,

three heads of descriptions. 1st. All treaties made under the authority of the United
States. 2d. The laws of nations. 3dly. The constitution, and statutes of the United
States." Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100-01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360).
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; art. VI.
145. Id. art. I., § 8, cl. 10. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J. Jay), supra note 46,
at 98.
146. Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164-68 (1988) affg in part, rev'g in part,
Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1455-58 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In its defense, the Supreme
Court did not purport to consider the issue in depth.
147. United States cases have not carefully examined opiniojuris.A LEXIS search
of all federal cases in that service reveals the term "opinio juris" only once. See Lareau
v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1193 n.18 (D. Conn. 1980). The notion has been expressed, however, in other decisions. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)
(custom becomes law with the "general assent of civilized nations"); United States v.
Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484, 487 (1887) (law of nations requires states to use due diligence to prevent wrongs to states with whom they are at peace; United States "bound" to
protect a right secured by the law of nations to another nation); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900)); Stat. I.C.J., supra note 125, art. 38, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note 125, at 397 ("general practice accepted as law"). For an early scholarly view of the
evidence of custom, see I J. KENT, supra note 13, at 18-19.
148. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
149. Id. at 420. Earlier, Jay had said:
I do hereby make known, that whosoever of the citizens of the United States, shall
render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture, under the law of nations, by
committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers, or by
carrying to them those articles which are deemed contraband, by the modem usage
of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States against such punishment or forfeiture....
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discussed whether the fact that the Nereide had resisted capture-unsuccessfully-overcame the rule "asserted in the most broad and
unqualified manner in publicists,"1 ' that neutral goods could lawfully
be shipped aboard enemy vessels without being prize. Justice Story,
more of a scholar than Chief Justice Marshall,1 51 found it "utterly inadmissible" to argue that the absence of treaties dealing with the issue indicated that it was not the law that resistance transformed a neutral into
a belligerent.1 52 He cited English prize decisions and the statement of a
1 53
Danish minister.
In 1820, in United States v. Smith,'" Justice Story demonstrated even
more graphically how an erudite judge determines custom. Pursuant to
the offenses clause, Congress had made a "crime of piracy, as defined by
the law of nations." Justice Story found that piracy was sufficiently defined by the law of nations so that Congress could incorporate that body
of law by reference.1 55 He cited jurists, "general usage and practice,"
and judicial decisions. 56 Justice Story's opinion contains a nineteen-page
footnote-enough to warm the heart of any law review editor-setting
out commentaries by United States, British, French, Spanish, Swiss and
German writers, French and British statutes, and British trials.1 57
In a subsequent case, The Antelope, 58 Chief Justice Marshall had to
consider the legality under international law of the slave trade. In the
course of his review of international law, he considered English opinions,
the acts of France, and the practice of nations in Africa. 159
Seventy-five years later, in The Paquete Habana, 60 the Supreme

Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1102 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360).
150. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 437 (Story, J., dissenting).
151. See B. ZIEGLER, supra note 120, at 13-15.
152. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 437-41 (Story, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 442-43 (Story, J., dissenting).
154. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
155. Id. at 160-62.
156. Id. at 160-61.
157. Id. at 163-81 n.(a).
158. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). The opinion leaves little doubt of Marshall's
moral abhorrence of the practice. See, e.g., id. at 114-16, 121.
159. Id. at 116-21. Marshall wrote:
Whatever might be the answer of a moralist to this question, a jurist must search
for its legal solution, in those principles of action which are sanctioned by the
usages, the national acts, and the general assent, of that portion of the world of
which he considers himself as a part, and to whose appeal the law is made.
Id. at 121.
160. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See also The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 278-80
(1814) (considering English decisions in deciding question of international law).
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Court dealt with the question whether certain Cuban fishing smacks
were subject to capture by United States armed vessels during the Spanish American War. The Court began by referring to "an ancient usage
among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening
into a rule of international law." ' ' The Court considered an extensive
variety of sources, including orders issued in 1403 and 1406 by Henry
IV of England, a treaty of October 2, 1521, between the Emperor
Charles V and Francis I of France, French and Dutch edicts of 1536, a
letter of June 5, 1779, from Louis XVI to his admiral, standing orders
of a judge of the English high court of admiralty, decisions of a French
prize tribunal, and records of the United States Navy Department.6 2
Thus, for the first 100 years after the Constitution, in deciding the
existence of customary international law, justices of the Supreme Court
looked to the actual practice of states. That method, in theory at least,
retains its vitality in non-offenses clause cases.' The Court relied upon

161.

The PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 686.

162. Id. at 687-97. See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 207-27 (1895) (in deciding an issue of the international law of effect of judgments, Court considered judicial
decisions from England, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Germany, various Swiss
cantons, Russia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Italy, Monaco, Spain, Portugal,
Greece, Egypt, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Chile and Brazil).
163. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-22 n.21 (1962) (judicial decisions of United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy,
Switzerland and Japan relating to act of state doctrine); id. at 429-30 (discussing international judicial and arbitral decisions and commentators from various countries regarding the international law of compensation after expropriation). See also New Jersey v.
Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 381-84 (1934).
In this century, the use of international instruments, such as treaties and declarations
of international organizations, especially the United Nations, both to codify existing custom and to generate new custom is far more widespread than it was previously. See, e.g.,
W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 127, at 123-24; R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4-7

(1963); G.

TUNKIN,

supra note 127, at 133-37; Akehurst, supra note 1, at 5-7;

D'Amato, Treaties as a Source of General Rules of InternationalLaw, 3 HARv.INT'L
L.J. 1 (1981); Stein, supra note 15, at 464-66. But see Baxter, supra note 128, at 99
("Rules found in treaties can never be conclusive evidence of customary international
law."). See generally M. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES
xxv, 3-61, 183-205 (1985). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 530 (Jennings, J., dissenting); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33 (advisory opinion) (General Assembly Resolution 1514
(XV) (1960) conforms application of right of self-determination).
These developments have been reflected in many cases. For example, in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-84 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit based its decision
that official torture violates the law of nations on, among other things, the United Nations Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (IIIA)
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the writings of publicists as secondary evidence."' United States judges
also understood that state practice had to have an obligatory quality to

(1948); the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N Doe. k/1034 (1975);
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); the American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. 4/
16; and the cases decided under the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. On the other
hand, in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring), Judge Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit held that
terrorism does not violate the law of nations, relying on several General Assembly resolutions. Both Filartigaand Tel-Oren involve claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
Cases involving Cuban and Haitan refugees have also raised issues of when treaties
and international declarations create customary norms. See, e.g., Fernandez-Rogue v.
Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 901-04 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affd sub. nom. Garcia-Mir v.
Meese, 88 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (even if customary international law violated by
prolonged arbitrary detention, "controlling" act of executive branch overcomes force of
international legal norm); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396,
1406 (D.D.C. 1985) (Universal Declaration of Human Rights merely a nonbinding resolution); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796-98 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on
other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (prolonged arbitrary detention violates
customary international law as expressed in Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra; and International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra).
See also In re Alien Children Education Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 594, 595-96 (S.D.
Tex. 1980) (various international instruments did not establish existence of customary
international law right to education).
United States courts have also dealt with custom as codified in treaties. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pena-Jessie, 763 F.2d 618, 620-21 (4th Cir. 1985) (Convention on the
High Seas, Apr. 12, 1961, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, codifies
custom); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(same).
In the criminal area, courts have had to consider assertions that customary norms give
extra protection to defendants. See, e.g., People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 779, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 82, 108-09 (1987) (Lucas, C.J.); id. at 780-81, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10 (Mosk,
J., concurring).

164. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. In The Paquete Habana,the
Court stated:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor,
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat.
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be law. 165 In contrast, the court of appeals in Boos made no attempt to
canvas international practice. The court did not even mention the concept of opinio juris. The latter is particularly disturbing because much
of the practice relating to diplomats has long been considered a matter of
international comity, rather than of international obligation.1 66
2.

Evidence of International Custom: Punishment
for Insults to an Ambassador's Dignity

The protection foreign diplomats receive or should receive is encompassed in the term "inviolability. 1 67 The notion of diplomatic inviolability goes back, at least, to the time of King David of Israel."' There have
been several competing theories of a state's duty to protect foreign ambassadors. One such theory was based upon the notion that the ambassador was the representative of the sovereign. 9 Another was based upon
165.
166.
167.
(1931);

See supra note 90.
See supra note 137; infra note 178.
1 R. GENET, TRArrE DE DIPLOMATIE ET DE DROIT DIPLOMATIQUE, § I
Harvard Research, supra note 31, at 90-91 (1932); 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 385 (8th ed. 1955); F. PRZETACZNIK, PROTECTION
OF OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN STATES ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1983);

B.

DE VATTEL, supra note 30, at 464 ("Embassies then, being of such great importance in
the universal society of nations, and so necessary to their common well-being, the persons
of ministers charged with those embassies are to be held sacred and inviolable among all
nations . . . ")(emphasis in original). Lauterpacht, on the other hand, indicates that
inviolability itself is an attribute of the inherent "dignity of states." 1 H. LAUTERPACHT,

supra, § 120.
168. 2 C. HYDE,

INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED

§ 433 (2d ed. 1945). The Greek city-states recognized the idea,
supra note 167, at 494-95; R. NUMELIN, THE BEGINNING OF DIPLOMACY

BY THE UNITED STATES

1 R.

GENET,

299 (1950), as did the Romans. P. CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATION OF
STATES 191 & n.7 (1951). Nor is the notion limited to Western law. See E. DENZA,
DIPLOMATIC LAW 135 & n.3 (1976) (Indian Law); Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats
Under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 609 (1980); see also Deik, Classifications,
Immunities and Privilegesof DiplomaticAgents, 1 S. CAL. L. REV.209, 210-15 (1928).
Indeed, Grotius, noting the sacred character of the rights of ambassadors and the fact
that they were under the protection of the gods, stated that a violation of those rights was
"not only unjust, but impious." 2 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PActS ch. 18, § 1

(W. Whewell trans. 1st ed. 1853).
169. See Report of the Tenth Session of the InternationalLaw Commission, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), at 11, U.N. Doc. A/
3859 (1959), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 266 (1959); C. HURST, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF SIR CECIL HURST 176-77 (1950); C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 1-5 (1967); E. DE VATTEL, supra
note 30, at 464. Curiously for this theory, recognition of the rights of ambassadors preceded recognition of the rights of sovereigns. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, supra note 131, at
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the "extraterritoriality" of the embassy."" At present, however, states
have accepted a functional, rather than a verbal, rationale for inviolability:171 inviolability is necessary to promote the ambassadorial function.
As one commentator has noted with regard to ambassadors,
[I]t is obvious that, were they liable to ordinary legal and political interference like other individuals, and thus more or less dependent on the good
will of the Government, they might be influenced by personal considerations of safety and comfort to a degree which
would materially hamper
1 2
them in the exercise of their functions.

7

The point is that, whether or not one uses the term inviolability, it has
often been stated that nations must provide some level of protection for
diplomatic agents that is greater than that which they provide either
their own citizens or other foreigners, in order that the diplomat can
1 3
properly perform his or her mission. "
Diplomatic protection covers a wide range of possible immunities. It
includes freedom from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving
state" 4 and generally freedom from customs duties and taxes.1 5 Some
authors have gone farther and written that inviolability is "the protection
against any aggression, illegal attack, injury or either physical or moral
offense."11 76 One way to give effect to the international obligation to protect the inviolability of diplomats is to provide increased penalties for
offenses against them, including offenses against their dignity or reputa-

254; P. CORBETT, supra note 168, at 189.
170. C. WILSON, supra note 169, at 5-16; see 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at
246-48.
171. C. WILSON, supra note 169, at 17-25; Note, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal
for Amending the Vienna Convention to Deter Violent CriminalActs, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J.
177, 200-02 (1987) (Vienna Convention adopts functional view). By 1932, the Harvard
Researchers had rejected both extraterritoriality and "inviolability" as useful terms and
had adopted the functional approach. Harvard Research, supra note 31, at 51-57.
172. 1 H. LAuTERPACHT, supra note 167, at 788.
173. C. HURST, supra note 169, at 176; Przetacznik, The Protection of Foreign Officials Under International Law, 9 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 177, 185 (1980). But see F.
PRZETACZNIK, supra note 167, at 6 (discussing writers who view inviolability as only
immunity from "measures of constraint").
174. See, e.g., 2 C. HYDE, supra note 168, at § 435; 1 P. CORBETT, CASES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 340 (1947); P. CORBETT, supra note 168, at 190-99. For other
examples of immunity, see 2 C. HYDE, supra note 168, at §§ 436-37, 440-42.
175. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, supra note 131, at 258-59.
176. F. PRZETACZNIK, supra note 167, at 7 (citing 1 C. BEVILAGUA, DIREITO PUBLICO INTERNACIONAL 425 (1911); C. CISNEROS, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO

86 (1966); M. Giuliano, Les Relations et Immunits Diplomatiques, 100 HAGUE
RECUEIL 125 (1960-I)).
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tions. Alternatively, a state might establish separate offenses for violations of diplomatic inviolability. 7 The protection can be custom or it
can rise to the level of a legal norm. The issue here is whether the protection against "moral offenses," if given at all, exists simply as nonbinding custom 178 or as a binding international legal norm.
Initially, it is necessary to define the inquiry. If one looks for evidence
of an obligatory international practice that states punish or, at least, discourage peaceful picketers who are within certain number of feet of an
embassy and who are carrying signs likely to bring odium or disrepute
upon a foreign state, the search will prove relatively fruitless. There are
no examples of international practice or even of domestic legislation,
other than section 22-1115, that purport to authorize such a result. Accordingly, one must broaden the inquiry to cases in which a foreign state
or an ambassador, as the representative of a foreign state, has been insulted but not physically harmed, and the sending state demands redress
or the receiving state punishes the act.1 ' Except for a few cases distinguished almost as much by their antiquity as by their ambiguity, it is
virtually impossible to find any cases or other examples of state practice
involving insults only. 8 On the other hand, commentators going back to
Grotius have regularly asserted that international law prohibits insults to
ambassadors.1"'
a.

Judicial Decisions

The conceit that insulting a diplomat is sufficiently serious to provoke
a war goes back to biblical times. The Old Testament reports that King
David of Israel waged and won a war against King Hanum of the Ammonites after the latter treated an Israelite ambassador with contempt."8 '
Nonetheless, it is difficult to find examples of judicial decisions or claims
in the United States or in other jurisdictions recognizing mere insults as
violations of the law of nations.1 8 '
177.

also F.

See, e.g., 2 D.
PRZETAcZNIK,

O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 899-90 (2d ed. 1970);

see

supra note 167, at 7.

178. For example, O'Connell pointed out in the first edition of his treatise that the
"universal practice" of exemption of diplomats from local taxation is "more a matter of
comity than of law." 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 977 (1st ed. 1965).
179. Cases of actual violence differ, of course, from insults. Violence, or even a realistic threat of violence, unquestionably interferes with the diplomatic function. Moreover,
free speech concerns are absent when the protestors' aim is physical harm.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 185-205.
181. See supra note 168; see infra text accompanying notes 261-63.
182. 1 Chronicles 19; 2 Samuel 10:18-19.
183. But see F. PRZETACZNIK, supra note 167, at 221, text accompanying nn.58-59.
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Cases from foreign jurisdictions are too rare and too ambiguous to
establish a practice of protecting diplomats from insults. Genet reports a
1728 case in which an individual was condemned to death in Sweden for
publically insulting Louis XV's ambassador."" In State v. Acuna
Araya,185 a well-known Costa Rican case, the Peruvian charg d'affairs
had instigated a quarrel by calling the defendant a drunkard and making
a gesture with his umbrella as though to strike the defendant."8 6 Although the report is slightly unclear, it appears the defendant returned
the insult and physically assaulted the charg. In the course of holding
that the chargk's conduct excused the defendant, 8 7 the court assumed
that "offenses by word" would constitute a violation."8 8 This is, however,
merely dicta since the real issue in the case was whether the assault/
insult was excused.
Five British cases deal with criminal libels on foreign monarchs or
ambassadors, but none evidences that there is an international obligation
8 9 Sir James Stephen, in his
to impose criminal liability or opinio juris.'
History of the Criminal Law of England, classifies them with seditious
libel. 9 In the 1764 case of R. v. D'Eon,'9' the defendant Chevalier
D'Eon charged the French ambassador, Count Guereley, with forging
D'Eon's letters of recall. He was convicted and Lord Mansfield observed
to the other ambassadors present at the sentencing that "the law of England ... would equally protect [foreign ambassadors] from all insults, as
well on their reputation as their persons or property, as the laws of any
Neither incident discussed by Przetacznik indicates that the expressions of regret sent by
the country whose citizens offended the foreign dignitary-in neither case an ambassador, but in each case the head of state-reflected a legal responsibility.
184. 1 R. GENET, supra note 167, at 496. Vattel also reports an incident, of uncertain date, in which "a company of young rakes" insulted the house of the British minister in a Swiss town, not knowing that it was his home. The local magistrate asked the
minister what satisfaction he desired, but the latter responded that nothing was required
because he was not affronted as the young men had not known who he was. E. DE
VATTEL, supra note 30, at 465-66.
185. 4 Ann. Dig. 359 (Costa Rica Ct. Cass. 1927).
186. Id. at 359.
187. Id. at 360-61.
188. Id. at 359-61.
189. The lack of express references to international obligations in the earlier cases
may reflect the Blackstonian view that customary international law was part of English
law. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 67. See also Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478,
97 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B. 1764)) (Mansfield, L.J.) (law of nations part of common law of
England).
190. 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 375 & n.1

(1883).
191.

1 BLACK. 510, 96 Eng. Rep. 295 (K.B. 1764).
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other country." '92 This is not a statement that international law provided the protection. In 1787, Lord George Gordon was tried for libelling Marie Antoinette and the French charg d'affaires, M. Barthelemy,
by calling the latter a spy and a participant in a kidnap attempt.1 9
However, in prosecuting, the Attorney General stated that "[tihe laws of
England protect every man's character from reproach."19' 4 International
law did not serve to impose any extra obligation. Subsequent cases involve not only insults but allegations of encouraging assassination. 9 "
The editor of Russell on Crimes gives the reason for those prosecutions;
the reason was not an international legal obligation, but rather that
"malicious and scurrilous reflections upon foreign sovereigns or their
representatives may tend to involve this country in disputes, animosities
and warfare ....

.""'

Even so, more than 100 years ago, Stephen com-

mented regarding these decisions that "highly important judicial decisions ...

give a right to every one to criticise fairly, that is honestly, even

if mistakenly the public conduct of public men," a group which he evidently believed included ambassadors.1 9 7
Putting aside a 1708 incident involving the British ambassador to
Venice, it does not appear that Britain has complained about any cases
of mere insults to her envoys in modern times. Parry lists a number of
incidents under the heading of "injuries and insults," in the 1965 edition
of the British Digest of InternationalLaw, but all involve violence, including shooting, sabre-cuts or physical invasions of diplomatic
19 8

premises.

A diplomatic exchange regarding the incidents that led up to the outbreak of World War I is also instructive regarding the possibility of legal

192. Id. at 517, 96 Eng. Rep. at 298.
193. R. v. Gordon, 22 Howell's St. Tr. 213 (1787).
194. Id. at 225.
195. K. v. Vint, 27 Howell's St. Tr. 627 (1799); R. v. Peltier, 28 Howell's St. Tr.
529 (1803); R. v. Most, 7 Q.B.D. 244 (1881). Lauterpacht calls Vint and Peltier "exceptional." I H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 167, § 121, at 283 n.1.
196. 2 RUSSELL ON CRIME 1549 (12th ed. 1964).
197. 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 190, at 376. It is not at all clear that Sir James
approved of that; in the next paragraph he noted the "state of moral and intellectual

anomaly in which we live at present." Id.
198.

7

BRITISH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

714-16 (C. Parry ed. 1965). See

also Public Prosecutor v. Hjelmeland, summarized in 87 JOURNAL

DU DROIT INT'L

512

(1960)(1956 decision of Norwegian Supreme Court under that country's statute that
punishes, among other things, anyone who "publicly insults the flag or coat of arms of a

foreign State or threatens or attacks a diplomatic representative or does damage to any
building used by a foreign embassy"; actual act involved throwing a bomb at the Soviet

Union's embassy).
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redress for insults. Austria-Hungary had protested, among other things,
articles appearing in Serbian newspapers. 9 ' It requested that Serbia
crack down on newspaper articles that printed pieces hostile to AustriaHungary. Serbia responded with a diplomatic note indicating that in
"almost all countries" such articles were "quite ordinary" and "not generally under state control."2 ' Austria-Hungary responded by stating
that the "practice of modern states, even under the freest interpretation
of rights of the press" rendered the press "of public character" and "subject to state supervision."' 0 ' Serbia offered to amend its law to punish
hostile publications against Austria-Hungary, but the latter rejected the
offer, in part because of the well-known difficulty in obtaining punishment in such cases.20 2
Among United States courts there is only one decision that even intimates that, in the absence of physical injury, insulting a foreign diplomat
would violate international law. Respublica v. De Longchamps, °3 was a
decision by Chief Justice McKean of Pennsylvania, sitting at Oyer and
Terminer. In this case, de Longchamps had gone to the residence of the
French minister and violently threatened Francis Barke de Marbois, secretary to the French legation. Chief Justice McKean held that the threat
was a violation of the law of nations and that the law of nations was
part of Pennsylvania's law. 20 4 This was not, however, a case of a mere
insult, but of a violent threat.
Still, this appears to be as far as United States courts were willing to
go. Although a number of early cases consider threats and insults in-

199. 8 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 381 (1914).
200. Id. at 387.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 388-89.
203. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Phila. 0. & T. 1784). This case, which began when a
French emigre in Philadelphia married a young Quaker woman against the wishes of
her guardians, had political as well as legal and romantic ramifications. The emigre,
Charles Julien de Longchamps, claimed a noble lineage. He asked the French consul
general to help him prove his claims and, when the latter refused, threatened him. Later
the same day, more heated words were exchanged and de Longchamps struck the consul
general with his cane. The Philadelphia diplomatic corps was outraged; both the French
and United Netherlands ministers threatened to leave the city. The latter urged the Continental Congress to proclaim the law of nations to be a part of the law of each state. See
G. ROWE, supra note 34, at 209-14.
204. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) at 117. Justice McKean was a member of the
Continental Congress, a leading federalist, Pennsylvania's chief justice for 22 years, and
its governor. G. ROWE, supra note 34, at xii, 57, 304-06. Justice McKean was also
involved in another celebrated case involving an alleged libel on the Spanish minister,
Don Carlos Martinez D'Yrujo. G. ROWE, supra note 34, at 295-99.
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flicted on diplomatic personnel,20 5 none finds that a mere insult violates
international law.
In contrast to these rather antiquated incidents, it is a commonplace
event to see demonstrations in front of diplomatic missions. 20°lndeed, the
problem is far more serious than mere verbal insults;2 0 7 the State Department has had to "stress[] defense against mob attacks."02 When the
demonstrations turn violent, the news media comment.2 0 Otherwise,
they go largely unnoticed.

205. United States v. Ravana, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 297 (Wilson, Circuit Justice 1793)
(consul can be charged with a misdemeanor for sending "anonymous and threatening
letters" to British minister, citizens of Philadelphia, and other persons); United States v.
Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 15,598) (assault and battery of public
minister); United States v. Hand, 26 F. Cas. 103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 15,297) (shooting at Russian charge d'affaires); United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1825) (No. 15,971), af'd, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1826) (assault on a foreign minister); United States v. Benner, 24 F. Cas. 1084 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 14,568) (assaulting and imprisoning Danish minister); United States v. Jeffers, 26 F. Cas. 596
(C.C.D.C. Cir. 1836) (No. 15,471) (constable intruded upon house of secretary of British legation to take a "colored lad," serving there, back to his "master" in Alabama).
While the court in Hand indicated that insulting an ambassador, or someone in his
train, would violate the law of nations, the language is dictum. Moreover, given the
violent context of the case (a shot through a window), it is not clear if a simple verbal
insult would constitute an offense against the law of nations.
Nor do arbitrations involving the United States support the notion that insults or violations of "dignity" would constitute a violation of international law. See, e.g., William
E. Chapman Claim, 1930 Op. of the Comm'rs 121 (U.S.-Mex. General Claims
Comm'n), reprintedin 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1931) (violation of international law not
to provide protection to consul against threats of physical harm); Francisco Mallen
Claim, 1927 Op. of the Comm'rs 254 (U.S.-Mex. General Claims Comm'n), reprinted
in 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 803 (1927) (same).
206.

See Brief for Petitioners at 32-33, Boos v. Barry, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (1988).

See Friedlander, The Crime of Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel, in 1 M.
485 (1986) (in 17 years preceding 1985,
United States lost more diplomats to terrorism .than in prior 150 years); Perez, The Impact of InternationalTerrorism, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 55 (1982).
207.

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

208.

Perez, supra note 207, at 56.

209. See, e.g., 8 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 385-86; C. WILSON, supra note 169, at 5758. See also Dehaussey, The Inviolability of Diplomatic Residences, 83 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INT'L 597 (1956) (citing various violent attacks on embassies in 1955 and 1956,
but no examples of mere insults; author argues in favor of international law obligation to
give special protection to the persons of diplomats, while conceding there is no such obligation with respect to embassy buildings).
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b.

Opinions of Legal Advisers

Custom can be realized in domestic legal systems through the opinions
of governmental legal advisers. A review of the available United States
and English opinions reveals parallel trends: in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, advisers believed that insulting an ambassador
violated international law, but by the middle of the nineteenth century,
those advisers either opined that there was no special penalty attached to
insulting an envoy or discouraged offended parties from bringing actions.
Early attorneys general of the United States several times voiced their
view that insulting or defamatory statements made about ambassadors
were punishable under international law. In 1794, Attorney General
William Bradford wrote to the Secretary of State, regarding the publication in the New York Journal of an article allegedly libeling the British
Minister, Mr. Hammond. Noting that a malicious publication, tending
to render a citizen "ridiculous, or to expose him to public contempt and
hatred, or to injure him in his profession, is deemed a libel," Bradford
stated that "in the case of a foreign public minister, the municipal law is
strengthened by the law of nations, which secures the minister a peculiar
protection, not only from violence, but also from insult.

21

0

Only three years later, Attorney General Charles Lee considered
whether the United States could bring a libel prosecution against the
editor of Porcupine's Gazette for carrying certain allegedly defamatory
letters regarding the King of Spain and the Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary. 211 Relying on Blackstone, he opined that each of the letters
210. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 52 (1794). Prosecutions for criminal libel are "almost obsolete." Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 521,
533 (1952). Often, criminal libel laws are either unconstitutionally vague, see, e.g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966); Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 292-95
(Alaska 1978), or run afoul of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See,
e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Eberle v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 423, 431-33, 127 Cal. Rptr. 594, 599-600 (1976). Moreover, it is not clear
whether Bradford correctly assumed that the criminal libel would be punishable in federal courts. In 1812, the Supreme Court held in a libel case that United States courts had
no common law jurisdiction. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32 (1812). But see Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States (pt. II), 101 U. PA. L. REv. 792, 793-95 (1952).
211. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 71 (1797). See supra note 204. Citing Lord Mansfield, Lee
stated that "the liberty of the press consists in printing without any previous license,
subject to the consequence of law." Id. at 72. Until at least the early twentieth century,
many assumed that the entire content of the first amendment was the freedom from prior
administrative restraint. See, e.g., L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss 204 (1985)
(" 'what is meant by liberty of the press is that there should be no antecedent legal
restraint upon it' "). See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes,
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could be deemed libelous. Lee then made some observations that anticipated free speech concerns with regard to this type of prosecution:
As yet, in the United States, the line between the freedom and licentiousness of the press has not been distinctly drawn by judicial decision. With
respect to national concerns among ourselves, as well as with respect to
foreign nations, our presses have been unlimited and unrestrained. If on
those subjects the liberty of the press can be excessive, or carried to licentiousness, it must be admitted that, in many instances, licentiousness of the
press has prevailed in our country.212
Although he cited no specific examples, Lee observed that ambassadors
and other representatives of foreign nations are "entitled to be treated
with respect . . . and especially ought not to be libeled by any of the
citizens." 2 13
An affront to an ambassador is just cause for national displeasure, and, if
offered by an individual citizen, satisfaction is demandable of his nation. It
is not usual for nations to take serious notice of publications in one nation
containing injurious and defamatory observations upon the other; but it is
usual to complain of insults to their ambassadors, and to require the parties to be brought to punishment.2 1'
Lee also stated that the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction over actions involving libels of ambassadors, but since no law establishing such
an action existed, no action could be brought.215 This statement was an
accurate prediction of what the Supreme Court would hold in its 1812
decision in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin that there is no federal
common law of crimes. 216 Nevertheless, Lee's conclusion is somewhat

J.). But see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
212. 1 Op. Att'y Gen., at 72. Consider also John Marshall's letter of October 16,
1793, published in the Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser. In arguing that a letter
in a recent newspaper supporting Jefferson's neutrality proclamation should not "discontent" France, Marshall noted:
Are we so sunk, so degraded even in our own eyes, that we become accountable as
a nation for the false reasoning of any individual, who may chuse to publish his
opinions? The papers of America teem with publications testifying our ardent attachment to France; while the press remains free (and Heaven forbid its freedom
should be violated) every individual may reason on every subject, according to his
own judgment.
2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 228 (C. Cullen & H. Johnson eds. 1974).
213. 1 Op. Att'y Gen., at 72-73.

214. Id. at 73.
215. Id. at 73-74.
216. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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curious. At the time when he made his observation, both state217 and
federal 218 courts recognized that the law of nations is part of the United
States law. There was also authority that international law offenses
could be punished in United States courts.21 9 Thus, one might naively
conclude that if international law required punishment of an insult
against a minister, no statute would be necessary. Because there is no
federal common law of crimes, including offenses against the law of nations, 2 the result is understandable.22
By the mid-nineteenth century,22 2 however, it was clear that the federal government would take no action regarding even libelous letters addressed to foreign ministers. 223 The reasons reflected a concern for free

217. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa. 0. & T. 1784).
218. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.); see also 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (Randolph) ("The law of nations, although not specially
adopted by the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the
land.").
219. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Gas. 1099, 1100-01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360).
220. See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 416-17 (1816).
221. The development of the statutory law of piracy supports this conclusion. Congress made piracy criminal by the Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510-13,
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982)). However, that act refers to piracy "as
defined by the law of nations." In United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162
(1820), the Supreme Court upheld Congress' power to define piracy as a domestic crime
by reference to the law of nations. The opinion also makes it clear that piracy as so
defined had long been a violation of the law of nations. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at
162. That being the case, if there were a federal common law of crimes, and if that law
included the international law crimes of piracy, no statute was necessary. Because Congress apparently believed such a statute was necessary, there would seem to be no room
for a federal common law of crimes, including, any crimes-should they exist-for insulting ambassadors.
222. The next statement on point by a United States government official, other than
a judge, is President Fillmore's cryptic remark in his annual message of December 2,
1851. H. EXEC. Doc. 2, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1851). The President noted that "ambassadors [sic], public ministers, and consuls, charged with friendly national intercourse,
are objects of especial respect and protection, each according to the rights belonging to his
rank and station." The precise import of that statement is dubious. It is not sufficient to
say that an ambassador is entitled to "especial respect," without defining what the nature
of that respect might be.
223. See 1 F. WHARTON, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 56 (1887). Wharton cites, among other things, an 1852 letter from the acting
Secretary of State; an 1860 letter from Secretary of State Cass; an 1869 letter from Secretary of State Seward; and another 1869 letter from Secretary of State Fish. Seward's
letter is particularly interesting:
Free discussion, by speech and in the press, in public assemblies, and in private
conversation, of the Cretin insurrection, and of all other political transactions and
movements occurring either abroad or at home, is among the rights and liberties

906

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:865

speech, especially in the discussions of foreign affairs, a public issue.
In 1906, whether for reasons of policy or reasons of principle, the
United States Government stressed first amendment considerations in declining to proceed against publishers of possibly insulting information.
At that time, the Government of Mexico asked the United States Government to prevent further circulation of a St. Louis, Missouri, newspaper that had insulted Mexico. The solicitor of the Department of State
stated that if the editors had committed an offense, it was a political
one.224 Similarly, in 1929, the Assistant Secretary of State wrote to the
Mexican chargg d'affaires:
It is always a cause for regret when private publications print articles
which may be offensive to the Government or people of a friendly nation,
but the publication of articles containing allegations or expressions of
opinion, however unwarranted they may be is not, under our Constitution, subject to executive control. This applies to articles reflecting on the
Government of the United States or its officials as well as to those which
refer to foreign governments or officials.
However, if any such article should be regarded as libelous resort may
be had to the courts by any one alleging to have suffered injury by its
publication. 25
Obviously, an insulting newspaper article about an envoy or about the
envoy's country may be different from an insulting placard held in the
ambassador's face. 228 Both of the foregoing examples are consistent with
the remarks of Attorney General Lee quoted above; however, until the
ambassador's safety or ability to function is endangered, the difference is
one of degree, not of kind.
In sum, by 1937, when section 22-1115 was introduced, the international legal requirements of punishing insulting statements were at best

guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States to every citizen and even to
every stranger who sojourns among us, and is altogether exempt from any censure
or injury on the part of the Government of the United States.... The maxim was
long since adopted in the United States that even error of opinion may be safely
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.
Id. But see 3 id. § 121 (quoting 1861 instruction from Secretary of State Seward to Mr.
Harvey, stating that "[i]nsults by a foreign Government to a consul . . . will justify a
demand that in addition to other redress, 'the flag of the United States shall be honored

with a salute.'

").

224. 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 129 (1940).
225. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State to the Mexican chargb d'affaires
(Dec. 27, 1929), reprinted in 2 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 224, at § 129.
226. Senator Pittman, the sponsor of § 22-1115, used this example when arguing for
the legislation. See 81 CONG. REc. 8587-88 (1937).
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old and equivocal. In that context, Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent
Senator Pittman, section 22-1115's sponsor, a brief letter endorsing the
1 7
bill.22
It is difficult, however, to read a great deal into the letter. Secretary Hull referred to "certain immunities under international law to enable [diplomats] to transact" official business, but he did not spell out the
details and concluded by saying the "comity of nations," not international law, entitled diplomats to be free from "attempted intimidation or
coercion," not insult or odium.228
British practice seems to have followed a pattern similar to that of the
United States.229 In 1762 Attorney General Charles Yorke noted that
"scandalous and injurious reflections published in derrogation of the
Honour and Dignity of Foreign States and Princes in Amity" with England might be punished as libel. 230 The stated reason, however, was that
such writings impaired the relations between Great Britain and its allies,
not that there was an international obligation.231
In 1816, the King and the Prince Royal of Sweden complained about
allegedly libelous newspaper articles. The law officers acknowledged that
if the articles tended to degrade the king and prince and to render their
people discontented the articles might be libelous, but in view of the "almost unbounded latitude" tolerated in Great Britain in the discussion of
23 2
their own and foreign governments, a conviction was "very doubtful.1
Obviously, this did not imply that an indictment would not lie, but it
hardly encouraged the bringing of one.
By 1857, the law officers indicated that an alleged libel against a foreign sovereign or foreign chief of state would not be treated differently
from any other libel.2"3 In 1896, however, the law officers reported, in
reference to an attack on the Turkish Sultan, that a libel upon a foreign
sovereign could be the subject of a criminal action. Still, the law officers
227. The letter was printed with the deliberations on the bill. Id. at 8486.
228. Id.
229. Hurst does note an incident in 1856 in which the Government of Peru dismissed the editor of a newspaper that had attacked the diplomatic corps. However, Hurst
assumes that the paper either belonged to or was under the control of the government. C.
HURST, supra note 169, at 185.
230. McNair, Aspects of State Sovereignty, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 627 (1949). The
incident involved the King of Denmark.
231. Id.; see also id. at 27-28 (quoting Letter of December 4, 1779, to Lord
Grenville).
232. 1 A. McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 12 (1956) (quoting Letter to
Viscount Castlereagh dated February 6, 1816).
233. Id. at 12-13 (quoting Letter of March 21, 1857, to the Earl of Clarendon). The
response was to a Prussian inquiry, which shows that Prussian officials had a much less
speech-protective attitude and, indeed, appeared to see no barrier to prosecution. Id.
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argued against bringing the case because the article in question concerned "public conduct in connection with the Armenians," 2 4 so a conviction appeared unlikely. Notably, the opinion does not indicate that
there was any special punishment for libel of a foreign sovereign.2 3 In
fact, in 1898, the Foreign Office wrote to the French Ambassador, M.
Chambon, saying that with respect to libels, foreign diplomatic agents
have the "same legal remedies as British subjects" but that "as an act of
courtesy" if a matter was brought to the attention of the government, the
opinion of the law officers would be sought and, if "advisable" a prosecution would follow. 236 The Foreign Office noted that it was a misdemeanor to publish a libel regarding a foreign prince, potentate, ambassador or other dignitary "with intent to disturb peace and friendship
between the United Kingdom and the country to which any such person
belongs.23
Currently, one assumes diplomatic officials would be delighted if they
could limit their concerns to oral or written insults, even if printed in
national magazines or broadcast by the television networks.23 " While it is
true that two hundred years ago United States officials stated that insults
violated international legal norms, the fact is that those concerns have
been submerged beneath both concerns about more violent demonstrations and the need to affirm free speech rights. It is very difficult to find
in the official writings of United States attorneys general, State Department officials, or their counterparts in England, any recognition of either
a broad international law prohibition against defamatory or insulting remarks leveled at an ambassador or, any legal argument in support of a
prohibition on peaceful, but insulting, picketing.

234. Id.
235. Id. (quoting memorandum of June 6, 1896).
236. 7 BRITISH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 198, at 702-03 (quoting Letter from Foreign Office to M. Chambon (Dec. 27, 1898)).
237. Id. at 710.
238. See 7 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 36 (1967); 52
DEP'T ST. BULL. 289 (1965) (note protesting failure of Russian Government to provide
adequate police protection for demonstration in front of United States Embassy). See
generally Friedlander, supra note 207; DIPLOMATS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD: PROTECTION FOR DIPLOMATS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (N. Hevener ed. 1986). In
1971, Professor Wilson did not even bother to catalogue such insults among assaults on

diplomats. C. WILSON, supra note 169, at 55. This is not to say that an insult to a
diplomat's dignity may not, in certain circumstances, violate international norms. For
example, racially discriminatory treatment of diplomats may breach such a duty. See id.
at 73-77. However, while not denigrating the resulting affront to an individual's dignity
from such treatment, it would also impair the diplomat's ability to function in his or her

role.
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c.

Municipal Statutes

Municipal legislation presents something of a puzzle as potential evidence of custom. In the absence of legislative history showing that the
legislation was enacted to fulfill an international obligation, it may not
demonstrate any opinio juris.2 89 Such legislation may indicate state
practice; however, if it is not enforced, this indication could be nullified.
Although picketing is a relatively new mode of expression, one might
expect to find municipal statutes limiting picketing or, more broadly,
limiting insults, if international law actually imposed upon states a duty
to restrict picketing or, even more broadly, insults leveled at a diplomatic
mission. Putting aside section 22-1115, which would render the argument tautological, one would find little support for laws against picketing and mixed support for laws dealing with insults. For example, until
1964 the only British legislation on diplomatic protection, the 1708 Statute of 7 Anne ch. 12, was limited to writs or process against the person
of the ambassador or of his or her servants.240 As to picketing itself,
other than the United States legislation, there appears to be little national legislation. 4' This may be due to the fact that the legislation does
not exist, that police often have broad discretion to prohibit picketing, or
that national legislation is, in effect, embodied in local legislation. In
1968, for example, the Ottawa City Council passed an ordinance giving
police greater power to control demonstrations, partly in response to vandalism at the Soviet Embassy the prior year.242
Until the passage of section 22-1115, United States law contained no
239. In 1934, Preuss listed seventeen states that had laws punishing "acts which are
of a nature to provoke a foreign state to war or reprisals, or which, being directed against
a foreign state, would constitute treason if committed against themselves." Preuss, Inter-

national Responsibility for Hostile PropagandaAgainst Foreign States, 28 AM. J.
L. 649, 650-51 nn. 9-10 (1934). He argued, however, that the statutes did not
demonstrate opinio necessitatus. Id. at 651. They protected the legislating state from
hostile reactions or secured the benefits of reciprocal protection abroad. Cf. 2 A. GRAHLMADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 182 (1972) (although
many states' municipal law gives right to be granted asylum, laws often result from
humanitarian, rather than legal, grounds and are thus not evidence of customary international law).
240. Amended by Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 58. It does not
appear that there has ever been a prosecution under the statute. 2 RUSSELL ON CRIME,
supra note 196, at 1551. That statute was repealed in 1964, with the enactment of the
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. II, ch. 81, which incorporated relevant
provisions of the Vienna Convention, supra note 29, into English law.
241. See Higgins, supra note 141, at 650.
242. 7 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 238, at 385 (citing Airgram No. A-1149 (April 9,
1968)).
INT'L
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provision criminalizing simple insults, and certainly none dealing with
picketing. Since the earliest days of the republic, however, there has been
a statute dealing with violent behavior directed at diplomatic agents
which states that:
[A]ny person ... [who] shall assault, strike, wound, imprison, or in any
other manner infract the law of nations, by offering violence to the person
of an ambassador or other public minister . . . shall be imprisoned not
exceeding three years, and fined at the discretion of the court.243
Arguably, the absence of any statutory prohibition on insulting ambassadors or public ministers implied the absence of an obligation to make
that sort of behavior criminal.
The legal systems of other countries present a more complex picture.
States generally have chosen to protect diplomatic dignity interests
neither with additional punishments nor with separate crimes, and many
that did so in the past have abandoned the practice. The Dutch apparently had the first statute dealing with the subject. This statute, enacted
in 1651, authorized corporal punishment against one who offends an
ambassador or injures the ambassador by word. 24 ' Some states have statutes that punish insults, but only on the basis of reciprocity, which indicates the absence of a legal obligation, and at least one state has a statute, but admits that it is not enforced.
In 1932, the Harvard Researchers found that a "survey of national
legislation fail[ed] to reveal evidence of the general recognition of a legal
obligation to establish specially severe penalties for offenses against diplomatic officers..
"24 Przetacznik has catalogued the laws relating to
injuries-physical and emotional-to diplomats. 46 His catalogue relies
on Feller and Hudson's 1933 compilation24 and the United Nations
1958 survey. 48 In addition, the present author has reviewed more recent
penal codes.
243. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118, repealed by Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 683, 862. The material in § 28 of the Act of April 30, 1790,
is now covered by 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
244. Harvard Research, supra note 31, at 94 (citing 1 FIERAUD-GRAUD, ETATS ET
SOUVERAINS 333 (1895)).
245.

Id. (citations omitted). See also De~k, supra note 168, at 229 ("There are...

many countries where municipal law does not contain any stipulation whatsoever concerning diplomatic immunities.").
246. F. PRZETACZNIK, supra note 167, at 68-73.
247.

A.

FELLER & M. HUDSON, A COLLECTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSU-

LAR LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES

(1933).

248. Laws and Regulations Regarding Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and
Immunities, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/7 (1958) [hereinafter U.N. Survey].
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Although a substantial number of states presently provide penalties for
violation of diplomatic or personal immunities, 4 9 only twenty-three
states have specifically provided either separate or enhanced penalties for
insults without demanding reciprocity.2"' Six of the twenty-three countries that once had such statutes, however, did not indicate that they still
had them in 1958 when they responded to the United Nations questionnaire. One of the countries that had such a statute, Israel, stated that it
251
was "rarely invoked.)
Five countries out of the twenty-three have or have had laws relating
to the freedom of the press that also punish inappropriate statements
against diplomats.252 In 1958, however, it appears that France did not
249. See, e.g., PENAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLUMBIA art. 133 (violation of
immunity), reprinted in THE COLUMBIAN PENAL CODE 49 (P. Eder trans. 1967).
250. See, Law of March 12, 1858 arts. 6-7 (Belg.) (punishing insults by words);
PENAL CODE art. 162 (Bol.) (enhanced sentence for "insult or injury" to foreign ministers, with knowledge of status); PENAL CODE art. 429 (Chile) ("calumny or insult");
CODE OF SOCIAL DEFENCE art. 258 (Cuba) (maligning, insulting, defaming diplomatic
agent); PENAL CODE art. 110 (Den.) ("honor"), reprintedin K. WAABEN, THE DANISH
CRIMINAL CODE 64 (1958); PENAL CODE arts. 126, 127 (Ecuador) (acts offending dignity of representative of a foreign state); CODE PENAL art. 192 (Egypt) ("outrages");
PENAL CODE § 104 (W. Ger.) ("insult"); PENAL CODE art. 154 (Greece) (attack on
"honor" of diplomat), reprinted in THE GREEK PENAL CODE 98 (N. Lolis trans. 1973);
CRIMINAL CODE ORDINANCE § 77 (Isr.) (publication intended to degrade, revile, or
expose ambassador to hatred); PENAL CODE art. 108 (Korea) (dishonors or defames);
PENAL CODE § 118-19 (Neth.) (intentional insult to representative of foreign power;
distributing insulting writing); PENAL CODE § 96 (Nor.) (increase in penalty if crime is
against envoy, including crimes which cause injuries to honor); PENAL CODE art. 283(3)
(Pol.) ("insults"), reprinted in THE PENAL CODE OF THE POUSH 111-12 (W. Kenney
& T. Sadowski trans. 1973); PENAL CODE art. 261 (U.S.S.R.) (continued by a decree of
June 30, 1921) (insults by words) ; FEDERAL PENAL CODE art. 43 (Switz.) ("insult");

art. 166 (Turk.) (defamation of an ambassador punished with same
penalty as defamation of Turkish official), reprinted in THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE
67 (0. Sepici & M. Ovacik trans.; T. Ansay, M. Yicel & M. Friedman eds. 1965);
PENAL CODE art. 176(2) (Yugo.) (damages to honor or reputation of diplomatic agent).
The cited Bolivian, Chilean, German, Norwegian and Swiss statutes are printed in A.
FELLER & M. HUDSON, supra note 247, at 118, 271, 929, 1178. Cuban, Egyptian,
Ecuadorian, Israeli, Korean, Netherlands and Yugoslavian provisions are in U.N. Survey
supra note 248, at 71, 107, 109, 179-80, 189, 201, 407. The Belgian and Russian statutes are cited in 1 R. GENET, supra note 167, at 503.
251. U.N. Survey, supra note 248, at 180.
252. Law of July 29, 1881, art. 37 (Fr.) (punishing "outrages"); PENAL CODE art.
141 (Para.) (doubles penalty for ordinary press offense); Law of May 28, 1881, art. 20
(San Marino) (same); Ordinance of July 16, 1812 (Swed.) (punishing "insulting judgments or utterances" made against nations with which Sweden was at peace); Decree of
October 14, 1884 (Tunisia) (Tunisia, then a French protectorate, enacted the French law
of July 29, 1881). The foregoing provisions can be found in A. FELLER & M. HUDSON,
CRIMINAL CODE
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inform the United Nations of its 1881 law. In all likelihood, this indicates a lack of enforcement. 3
Austria and Italy punish insults to a state or an ambassador respectively only on the basis of reciprocity. 25 Romania does not heighten the
punishment, but permits the public prosecutor to initiate the prosecution;2 55 Sweden also permits the public prosecutor to prosecute certain
assaults as insults against foreign states.256
As indicated, there are relatively few municipal enactments that require punishment for defamation of ambassadors. Likewise, there are
virtually no statutes that limit picketing directed toward embassies or
ambassadors. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that municipal legislation supports the existence of a perceived international legal obligation to
prevent either picketing or insults, defamatory or otherwise, of foreign
diplomatic agents or nations. This is so even if one takes into account the
more general provisions of law that would criminalize action which
might promote unfriendly relations between governments. 57
d.

Commentators

Thus far, the evidence of state practice-judicial decisions, claims, legal opinions, municipal statutes-shows no consistent pattern supporting
the existence of a contemporary international legal norm requiring punishment of insults. If there was a uniform practice, it did not extend far
into the nineteenth century. Moreover, fairly explicit free speech concerns seemed to gain force to compete with concerns of diplomatic inviolability, so that absent actual violence or the threat of violence there
would be no legal prohibition of insults in most countries. Although the
works of publicists are "subsidiary," both international 258 and United

supra note 247, at 537, 954, 1099, 1156 n.1, 545.
253. See 1 R. GENET, supra note 167, at 515 (indicating that juries tended not to
convict under the law, so jurisdiction was taken from them by a law of March 16, 1893).
254. CRIMINAL CODE § 66 (Aus.) (attempting to incite contempt or hatred), reprinted in THE AUSTRIAN PENAL AcT 43-44 (N. West & S. Shuman trans. 1966);
PENAL CODE arts. 298, 300 (Italy) ("affronts" to ambassador), reprinted in THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 107, 108 (E. Wise & A. Maitlin trans. 1978).
255. PENAL CODE art. 171 (Rom.) (offenses against "dignity"), reprinted in THE
PENAL CODE OF THE ROMANIAN SOCIALIST REPUBLiC 86 (S. Kleckner trans. 1976).
256. PENAL CODE, 5, § 5 (Swed.) (assaults which insult foreign states), reprintedin
THE PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN 22 (T. Sellin & J. Getz trans. 1972).
257. See, e.g., Ordinance of the Government of India of April 5, 1931, 134 BRIT. &
FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 207. See also F. PRZETACZNIK, supra note 167, at 68-69.
258. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986
I.C.J. 14, 530 (Jennings, J., dissenting); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 26 & n.5
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States259 courts routinely cite them. The same trends noted exist in their
writings as in the other evidence.
The suggestion that an ambassador's inviolability extends to protection
against moral offenses or insults has an ancient lineage among publicists.
Vattel states that "[wihoever offends and insults a public minister commits a crime more deserving of severe punishment, as he might thereby
involve his country and his sovereign in very serious difficulties and
trouble."2 6 As seen above, both judges and other officials in the United
States utilized Vattel's comment. Commentators likewise relied on this
comment. In a statement made by Hyde in 1945, for example, he relied
solely on statements by United States attorneys general who had themselves relied on Vattel. In this statement, written approximately 200
years after Vattel wrote, Hyde noted that a
foreign minister is entitled to the same degree of protection for his reputation as for his person, and for like reasons. Hence it behooves the State to
which he is accredited to shield him from insult as well as personal violence, and to prosecute with vigor him who attempts to defame him.26'
In 1932, the Harvard Researchers had concluded that the special duty
to protect diplomatic premises would include "protection against crowds
or mobs collected in the vicinity of the premises for the purpose of expressing abuse, contempt or even disapprobation of the sending state or
of its mission, or of the members of a mission."2'62 This duty also "would
seem to exist" to protect against picketing;2 63 however, the researchers
did not cite any authority for those propositions.

259. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700-01 (1900). Notably, Justice
Gray felt it necessary to justify his reliance on text-writers and cited Wheaton and Chancellor Kent in support of their use. Id.
260. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 30, at 464. Vattel relies only on two events, both
involving violence (Genghis Khan extracted revenge in one, the Turkish Emperor Selim
I did likewise in the other), the events that lead to the statute of 7 Anne ch. 12, which do
not involve an insult, and the incident of the Swiss rakes, supra note 30, at 464-65, to
support his point.
261.

2 C.

HYDE,

supra note 168, at 1250 & n.8. See also 1 R. GENr, supra note

167, at 513 ("L'inviolabilite dans le personne physique et morale suppose egalement
l'intangibilite dans la reputation"); Gregory, The Privileges of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3 MICH. L. Rav. 173, 184 (1905) (citing only "Wharton's Dig. Inter.
L., Vol. I, p. 649"); F. PRZETACZNIK, supra note 167, at 9 (advocating a definition of

inviolability to include prevention of "any attack on [diplomats']persons,freedom and
dignity"). However, Przetacznik's position is based upon article 29 of the Vienna Convention. The scope of the protection of the Vienna Convention will be discussed infra,
Section B.
262. Harvard Research, supra note 31, at 57.
263. Id.
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On the other hand, either by express statement or by omission, other
commentators have called into doubt the existence of any norm of international law protecting ambassadors from insults, vel non. Discussing
the idea of a state's "dignity," including the inviolability of its envoys,
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht noted:
[while] a Government of a State, its organs, and its servants are bound in
this matter by rigid duties of respect and restraint, it is doubtful whether a
State is bound to prevent its subjects from committing acts which violate
the dignity of foreign States, and to punish them for acts of that kind
which it was unable to prevent.2 '"
Lauterpacht plainly stated his conclusion:
In any case a State must prevent and punish such acts only as really
violate the dignity of a foreign State. Mere criticism of policy, judgment
concerning the past attitude of States and their rulers, utterances of moral
indignation condemning immoral acts of foreign Governments and their
monarchs, need neither be suppressed nor punished.26
Along this line, Sir Cecil Hurst stated that in normal times in democratic countries the press is now free and can make what statements it
wishes as long the statements made do not surpass the limits of what is
legal.26 6 Arguably, his statement is limited to the press, and does not
address even peaceful picketing. Moreover, it may beg the question:
What are the legal limits? Nonetheless, the thrust of the remark is that
.foreign sovereigns should not expect their dignity interests, if any, to
override press freedoms. This opinion, rendered in 1926 by a person in
England, a country without an express right to freedom of the press,
evinces perhaps a greater appreciation of the rights of a free press and a
greater sophistication of other nations' understanding of those rights than
Americans writing only a few years later demonstrated.
264. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 167, at 282-83. Regarding inviolability of diplomats, Lauterpacht refers only to their personal safety and exemption from criminal
jurisdiction. Id. at 789. See also Lyons, Personal Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, 31
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 299 (1954) (arguing that diplomats are entitled to no special
protection).
265. 1 H. LAUTERPAcHT, supra note 167, at 284. There is, however, an important
distinction: Lauterpacht is writing here of the obligations of a state to prevent a citizen
from insulting another nation or the ambassador of another nation; more stringent rules
apply to the behavior of the state itself. Id. at 283.
266. C. HURST, supra note 169, at 185. Hurst continued by noting: "Representatives of foreign governments now generally accept the position that a government is
bound to respect the freedom of the press and, therefore, cannot be held in any way to
blame for newspaper criticisms of foreign governments or their ministers." Id.
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Professor O'Connell takes a somewhat ambivalent position. He begins
with the "idea that the receiving State is obliged to take legal action
against any person who insults or scorns a diplomat."2 7 He then points
out that, as a practical matter, the protection "is only meaningful when a
special penalty attends the commission of an act derogatory of diplomatic
dignity."26 He nevertheless concedes that English law bases no crimes
on international law, including any separate crime for assaulting an ambassador. Therefore, he states, "a fortiori in the case of mere insult...
there is no offense under the ordinary criminal law."26 O'Connell observes that states have a duty to preserve embassies "from insult or invasion," but his only authority is Frend v. United States,"' which makes
his position circular in the present context.
Other commentators fail to mention any duties to protect the "dignity"
of a foreign state from attacks by citizens of a receiving state. For exam2 71
ple, in 1912, Professor Hershey did not mention any such rights.
More recently, Denza, discussing the notion of personal inviolability
under article 29 of the Vienna Convention, does not refer to any duty to
prevent private defamatory attacks on a foreign state or the diplomatic
agents of a foreign state.27 2

Of course, the preceding authorities considered only a general situation-state responsibility for private defamatory or insulting remarks
about a foreign state or a foreign ambassador. In the late 1920s and the
1930s, however, there was some discussion in the American academic
community about issues directly related to insults leveled at foreign governments. In 1928, Professor Dickinson argued in favor of a criminal
libel action against the Hearst newspapers for a series of apparently

267. 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 177, at 964. O'Connell cites United States v.
Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1826) for this proposition. Ortega, however, does not
support his view. First, the report of the trial court shows that physical violence, not
verbal violence, was involved. See United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1825) (No. 15,971). Second, the Supreme Court's opinion, cited by O'Connell, deals only
with the question of consular immunity, since the defendant, Ortega, was a consul.
268. 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 177, at 965.
269. Id.
270. 100 F.2d 691 (1938), cited in 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 177, at 965.
271. A. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION §§ 266-91 (rev. ed. 1929). See also J. BRIERLY, supra note 131, at 256-61;
E. DENZA, supra note 168, at 78-82.
272. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 94, 97 (1986) (Denza article entitled Diplomatic Agents and Missions, Privileges, and Immunities). Indeed,
Denza affirmatively asserts that states have no duty to impose special penalties for attacks on diplomats, including attacks on their dignity. E. DENZA, supra note 168, at 138.
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fraudulent articles about Mexico. 273 Dickinson believed that the publications would support a prosecution for criminal libel at common law.2 "
He suggested that Congress should enact appropriate legislation under
the offenses clause to render statements such as those made by the
Hearst newspapers criminal under federal law. Without citation, he
wrote that such legislation would fulfill an international obligation.2 7
However, while noting that the United States had already enacted a substantial amount of legislation to fulfill its "international obligations to
safeguard the interests of foreign states," he conceded that "it is not always easy to say just how far such legislation is dictated by international
obligation, on the one hand, and how much of it is merely national policy expressed in law for reasons of municipal convenience, on the other.
S. .27 Thus, even a strong proponent of legislation to protect the dignity of foreign sovereigns doubted whether international obligation, as
opposed to international policy, required the statute.2 '
A few years later, another commentator, Professor Preuss, discussed legislation that eventually became section 22-1115.'7' Preuss be273. Dickinson, The Defamation of Foreign Governments, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 840,
843-44 (1928).
274. Id. For this latter proposition, Dickinson relied upon several English cases and
authorities. See id. at 842 n.8 (citing R. v. D'Eon, 1 Black. 510, 96 Eng. Rep. 295 (K.B.
1764); R. v. Gordon, 22 Howell's St. Tr. 213 (1787); R. v. Vint, 27 Howell's St. Tr.
627 (1799); R. v. Peltier, 28 St. Tr. 529 (1803)).
275. Dickinson, supra note 273, at 843.
276. Id. at 843-44. Indeed, one might argue that domestic interests were paramount
even in prosecutions for insults of ambassadors, "the laws and peace of this country
[England] having, in truth, been attempted to be violated, and such probable violation
being the real ground of prosecution." Id. at 843 n.13.
277. Some of Professor Dickinson's contemporaries noted that states bore no responsibility for hostile or revolutionary propaganda issued by their citizens. See Lauterpacht,
Revolutionary Propagandaby Governments, in 13 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTuS
SociETY 143, 144-45 (1928); Preuss, International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign States, supra note 239, at 649. See also 2 G. HACKWORTH,
supra note 224, at § 129 (quoting Letter from Secretary of State Knox to Mexican
Ambassador de la Barra (Dec. 1, 1910) ("[S]ince under the American Constitution liberty of speech and of the press is guaranteed, mere propaganda in and of itself would
probably not fall within these statutes [neutrality statutes] and would not therefore be
punishable thereunder."). It appears that Secretary Knox reiterated the point later that
year to another Mexican ambassador, Sefior de Zamacona: "[T]he carrying on of a mere
propaganda either by writing or speaking does not constitute an offense against the law
of nations, nor does it constitute an offense against the local law since freedom of speech
and of the press is, under the Constitution of the United States, absolutely assured to
those dwelling within its jurisdiction." 2 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 224, at § 129
(quoting Letter from the Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador (June 7, 1911)).
278. See Preuss, Protection of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Premises Against
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gan by noting several contemporary incidents of picketing. 279 A resolution substantially similar to section 22-1115 had been introduced in the
Senate in August 1937 but had died in the House at the end of the
legislative session. Preuss argued that it should be reintroduced, yet he
equivocated as to whether international law imposed an obligation upon
states to prevent picketing. 28 0 Consequently, even Preuss, an advocate of
the legislation that eventually became section 22-1115, could not argue
unequivocally that international law required the legislation.2 8

Picketing, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1937).
279. Id. at 706-07 & n.8. See also Stowell, The Joint Resolution Prohibiting the
Picketing of Diplomatic and ConsularPremises in the District of Columbia, 31 AM. J.
INT'L L. 344 (1937).
280. "Since the picketing of foreign official premises is of recent origin, it may be
questioned whether there has developed a rule of international law which would impose
upon the receiving state a clear and immediate obligation to prevent this practice as
such." Preuss, supra note 278, at 708. He noted in a footnote that the "subject is not
discussed in such standard works as those of Sir Ernest Satow, A GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (3d ed, 1932), and Raoul Genet, Trait de diplomatie et de droit
diplomatique, Vol.JI (1931)." Id. at 708 n.10. After discussing the possible origins of
such an obligation, Preuss wrote: "Whether or not the toleration of such picketing constitutes an international deliquency [sic] in itself, it would undoubtedly lay the foundation
for claims against the United States should the demonstrations of hostile feeling lead to
actual violence against foreign representatives or their official premises." Id. at 709. In
the course of his article, Preuss rejected the theory that there is an
international obligation to erect the defamation of foreign sovereigns or states into
a delictum sui generis, nor to afford them greater protection than is provided
under the general law, adequately enforced. Early English and American decisions
have been cited as evidence of such obligation, but these decisions must, in the
light of later developments, be regarded as discredited and overruled.
Id. at 712 (citing Preuss, La r~pressio' des crimes et dMlits contre la silret des Rtats
trangers 40 REvuE GENERALE DE Dgorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 639 (1933)) (footnote omitted).
281. More important, Preuss' view of the first amendment implications of the legislation was at best arguably accurate even in 1937. After 136 years of not-so-benign neglect of the first amendment, in 1927 the Supreme Court first used the amendment to
reverse a criminal conviction in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). In 1931, it held
that an injunction against a newspaper violated the first amendment in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and in 1937, it recognized a right of peaceful assembly as
cognate to free speech in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). Soon after section
22-1115 became law, the Court decided Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), which
laid the foundations of the public forum doctrine that forms the backbone of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Boos v. Barry.
At the time that Preuss wrote, his views were being overtaken by the development of
first amendment law. See generally L. LEVY, supra note 211; L. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION (1960); Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 160 (Kairys
ed. 1982); Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514
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To summarize, commentators were and are far from uniform in asserting the existence of an international legal obligation to prevent even
the defamation of foreign embassies or ambassadors, much less simple
insult. Moreover, at the time section 22-1115 was enacted, there was no
scholarly support for the proposition that international law imposed an
obligation to prevent nonviolent picketing. Even the commentators who
argued for a broad obligation to prevent defamation represented an era
that preceded the development of contemporary free speech law.
B.

Applicability of the Vienna Convention

As noted above, multilateral conventions are not decoupled from custom.

282

Conventions can both declare existing custom and serve as nuclei

about which customary norms crystallize.2"' One might argue that the
Vienna Convention, 84 which entered into force in 1964 and to which the
(1981) (describing the development of first amendment law leading up to the First World
War). For example, Preuss believed that a section of the District of Columbia Code
punishing insulting, profane, or obscene language directed at bystanders would be constitutional but that it did not go far enough. Preuss, supra note 278, at 710-11. However,
there is no doubt that today the section would not survive first amendment scrutiny. See,
e.g., Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 2505 (1987); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S.
130, 131 n.1 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 n.1 (1972).
282. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
283. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) considered the contention of Denmark and the Netherlands that the Federal Republic of Germany was bound by the boundary delimitation provisions of article 6 of the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, even though the Federal Republic of Germany was not a
party to the Convention. They argued, among other things, that the "equidistance-special
circumstance" rule of article 6 had contributed to the formation of a customary norm.
The court held:
In so far as this contention is based on the view that Article 6 of the Convention
has had the influence, and has produced the effect, described, it clearly involves
treating that Article as a norm-creating provision which has constituted the foundation of, or has generated a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in
its origin, has since passed into the general corpus of international law, and is now
accepted as such by the opiniojuris, so as to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do not, become parties to the Convention. There is no
doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one and from time to time does occur:
it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary international law may be formed.
1969 I.C.J. 1, 14. The ICJ held that on the facts of that case, article 6 did not contribute
to the creation of a customary norm.
284. Vienna Convention, supra note 29, is largely declaratory of existing law. See
Higgins, supra note 141, at 642. See generally B. DENZA, supra note 168; Brown, Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
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United States is a party, contains provisions that explicitly or implicitly
support section 22-1115.285 Its two applicable articles are article 22(2)
and article 29, which read, in relevant part, as follows:
Article 22:
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps
to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
dignity.
Article 29:
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him
with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack
26
on his person, freedom or dignity.
Neither the specific language of the Vienna Convention nor its drafting history supports a conclusion that either existing or evolving custom
requires section 22-1115. Other states that have adopted the Vienna
Convention seem not to have taken such a position. Moreover, the absence of implementing legislation, in the United States or elsewhere, that
protects diplomats or their states from odium or disrepute casts doubt on
whether that was ever a goal of the Vienna Convention.
The language of articles 22 and 29, requiring states to protect the
"dignity" of diplomats and diplomatic missions, might be read to imply a
duty under customary international law to prevent peaceful picketing
that would bring odium or disrepute on another state. There are several
difficulties in such an interpretation. First, the Vienna Convention does
not say what steps, if any,2 87 states must take to protect that dignity. If
such a duty is a customary norm, one would expect the treaty that codifies custom to express it.2" 8 Second, the preamble of the Convention spe-

tions, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 53 (1988).
285. Judge Bork made a somewhat similar argument in his opinion in Finzer v.
Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1986). He did not specify whether the Vienna
Convention simply declared existing custom or generated new custom. Indeed, Judge
Bork seemed to believe that section 22-1115, a 1938 statute, fulfilled obligations under
the Vienna Convention, a 1961 treaty. Id. at 1457-58.
286. Vienna Convention, supra note 29, arts. 22(2), 29.
287. See E. DENZA, supra note 168, at 138 & n.21.
288. Sir Francis Vallat, leader of the United Kingdom's delegation to the drafting
committee of the Conference that drafted the Vienna Convention, testified before the
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee that, rather than setting down legislative
rules, it would be better to let courts decide cases under article 22 as they arose. H.C.
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cifically provides that "the rules of customary international law should
continue to govern questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of
the present Convention."2'89 To the, extent that the Convention does not
spell out the measures necessary to protect dignity, one should consult
custom to determine the contours of those measures. As discussed above,
custom offers little guidance in the present situation.2 90 Third, nothing in
the preparatory works of the Vienna Convention suggests such a broad
reading of the document.2"' Finally, the drafters of the Vienna Convention must have been aware of section 22-1115,2"" but they did not insert
a similar provision into the Convention, leaving specific protections a
matter of individual state practice. This is not to say that Congress could
not choose to implement the Vienna Convention by enacting legislation
like section 22-1115. If it did so-and if other nations followed-a custom might develop. Rather, the point is that nothing in the Vienna Convention implies that custom compels legislation like section 22-1115.
Obviously, giving a broad reading to the notion of protecting dignity
would permit a state not only to limit offensive demonstrations, but also
to limit media commentary, picketing of any kind, or even letters to diplomatic agents. On the other hand, adopting a contrary position forces
one to find a meaning for "dignity" to avoid its being surplusage. The

FOREIGN AFF. COMM., FIRST REPORT,

AND IMMUNITIES No.

289.

1984

THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES

127, at 37 [hereinafter FOREIGN

AFF. COMM. REP.].

Vienna Convention, supra note 29, at preamble. See Kerley, Some Aspects of

the Vienna Conference on DiplomaticIntercourse and Immunities, 56 AM. J. INT'L L.
88, 93 (1962). Ambassador Kerley notes ironically that "[a] major factor in the adoption
of this preamble was the need to avert a less acceptable one." Id. at 91.
290. See supra Part III, A. The commentary to the draft that became the Vienna
Convention is also unhelpful. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on Covering Its Tenth Session, 1958, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), at 11-27, U.N. Doc. A/
3859 (1958), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 230, 268 (1959) [hereinafter International Law Commission Report].
291. The Vienna Convention was based upon the International Law Commission's
Draft Articles. International Law Commission Report, supra note 290, at 254. The
1958 draft followed a 1957 draft. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on Its
Ninth Session, 1957, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), at 1, U.N. Doc. A/3623 (1957).
Comments to the 1957 draft were attached as an annex to the 1958 draft. 13 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9), at 33, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958). None of the comments indicates
that states have an international legal obligation to protect against insults. None of the
amendments proposed to draft article 20, which became article 22, or draft article 27,
which became article 29, shed any further light on states' duty to protect the dignity of
the diplomatic mission or of the diplomatic agents. Kerley, supra note 289, at 101-07.
292. In the 1948 edition of Oppenheim's treatise, for example, Lauterpacht cites
Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938), which upheld section 22-1115. 1
H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 167, at 789 n.2.
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most realistic interpretation is that protection of dignity means protection
from such things as civil process.29 Although service of process would
not disturb the peace of, intrude on, or damage the embassy, it might
impair its dignity. While the Vienna Convention contains provisions
granting immunity,2 94 it does not expressly forbid service of process.
29 5
That is historically a central meaning of the protection of diplomats.

The absence of any other explicit reference to such protection in the
Vienna Convention indicates that it falls within the dignity protection.
Protection of dignity undoubtedly may extend beyond forbidding service
of process; 296 the absence of specific references to anything else, however,
makes it very difficult to extract a rule from the vague word, dignity.
Even if custom contained some prohibitions of insulting language, the
tension between those prohibitions and the protection of political speech
renders the vagueness problem particularly acute. In view of that tension, the Vienna Convention's silence suggests that no norm exists.
The United States signed the Vienna Convention on June 29, 1961;
the Senate consented to it on September 14, 1965; and the United States
ratified it on the November 8, 1972.29 The United States did not pass
legislation, public law 95-393, "consistent" with the Convention until
1978.298 Public law 95-393 had nothing to do with protecting the dignity
of diplomatic agents or diplomatic missions. Rather, it repealed broad
personal immunity provisions enacted in 1790,299 which were inconsis-

293. See InternationalLaw Commission Report, supra note 290, art. 20, commentary, para. 5, at 17, reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L., at 268 (service of process special
application of protection of inviolability).
294. Vienna Convention, supra note 29, art. 31.
295. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
296. See FOREIGN AFF. COMM. REP., supra note 288, at 36 (Sir Francis Vallat:
"stop[ping] demonstrations which really do contain a threat to the dignity of the embassy" within article 22(2); not necessary to show danger or the threat of damage).
297. June 29, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
298. See H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). The legislation did not
purport to implement the Vienna Convention, since that Convention is self-executing. Id.
Under article VI of the Constitution, treaties are the "supreme law of the land." However, that does not automatically render them enforceable in domestic courts. Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
(1829); Frovlova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875-76 (5th Cir. 1979); Sei Fujii v. State,
38 Cal. 2d 718, 721, 242 P.2d 617, 619-20 (1952). See generally REsTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 130, at §§ 111(3), (4), comment h. Self-executing treaties are enforceable without implementing legislation; non-self-executing treaties require implementing legislation.
299. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18 (formerly codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 252-54; repealed in 1978). The 1790 act was taken from the Statute of Anne, supra

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:865

tent with the Vienna Convention and set forth insurance obligations of
foreign diplomats.3 00 If the United States had intended to use the Vienna
Convention as a vehicle for adopting laws to protect diplomatic dignity
or to limit peaceful picketing, it missed its best opportunity in 1978.
The implementing legislation of other nations is no more illuminating.
For example, Canada, England, Australia, and New Zealand have all
enacted the Vienna Convention as part of their domestic law.3 1 While
none of these statutes specifically defines what is meant by protecting
dignity, there is some useful commentary.
In 1969, the legal division of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked to interpret article 22(3) of the Vienna Convention. In
responding, it found it "difficult to assess precisely the degree of protection that the Receiving State is obliged to provide due to the somewhat
undefined obligation it has (i.e. its 'special duty to take all the appropriate steps').1 30 2 However, the Legal Division did not find any obligation
to take special steps to prevent affronts to the dignity of the diplomatic
agent's mission.30 3 Instead, it concluded that a receiving state's obligation
note 238. S. REP. No. 1108, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
300. The law required diplomats to carry liability insurance against certain defined
risks, created a direct right of action against an insurer when an insured diplomat had
immunity from civil suits, and made certain conforming amendments in the Judiciary
Code. S. REP. No. 1108, supra note 294, at 1. See also 14 WEEKLY Comp. PRES. Doc.
1694 (Oct. 2, 1978); 123 CONG. REc. H25,204 (daily ed. July 27, 1977) (remarks of
Rep. Fascell). See generally Valdez, Privileges and Immunities under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 15 INT'L
LAw. 411 (1981); Comment, A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic
Relations Act of 1978, 54 TUL. L. REv. 661 (1980); Note, The Effect of the Diplomatic
Relations Act, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 354 (1981).
301. In England treaties are generally not self-executing. S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw

130 (2d ed. 1973). In Canada, treaties affecting

private rights are generally not self-executing. J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 851-60 (1st ed. 1965). The specific implementing statutes are Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964, ch. 81 (United Kingdom); Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act, 1967-1973, S.Austl. Acts, § 6 ; Can.
Stat., ch. 31 (1977); Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act, 1968 no. 36 (N.Z.). See
Merger, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968, 3 N.Z. UNIv. L. REV. 346
(1969) (discussing New Zealand statute); O'Keefe, InternationalPrivileges and Immunities in Australia-TheLegislative Framework, 8 FED. L. REV. 265 (1977) (discussing
Australian statute); Przetacznik, The History of the JurisdictionalImmunity of the Diplomatic Agents in English Law, 7 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 348 (1978) (discussing English
act); Samuels, Dipomatic Privileges Act, 1964, 27 MOD. L. REV. 689 (1964) (same).
302. 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 355, 355-56 (1970) (citing Memorandum dated September 23, 1969). Professor Castel refers to no special duties to protect against insult. See J.
CASTEL, supra note 301, at 717-19.
303. 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L., supra note 302, at 356.
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to protect diplomatic missions is greater than its normal obligation to
protect the property of the public. It noted that the obligation to protect
diplomatic premises is based upon the following principles:
(1) the receiving State's responsibility is not incurred by the mere fact that
damage was inflicted upon diplomatic premises;
(2) the receiving State's obligation to protect diplomatic missions is somewhat greater than its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing
injuries to aliens;
(3) this obligation is in direct proportion of the predictability of the commission of an aggression, or in other words, to the circumstances."0 4
It would seem difficult to argue that the Canadian Foreign Ministry
believes that there is an-obligation to protect the dignity of an embassy
that extends beyond protecting against violence or damage to the
embassy.
A matter nearly directly on point arose in Great Britain in 1984.05
London police arrested apparently peaceful demonstrators outside the
South African High Commission's offices on the belief of the police commander involved that the demonstrators violated Britain's statute implementing the Vienna Convention, the Diplomatic Privileges Act."' 6 The
Magistrates Court found in favor of the demonstrators, holding that
"impairment of dignity required abusing or insulting behavior, and that
political demonstrations per se do not amount to such."3 0 7 That, of
course, leaves open the question what "insulting" means. Interestingly,
Great Britain does not have an act setting a statutory distance as does
section 22-1115; it has no legislation specifically protecting embassies.3 0 '
Indeed, following the foregoing incident, and in the context of a general
review of the Vienna Convention, the House of Commons Foreign Af30 9
fairs Committee did not recommend passage of such an act.

304. Id. at 356, quoted in L.
INTERNATIONALLY

BLOOMFIELD

PROTECTED PERSONS:

& G.

FITZGERALD, CRIMEs AGAINST

PREVENTION AND

PUNISHMENT

(1975).
305. Regina v. Roques (Bow Street Mag. Ct. June 1984), noted in
COMM. REP., supra note 288, at xvii; Higgins, supra note 141, at 651.

306.

FOREIGN AFF. COMM. REP.,

45

n.19

FOREIGN AFF.

supra note 288, at xvii.

307. Higgins, supra note 141, at 651.
308. FOREIGN AFF. COMM. REP., supra note 288, at xvi.
309. Higgins, supra note 141, at 651. The Committee wrote:
[Tihe receiving state's duty to protect the peace of the mission cannot be given so
wide an interpretation as to require the mission to be insulated from expressions of
public opinion within the receiving state. Provided always that work at the mission
can continue normally, that there is untrammelled access and egress, and that
those within the mission are never in fear that the mission might be damaged or its
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An Australian appellate judge also commented about a prosecution
under Australia's statute implementing the Vienna Convention:
If there were in the last analysis no more in this case than a quite peaceful gathering on the lawn of persons shouting slogans and carrying placards of the kind in question here, with no risk of intrusion or damage to
the premises, I would have some doubt whether there was any basis for
believing that such action in such a place could reasonably amount to impairing the dignity of the mission, which is, after all, a political body. As
such it must presumably accommodate itself to the existence of strong disagreement with some of the policies of its government and to the direct
and forceful verbal expression of such disapproval. I appreciate that something may turn on the closeness of those concerned to the premises and on
the extravagance or insulting nature of the language used, but, for myself,
I would like to keep this whole subject open until, if ever, it arises for
decision. 10
Other states do not require implementing legislation, since international treaties to which they are parties automatically have the force of
law. 1 1 There appear to be no judicial decisions in these countries interpreting articles 22(2) and 29 of the Vienna Convention.
If Congress believed that the Vienna Convention required a statute to
protect diplomatic dignity, it could have passed one. The legislation implementing the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents (U.N. Convention) 1 2 and the Organization of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion
That Are of International Significance (O.A.S. Convention)31 3 deals prestaff injured, the requirements of Article 22 [of the Vienna Convention] are met.
FOREIGN AFF. COMM. REP., supra note 288, at xvii. But see id. at 68, 74 (memorandum
by Colonel Professor G.I.A.D. Draper arguing that United Kingdom's failure to enact
legislation to protect against impairment of embassies' dignity "could expose [the United
Kingdom] to international protest if not claims for reparation").
310. Wright v. McQualter, 17 F.L.R. 305, 321-22 (1970). This Vietnam War era
case involved a prosecution for obstructing a police officer in his duty to protect the
United States Embassy in Canberra. The obstruction occurred when a group of demonstrators pushed through three lines of police to reach the Embassy. Id. at 317.

311.

See, e.g., Sasse, The Common Market: Between International Law and Munic-

ipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695, 712-13 (1966).
312. Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered
into force Feb. 20, 1977) [hereinafter U.N. Convention]. See generally L. BLOOMFIELD
& G. FTZGERALD, supra note 304.
313. Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413 (entered into force for U.S.
Oct. 20, 1976) [hereinafter O.A.S. Convention].
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cisely with that problem. Both conventions seek to protect diplomats
from crimes such as murder, kidnapping and assault, threats or attempts
to commit murder, and extortion in connection with those crimes."1 4 In
1972, the United States amended 18 U.S.C. § 112, a statute that protects
diplomats outside the District of Columbia."'5 In 1976, Congress enacted
and the President signed H.R. 15552, which again amended section 112
and specifically implemented the U.N. and O.A.S. Conventions.318 In

314. U.N. Convention, supra note 312, art. 2; O.A.S. Convention, supra note 313,
arts. 1, 2.
315. The amended section 112 is analogous to, but slightly different than, section 221115. The legislation began as H.R. 10502 and S. 2436 in the second session of the 92nd
Congress, see H.R. REP. No. 1202, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), and was eventually
enacted as H.R. 15883. See S. REP. No. 1105, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 92 Stat. 4316. The law added sections 1116
and 1117 to Title 18 of the United States Code and amended, inter alia, section 112 of
Title 18. Id. at 4325-27.
H.R. 15883 purportedly fulfilled a United States "obligation under international law
as a host country to provide protection for diplomatic, consular, and other foreign government and international organization personnel and their families ... ." H.R. REP. No.
1202, supra, at 8. The report recognized a "generally accepted rule of international law"
regarding a host country's "special duty to protect" diplomatic and consular premises
and personnel. Id. at 9. See also 118 CONG. REc. S31,028, 531,032 (1972) (remarks of
Senator McClellan regarding H.R. 15883). It mentions nothing more about the source of
that duty.
H.R. 10502 initially contained an extremely broad antipicketing provision, making it a
crime for anyone to congregate with two or more persons within 100 feet of any diplomatic premises and to refuse to leave when ordered to so by federal, state, or local authorities. H.R. REP. 1202, supra, at 3. That provision was later stricken in favor of one
prohibiting parading, picketing, and the like, "for the purpose of intimidating, coercing,
threatening, or harassing any foreign official or obstructing him in the performance of his
duties" or "congregat[ing] with two or more other persons with the intent to perform the
aforesaid acts." 118 CONG. REc. H27,111, H27,112, H27,116 (1972). As amended, the
provision passed the House, 380 to 2. Id. at H27,118. Despite wide support in the Senate, Senator Ervin raised first amendment objections to the amended H.R. 15883. 118
CONG. REc. at S31,034-35 (comments of Senator Ervin). The bill's proponents stressed
both Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C.Cir. 1938), which held section 22-1115
constitutional and, perhaps more important, the purpose of the statute to "protect foreign
officials from danger and allow such officials to work in peace." Id. at S31,035-36 (remarks of Senator McClellan). Nonetheless, the final bill was amended to provide that
"nothing in these provisions shall be construed or applied to abridge first amendment
rights." See 18 U.S.C. § 112(d) (1982); see also 118 CONG. REc. H33,210 (1972); H.R.
REP. No. 1485, 92 Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (conference report). The bill was signed on
October 28, 1972. 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1582, 1584 (1972). See generally
Przetacznik, The Protection of Foreign Officials in the United States Code, 9 INT'L
LAW. 121 (1975).
316. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1614, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in
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amending section 112 in 1972 and 1976, the Senate purported to act in
accordance both with customary international law and with a specific
treaty. 3 17 Absent similar legislation purporting to implement the Vienna
Convention within the District of Columbia, section 22-1115 does not
accomplish that implementation.
Finally, it would seem odd that nations implicitly agreed by treaty to
limit speech and assembly rights, shortly after many of the same nations
were concluding other treaties that established such rights."1 ' The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention),' 9 which was signed in 1950 and
which entered into force in 1953, specifically guarantees "freedom of expression . . . . includ[ing] . . . to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority."3' 20 It also guarantees the
right of "peaceful assembly and ... freedom of association." 21 All sixteen signatories of that convention are also parties to the Vienna Convention. Conceivably, if the European Convention limited peaceful picketing, those signatories believed that the Vienna Convention either (1)
did not affect what they viewed as legitimate speech or assembly rights,
or (2) drew the proper balance between those rights and other states'
dignity interests. Still, one would have expected some discussion of the
issue if the Vienna Convention actually restricted speech or assembly
rights, only ten years after many of its parties had entered the European
Convention. 2 2

1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4480; 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1486
(1976) (statement by President Gerald R. Ford on signing H.R. 15552 into law). Interestingly, despite changes in the 1972 legislation described in note 315, supra, the House
Committee on the Judiciary reported that the language still "raises serious Constitutional
questions because it appears to include within its purview conduct and speech protected
by the First Amendment." H.R. REP. No. 1614, supra, at 6 n.9. The Committee, however, believed that the language was not constitutionally objectionable and that the
speech-protective language added in 1972 made it clear that "this legislation is not intended in any way to inhibit the exercise of first amendment rights . . . ." Id.
317. See supra note 313.
318. In addition, various countries recognize such rights in their domestic constitutions. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany, Basic Law, arts. 5(1), B.
319. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
320. Id. art. 10(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
321. Id. art. 11(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
322. A similar point also applies to parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights, signed in 1969. O.A.S. Official Records OEA/ser. K./XVI/I.I., doc. 65 rev. I,
Corr. 2 (1970). That treaty also protects freedom of expression and the right of peaceful
assembly. Id. arts. 13(1), 15.
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C.

Conclusion

It is not easy to determine international practice: one cannot simply
consult the Modern Federal Practice Digest and Shepard's Citations.
The task requires examination of a variety of sources, over a wide time
period, and in different languages. One cannot limit oneself to a few
texts, especially if they are old; the meaning of words can change over
the years. "Dignity" may be a particularly apt example of that. The
difficulty in determining custom should render one particularly cautious
in saying that a customary norm exists.
Professor Akehurst has argued that under the right circumstances "a
very small number of acts, involving very few States and of very limited
duration, is sufficient to create a rule of customary law.11 2 3 He holds

that the quantum of evidence needed to establish the existence of a customary norm is relative: if the proponent has only a little evidence, but
the opponent has none, the former wins, at least provisionally.3 24 Yet
this assertion unnecessarily confuses the burden of proof with the substantive elements to be proved. All, or all interesting, proof questions are
relative. The real point is that the proponent of the norm must prove
both a nearly uniform practice and the existence of opiniojuris. In areas
involving a large number of events, a small number of decisions or paid
claims cannot establish a practice, much less a uniform one. In fact, sporadic practice suggests the contrary. Moreover, the quality of the evidence is very important; where the majority of the evidence used to establish the norm is ancient and there is little or no contemporary
practice, it renders more uncertain the existence of a norm.
Consequently, tested against the standards of "nearly uniform" practice and opinio juris, one cannot discern a customary norm prohibiting
or limiting peaceful picketing. There is little doubt that states have various kinds of international legal duties to protect the dignity interests of
other states and their diplomatic agents. There is equally little doubt
that no international consensus regarding an legal duty requires states to
prevent peaceful picketing-even "odious" peaceful picketing-near an
embassy.
States have no uniform practice regarding verbal affronts to dignity.
Only a few cases, all quite archaic, deal with the issue. For the better
part of a century, United States and British officials have discouraged

323.

Akehurst, supra note 1, at 18.

324. Id. at 13-14. See also Weisburd, A Reply to Professor D'Amato, 21 VAND.J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 473, 478-79 (1988); but see D'Amato, A BriefRejoinder, 21 VAND.J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 489, 489-90 (1988).
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offended states from bringing lawsuits, or have taken a hands-off attitude, often explicitly because of free speech or free press concerns. While
some states have enacted legislation that punishes insults to diplomatic
agents, by far the greater number of states has not. Moreover, those that
have such laws rarely invoke it. Other legislation prohibits only violent
displays or does not distinguish between insults generally and insults to
ambassadors. Even the commentators are split, with the more recent acknowledging either the absence of any general duty or the absence of any
municipal measures to enforce such a duty. Finally, although given the
opportunity to codify such a norm in the Vienna Convention, states
passed, essentially leaving regulation of peaceful picketing to local
options.
The opinio juris, such as it is, cuts against finding an obligation.
Under the traditional theory that states must recognize that they are acting under a legal obligation, there seems to be no consensus. Although
early United States cases assumed such an obligation, more recent British cases"' made it quite clear that the Crown prosecuted those who
defamed ambassadors because they might disrupt relations with other
nations. Likewise, those statutes that punish demonstrations appear to
protect local interests in peace, rather than the dignity of foreign governments. The fact that several statutes are reciprocal further indicates a
lack of legal obligation. Finally, the Vienna Convention itself does not
imply the existence of specific customary obligations. If nations truly believed that they had an international legal duty to prevent or limit peaceful picketing or other insults, one would expect to see it clearly stated in
the Vienna Convention. 2 '
The absence of a customary international law restriction on peaceful
picketing comports both with a functional view of diplomatic protection
and with developing protections for free expression and assembly. As to
the former, if restrictions on picketing prevent only actual interference
with the operation of embassies or ambassadors, laws against disorderly

325. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
326. Nor does D'Amato's articulation theory provide a basis for finding a norm. See
A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 2, at 74; see also supra note 130.
There are no compelling examples of states' articulating their understanding of the norm
while applying it. Indeed, there is no uniform articulation as to what the norm is, either
by national bodies or by international bodies. Only in cases such as Respublica v. De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 111 (Phila. 0. & T. 1784), see supra notes 203-05 and
accompanying text, have domestic courts articulated the rule they applied. The English
cases expressly relied on no international obligation. Nor have foreign ministries or commentators expressed a rule with the kind of uniformity that states, if they complied could
say that they were doing so.
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conduct are adequate; no additional legislation is necessary. As to the
free speech and assembly issues, the situation may be more complicated.
While the treaty and constitutional provisions cited above32 7 generally
protect expression and assembly, their precise outlines may differ from
nation to nation.32" Usually, however, when states choose to limit expressive rights to achieve another goal, that other goal has a fundamental
quality, whether it be public peace or another person's right to dignity.
States typically have not placed the dignity of another state at that fundamental level. Until they do, international custom cannot be said to
have established that ranking.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXERCISE OF
CONGRESSIONAL DISCRETION UNDER THE OFFENSES CLAUSE

We have seen that, despite the framers' limited conception of the offenses clause, the courts have given Congress broad discretion to define
offenses against the law of nations. The "mysterious" or inchoate nature
of some asserted customary norms emphasizes the thin line between definition and creation. There may well be times when the existence of an
international legal norm is far from clear. The question then concerns
the scope of congressional creativity; that is, what amount of evidence
must Congress have before deciding that a particular act constitutes an
offense against the law of nations? That in turn leads to a series of
questions.
First, one must determine which branch of government, Congress or
the courts, ultimately decides whether certain acts constitute an offense
327. See supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
328. See Kommers, The Jurisprudenceof Free Speech in the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 673-92 (1980) (discussing different balances applied by Germany and United States law in deciding speech cases).
Compare Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (invalidating permit requirement on overbreadth grounds); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (invalidating requirement of permit for outside religious meeting); and Saumur v. Quebec, [1953]
S.C.R. 299 (same) with Tokyo Ordinance Case, 14 Keishii 1243 (criminal) (No. 9
1960), reprintedin part in W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 513 (1977) (permit requirement for parades
constitutional). Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation of public official not actionable absent showing of actual malice) and Defamation
Case, Keishii 2,472 (No. A 1969) (no crime of defamation without proof of mens rea),
reprinted in part in W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, supra, at 537, with Mephisto
Case, 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971), reprinted in part in W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS,
supra, at 539 (publication of novel based on life of Nazi actor enjoined as violative of
right of personal honor). See also M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWNELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 698-701 (1980).
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against the law of nations. The language of the offenses clause appears
to make it a prime candidate for the political question doctrine.
Second, if the Constitution allows a judicial role, one might then ask
how much deference must be given to the political branches'"2" determination that certain conduct violates customary international law, absent
an asserted constitutional violation. Generally, Congress must have only
a rational basis for its actions, since courts are loathe to interfere with
Congress' political decisions. The issue here, however, is peculiar: the
existence of an international legal norm is not solely a political judgment. Arguably, then, courts may have a greater role. On the other
hand, courts rarely interfere with the political branches' foreign affairs
decisions, so despite the essentially legal nature of the decision, the
courts' role may still be circumscribed.
Third, when a congressionally-defined offense conflicts with a constitutional prohibition, in particular, the first amendment, the question becomes how to determine whether the congressional definition or the first
amendment controls. If, as here, strict scrutiny33 0 applies, the court must
determine whether the regulation is narrowly drawn and advances a
compelling state interest." 1 As discussed above, in Boos the Court found
that even if the interest was compelling, the statute was not sufficiently
narrowly drawn.33 2 It left open the question whether a foreign nation's
33 3
dignity interest can ever constitute a compelling governmental interest.

Determining whether the government's interest is compelling again requires examination of a series of questions. On the one hand, the international norm itself may have an impact on the result. Some norms, such
as the rule against genocide, are "peremptory," and the need to enforce

329. Obviously, both Congress and the President are involved in enacting legislation.
330. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 602-04 (1978).
331. See Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
332. See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
333. In Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), Justice Stevens wrote: "It is 'obvious
and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of

the Nation. Protection of the foreign policy of the United States is a governmental interest of great importance, since foreign policy and national security considerations cannot
neatly be compartmentalized." Id. at 307 (citation omitted). If Justice Stevens meant that

foreign policy considerations are per se compelling, his dictum is not the law in view of
Justice O'Connor's remarks in Boos. See Boos, 108 S.Ct. at 1165. On the other hand, if
Justice Stevens expressly meant what he said, that "foreign policy ...is a governmental

interest of great importance," he left open the precise question considered here: Of how
great importance? Other cases have linked foreign policy and national security. See, e.g.,
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1954) (restriction "supported by the weightiest considerations of national security").
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such a norm may affect the strength of the governmental interest. On the
other hand, there may be a generalized "foreign affairs" interest that is
ipso facto compelling.
This section will examine each of the above issues. It argues that the
political question doctrine does not foreclose judicial examination of the
issue and that the usual reasons for deferring to foreign affairs decisions
should not restrain the courts from looking into the existence of an international offense. This section concludes that neither the nature of the
proposed norm itself nor foreign affairs reasons renders the governmental interest compelling, unless there is a strong national security component or another domestic interest that would be compelling, such as
preventing racism.
A.

The Political Question Doctrine

The threshold inquiry is whether the political question doctrine"3 4
wholly forecloses judicial examination of a congressional definition of an
offense against the law of nations because the Constitution expressly
gives Congress the power to define offenses. 3 5 The political question
doctrine permits courts under limited circumstances to find certain questions nonjusticiable.33 6 Justice Powell stated the doctrine's broad con334. This Article will not attempt to examine the political question doctrine in depth.

For two classic and opposing views, see A.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

46-65 (1962) (doctrine an avoidance technique used to permit courts to maintain own
legitimacy by limiting reviewing power) and Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1-10 (1959) (doctrine applies when Constitution has committed autonomous decision-making power to another branch).
335. The fact that in the last century several cases specifically dealt with questions of
the existence of an offense does not necessarily end the inquiry. Those cases, such as
United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887), see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying
text, were decided long before the current flowering of the political question doctrine.
336. The modern fountainhead of the doctrine is Justice Brennan's opinion in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), an electoral apportionment case:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
Professor Scharpf set forth the categories of cases in which courts had applied the
doctrine as of 1961. Scharpf, JudicialReview and the Political Question: As Functional

932

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 21.865

33 7
tours in Goldwater v. Carter,
a dispute between the President and
some members of Congress over the power to terminate treaties:

(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of
the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government?
(ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond
areas of judicial expertise?
(iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?338
The doctrine represents a curtailment, if not a total abdication, of the
judicial function and is only appropriate in limited circumstances. One of
the most frequent, and some would say the only legitimate, 33 9 use of the
doctrine is in foreign relations cases. 40 Often such cases raise the issue
whether one branch of government has unreviewable discretion to take
41
certain action, for example, to commit United States forces to combat
or to terminate treaties.34 2 Yet, as Professor Scharpf has pointed out,
even in the foreign relations area, courts have often decided constitutional questions on their merits. 4 3 In the context of foreign affairs, the
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 537 n.69 (1966). Unfortunately for any generalized analysis, those categories remind one of the state of chemistry before Mendeleev. See also
Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17
UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1166 (1970) (political question doctrine not "a coherent, single
principle which permits or requires non-decision of an identifiable class of cases").
337. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
338. Id. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).
339. Champlin & Schwartz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of Foreign
Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 239 (1985). Those authors state that the last
domestic use of the doctrine occurred in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
Champlin & Schwarz, supra, at 239 n.99.
340. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) ("very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial...
. [Such decisions] are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy."). But
see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("Yet it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.").
341. See, e.g., Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd sub nom.
Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
342. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
343. Scharpf, supra note 336, at 543-48; see also Tigar, supra note 336, at 1168-70.
Professor Henkin has argued that if the "political question [doctrine] is one in which the
courts forego their unique and paramount function of judicial review of constitutionality," then no such doctrine exists. Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597, 599 (1976). Henkin contends that the leading cases in which courts have
declined to review "political questions" are cases in which the political branches were
simply exercising their legitimate constitutional responsibilities and courts declined to
intervene. Id. at 599-601. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (Court
bound by congressional determination that a state government was "Republican"). Pro-
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political question doctrine often involves the allocation of decisional competence between the political branches.'" The offenses clause presents
an interesting variation on the allocation theme; it raises the question of
allocation between the political branches and the judiciary, not the legislative and the executive.
Perhaps the most important reason that the doctrine has not been applied in Boos and other offenses clause cases is that those cases involve
criminal convictions. In effect, the existence of an offense against the law
of nations is an element of the crime. As a matter of due process, the
criminal defendant is entitled to a judicial determination that Congress
has not exceeded its authority." 5
Aside from the criminal nature of the proceeding, a careful examination of the standard criteria suggests that the doctrine does not apply. As
an initial approximation, the first, and probably most important, prong
of the Baker v. Carr test 46 seems to be met: the fact that the Constitution vests Congress with the power to "define" offenses seems as demonstrable a commitment as there can be. Concluding on that basis alone
that judicial inquiry is foreclosed, however, seems unduly scholastic.
Under article III of the Constitution and Marbury v. Madison,3 47 federal courts decide constitutional issues properly before them and "say
what the law is."' 348 The issue here is precisely "what the law is."
While Congress can define offenses, it does not follow that it has the
function of saying finally what the law of nations is. Traditionally, the
courts play a role in saying what the law is. In the absence of a clear
indication in the history of the offenses clause that the framers intended
to preclude a judicial role, one should be wary of excluding the courts.

fessor Henkin further argues that even in the foreign relations cases, the Court did not
"refuse to consider whether the President had exceeded his constitutional authority;
rather, it concluded that the President's decision was within his authority and therefore
law for the courts." Henkin, supra, at 612. See Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 414 (1839) (Court bound by executive determination that a regime was the government of a foreign state).
344. See Champlin & Schwartz, supra note 339, at 243-44.
345. See United States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 1979) (courts reluctant
to use political question doctrine in criminal cases); see also Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d
504, 513-16 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting Government argument that political question doctrine renders nonjusticiable issue whether "political offense" exception applies to extradition); In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, slip op. at 21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (declining to use political question doctrine to limit
inquiry into political offense issue). See generally Tigar, supra note 336, at 1175-78.
346. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
347. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
348. Id. at 177.
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The history of the offenses clause, read in the light of the framers' understanding of international law, does not suggest an exclusive role for
Congress. The debates over the offenses clause, outlined above, imply a
limited grant of authority to define offenses whose elements are unclear,
not to create offenses out of whole cloth. 49 International law was "part
of our law."3 5 0 If it required some definition, Congress could do that, but
nothing in the debates over the clause suggests that the courts should not
play their historic role in saying what the law is. In those days, international law, unlike the law of a particular foreign jurisdiction, was a
question for the court, not the trier of fact. 5 ' Determining the law did
not demand a political decision, but rather required an examination of
"the usages, the national acts, and the general assent, of that portion of
the [jurist's] world of which he considers himself a part. .. .
Nor does the courts' treatment of the offenses clause suggest an understanding that Congress has the ultimate decisional authority. From the
earliest days of the nation, the courts have considered the scope of congressional authority to define piracies,353 felonies'" and offenses against
the law of nations.3 55 Powell v. McCormack356 presents an analogous
case in which the Court refused to invoke the doctrine. The House of
Representatives claimed unreviewable discretion to judge the qualifications of its own members under article I, section 5 of the Constitution.
The Court rebuffed the argument, holding that the House's discretion to
exclude members was limited by article I, section 2, which sets forth the

349. As shown from the discussion of the history of the offenses clause, see supra
notes 58, 59 and accompanying text, the framers apparently did not intend to give Congress unbounded authority to define offenses against the law of nations. They likely assumed that Congress would specify the elements of crimes more generally understood by
the international community.
350. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Lobel, supra note 4,
at 1084-90; 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 223, at § 8.
351. Thomas Jefferson apparently did not consider trial by jury necessary in "matters of fact triable by the laws of the land and not by the law of Nations." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 440 (J. Boyd ed. 1958), and in 1 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 60, at 605, 606. Alexander Hamilton agreed with this conclusion. THE FEDERALIST
No. 83, supra note 46, at 468-69.
352. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825).
353. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
354. Oliver v. United States, 230 F. 971 (9th Cir. 1916) (statute covered attempt to
commit rape; rape occurred on American vessel on high seas).
355. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887); United States v. White, 27 F.
200 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1886).
356. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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three qualifications for House membership. 5 ' Likewise, under the offenses clause, Congress is restrained by international law.
In the general case, there is no reason to believe that the other Baker
v. Carr criteria3 5 8 apply. The offenses clause presents questions
uniquely suitable for judicial resolution, with standards readily at hand.
Indeed, unlike some other provisions of article I, section 8, the standards
are built into the text: Is there an offense against the law of nations?
This differs completely from such open-ended grants of power as article
I, section 8, clause 3, which gives Congress power "to regulate" interstate and foreign commerce, and article I, section 8, clause 14, which
gives Congress unlimited authority to make rules to govern the land and
naval forces.3 5 ' Although the bases for finding practice to be a norm of
customary international law are not always clear, no commentators suggest that the decision is open-ended or merely political. To the contrary,
the effort is generally to objectify the decision by demanding evidence of
uniform practice and opinio juris. Unlike situations involving hidden or
secret evidence in the possession of the executive branch,3 " if custom
exists, it must be public. That it may be esoteric, as it often is, is a
matter of inadvertence-and annoyance-rather than design.
Similar reasons undercut the prudential concerns, which Justice Brennan outlined more explicitly in Baker v. Carr.6 1 They include the possibility of lack of respect for the other branches of government, the need
for unquestioning adherence to the political branches' determinations, or
the possibility of conflicting prouncements from different branches of
government.3 6 2 In one way or another each of these flows from the judicary's reluctance to become enmeshed in policy decisions where other
branches of the government have taken a different (or various different)
position. That overlooks, however, the type of question the courts will
decide-whether a congressional enactment properly embodies an offense
against law of nations. There is no greater policy content here than in
any determination of the state of the law.
It is also somewhat difficult to imagine realistic scenarios in which the

357. Id. at 522.
358. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6-8, 10 (1973) (court erred in evaluating training of Ohio National Guard as a predicate to granting injunctive relief; U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 16, gave Congress authority over state militias and courts lacked
competence to make the required "complex, subtle and professional decisions on such
matters").
360. Scharpf, supra note 336, at 567-68.
361. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
362. Id. at 217. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 21:865

current problem would arise. The political question issue might arise if
the President committed that a person would be punished for allegedly
criminal behavior, obviously an incredibly unlikely event, or if the President made a public commitment that certain behavior would be criminalized as violating customary international law, without clear evidence to
3 63
support the law.
In the first situation, embarrassment would occur only if the other
states involved did not understand that in this country a trial must precede criminal sanctions. It need hardly be said that no court would bow
to that embarrassment argument. The second hypothetical is more problematic. Other states might not understand why a United States commitment to enact such a statute is not conclusive. There are several responses. First, the issue is only likely to arise in the context of a criminal
prosecution. There, the dictates of due process should defeat the President's commitment: on one side of the scale there is a criminal penalty;
on the other, a political, discretionary statement by the President. Second, if the existence of an international norm is in doubt, other states
should not complain if a United States court, after a proper inquiry,
refuses to proclaim it law. Third, if the political branches wished to
avoid the pitfalls of the offense clause, they could use other heads of
authority, such as entering into a treaty and then enacting implementing
legislation. Finally, this is not strictly a foreign affairs matter. If another
nation claimed reparations, rather than demanding punishment, its claim
would be handled through standard foreign relations channels. What is
at stake here is a domestic criminal prosecution.
The Baker v. Carr (or Goldwater v. Carter)criteria 64 are merely the
projection on the practical plane of the theoretical rationale for the political question doctrine. Thus, it may be worthwhile to see if any of the
more generalized rationales supports judicial abstinence. If the doctrine
flows from the constitutional text and applies only where the text allocates power solely to one branch, it is highly improbable that the text
precludes judicial participation in decisions concerning the existence of
customary international law. The framers did believe that our law incorporates custom; they must have envisioned judges as saying what that
customary law was, just as they did other law. Many of the cases discussed above required judges to do exactly that, even when the question
involved the offenses clause.
On the other hand, if one views the doctrine as a prudential avoidance

363. A treaty that criminalized the behavior would present a wholly different
situation.
364. See supra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
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device to permit the judiciary to maintain its legitimacy, it is not easy to
see how abstaining from offenses clause cases is useful. Again, if there is
anything judges should do, it is to "say what the law is." Those decisions
implicate basic legal questions, not political ones, so adjudicating them
should not detract from the vision of the court as above political
skirmishing.
B. Deference to CongressionalDefinitions of Offenses Against the
Law of Nations Absent a First Amendment Claim
Having concluded that courts may review statutes passed pursuant to
the offenses clause, one must determine the proper standard of review. In
general, if a regulatory statute does not contravene a fundamental right,
courts require Congress only to have a rational basis for its belief that
the law advances permissible legislative ends. The argument for deference is usually considered more compelling when the issues involved implicate foreign affairs. This view, however, raises several complications.
The argument for deference might be more persuasive if this were
strictly an executive branch rule. Part of the accepted mystique of the
Presidency is the great freedom to act in the area of foreign affairs. Congressional delegations of authority may be much broader in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs. 8 5 The President may enter into executive agreements that have the effect of overriding state laws when the
President recognizes foreign countries 8 6 or resolves international claims
generally. 86 7 Courts grant "great weight" to executive branch interpretations of treaty language.368 The Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.5 69 suggested two reasons (that apparently sur365.
366.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301

U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
367. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981).
368. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982); Kolovrat
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961). This rule may, however, simply be an extension of
the administrative law precept that interpretations of a statute by the agency charged
with the statute's enforcement are entitled to great weight. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); see also Damrosch, Application of Customary InternationalLaw by U.S. Domestic Tribunals, 76 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 251,
252 (1982) (arguing that United States courts defer less to State Department views on
treaties than on customary international law).
369. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland also articulated a
theory that the foreign affairs power is extra-constitutional:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to main-
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vive today) for the level of deference paid to executive branch decisions
in foreign affairs. Not surprisingly, those reasons largely overlap the political question doctrine. First, there is the "embarassment" argument:
Courts wish to avoid interfering with and possibly undermining United
States foreign policy initiatives.3 7 0 Second, there is the "competence" argument: The President has access to confidential information, not availa37 1
ble to Congress, upon which executive judgments might be based.
Generalizing, courts take into account the executive's "superior ability to
make factual determinations involving foreign situations"3 72 - its peculiar ability to deal with an entire problem-as opposed to the piecemeal
ways in which courts confront problems and the courts' own perception
of their inability to predict the reactions of foreign governments.3 7 3 Commentators374 and courts37 have extended this rationale to the political
branches generally vis a vis the courts.37 6
The cases and writers talk casually of deference to the "political
branches." But the generally understood grounds for deferring to congressional action differ substantially from those advanced for deferring to
the executive. In the former case, we assume that Congress does-or at

tain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.
Id. at 318. Justice Jackson, in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), referred to Sutherland's view as dictum. Id. at 635-36 n.2
(Jackson, J., concurring). Commentators have also criticized the historical basis of Justice Sutherland's analysis. See, e.g., L. Henkin, supra note 4, at 22-26.

370. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
371. Id. at 320-22. This concern for secrecy in the handling of foreign policy, especially treaties, has deep constitutional roots. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (A.
Hamilton), supra note 46, at 455; 4 ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 263 (Pierce Butler); id.
at 204 (Charles Cotesworth Pinckney).

372. Trimble, ForeignPolicy Frustrated-Dames& Moore, Claims CourtJurisdiction and a New Raid on the Treasury, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 317, 365 (1984) (citing
Scharpf, supra note 336, at 567-68, 571-83).
373. Id.

374. See, e.g., id.
375. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1458-59 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
376. In one recent case, the court noted that it is particularly inappropriate for courts
to examine congressional power to enact legislation in the foreign affairs area when Congress and the President act in unison. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1480
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). That court found that the present situation did not involve a case of
Presidential action by itself. Accordingly, the tripartite analysis of Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952), as
adopted in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981), was not warranted.
Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1480.
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least is more likely to-represent a majority view, and that no similar
majoritarian ground supports the authority of the courts.17 7 The usually
articulated grounds for deferring to the executive in foreign affairs are
quite different. Whether they derive explicitly from Curtiss-Wright's extra-constitutional theoretical base or from the pragmatic considerations
stated by Justice Sutherland in that case (and repeated by subsequent
courts and commentators), 378 they are anti-majoritarian, indeed almost
monarchical. 1 9
Even the accepted arguments for deference to the executive are not
very cogent here. Without cataloging all the examples of potential executive embarrassment, typical examples include situations in which the
President takes a position in foreign policy and the courts take an opposite position, 8 ' or in which courts might force the United States Government to take a position when it does not wish to do so.38 Even in these
circumstances, however, it is difficult to see how such embarrassment
would occur. If courts take a position contrary to that assumed by Congress or the President as to the content of customary international law,
only pathological naivete on the part of other nations could lead to embarrassment. They would have to believe that the political branches have
the final word regarding both what constitutes the law in a constitutional
sense and whether United States law violates the first amendment. That
seems most unlikely. Moreover, most nations should be expected to understand that, except in the clearest cases, there may be some question

377. See A. BICKEL, supra note 334, at 16-20; Choper, The Supreme Court and the
Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810, 830-32
(1974). This is not to deny that anti-majoritarian factors play a major role in the legislative process. See S. KmiSLOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 20
(1968).
378. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
379. The majority's view may work its way into the process as a constraint every
four years by changing those who select the judges, but that does not distinguish the
executive very much from the judiciary. Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a
Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21
(1968); Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284-86 (1957).
380. For example, Professor Trimble posits a situation in which the United States
Court of Claims awards additional relief to a claimant who had received some relief from
the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, finding there had been a taking without just
compensation. This would imply that the Tribunal had somehow behaved unfairly, contrary to the executive branch position on the Tribunal. Trimble, supra note 372, at 36667.
381. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring);
Trimble, supra note 372, at 367-68.
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about whether international practice has reached the level of custom. It
follows that they should be aware that, except in those very clear cases,
executive or congressional policy relating to custom may not be legally
authoritative.
To some extent, international law recognizes that states should be
aware of the internal gears and wheels of other states' legal systems.
Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiess. 2 states
that a treaty does not become binding between states if it is manifestly
apparent-to one acting in good faith-that it was adopted in violation
of the constitutional processes of the other state. Judicial review of statutes is a hallmark of the United States system. Given the substantial
number of countries that now employ some form of judicial review, one
would further expect states to understand that executive and legislative
pronouncements that something is "law" are not final. 383
The competence argument-the second argument in favor of judicial
deference-is even weaker than the embarrassment argument. To the
extent that it rests upon the existence of secret facts, it does not apply to
the existence of a customary norm of international law. To the contrary,
the facts at issue must be well known to support the existence of a norm.
Nor does it apply to Congress as opposed to the President; the desire to
keep things secret also means secret from Congress. More to the point,
deciding whether a practice has reached the level of "law" is precisely
what judges do."8 4 The argument also rests on the need for speed, again,
absent here.

382. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in BASIc DOCUMN-TS supra note
125 and at 368-69, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 890 (1969).
383. Judicial review of statutes virtually originated in the United States with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and has spread throughout much of the
world. See W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, supra note 328, at 32, 44-45, 91 (judicial
review in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Ireland); see generally M. CAP-

(1971); Cappelletti, Judicial Review in ComparativePerspective, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1017 (1970). The European
PELLETI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Community has a court that exercises judicial review of national statutes. See, e.g.,
Marckx Case, 1979 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUM. R'rs. 410; see generally F. CASTBERG,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1974).
384. Arguably, the judicial determination of customary international law, like the
law of other nations, is a matter of law. While the drafters of Rule 44.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not use the term judicial notice, the procedure set out by the
rule is very much like judicial notice. See I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 200[02], at 200-6-200-7 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Moreover, appellate
courts should and do exercise de novo review of facts when those facts determine results
that affect first amendment rights. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,

Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).
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Applied to congressional action, the argument for deference is even
weaker. The majoritarian argument does not fully justify deference to
congressional definitions of the law of nations. To first order, declaring
the existence of those rules is not a policy determination at all; either
there are rules or there are not. But the first order is not the whole story.
In some cases there is room for judgment in saying what the law is.
The judgment as to the existence of international legal rules is, however, quite different from other judgments involving legislation. Lyng v.
InternationalUnion, 85 is a typical example of judicial review of a congressional economic judgment. At issue in Lyng was a federal statute
that forbade states from issuing food stamps to households in which one
of the household members was on strike. 86 The Court rejected first
amendment challenges and, as relevant here, an equal protection attack.
It held that the statute was justified because it was rationally related to
Congress' desire not to favor one side of a labor dispute.38 7 In this respect, Congress is making a policy choice that has no logic other than a
congressional desire to achieve a certain purported end-neutrality in
labor disputes. Judicial interference in the result would simply substitute
the Court's preference for Congress' in an area lacking standards for
guidance.
In contrast, judicial consideration of the congressional definition of an
offense is based on the principle implicit in the offenses clause itself, that
an international norm exists. The offenses clause differs from many
other constitutional provisions in that it contains not only its own standard against which to measure congressional action, but a specifically
legal standard at that. Similarly, there is an obvious distinction between
Congress' decision to impose criminal sanctions on the violation of an
established norm, such as slavery, and its decision that there is a norm.
Finally, the congressional determination that a certain act constitutes an
offense against the law of nations contains nothing of the political character of the executive determinations that supported the discretion given
to the President in Zemel v. Rusk,388 Haig v. Agee 89 and Regan v.
Wald.390 Accordingly, a deferential standard of review will almost never

385. 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988). See also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S.
Ct. 1645, 1652 (1988) (similar standard applied to state statute).
386. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, § 109, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357.
387. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1192-93.
388. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
389. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
390. 468 U.S. 222 (1984). In Zemel and Wald, the issues were related to a determination that travel to Cuba was not in the best interests of the United States. In Agee, the
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be appropriate.
One might object that the decision to formulate a new "norm" of international law or to recognize an emerging norm is intensely political,
and may not be legal at all in any traditional, domestic sense. While that
is true, it does not vitiate this argument. The United States does not need
the offenses clause to participate in the progressive development of international law. Decisions as to international obligations, whether made by
the President alone or by the President and the Senate, will not necessarily have a domestic effect. Problems arise only when international
agreements or statutes executing them constrain domestic behavior.
C. Deference to CongressionalDefinitions of Offenses Against the
Law of Nations when the "Offense" Violates the FirstAmendment
The foregoing argument may seem to run contrary to accepted notions
of the judicial role in reviewing statutes. Yet, even if that analysis is
incorrect, the question remains whether the interests embodied in the
statute are "compelling" for a first amendment analysis. "Compelling"
both is and is not a term of art. On the one hand, it is among several
words that the Supreme Court uses interchangeably to connote an important governmental interest.3 91 On the other hand, some cases imply a
distinction between "important" and "compelling." '92 The question is
not one of semantics; rather, it is how one identifies a governmental interest of sufficient stature that it permits even a narrowly-drawn speech
restriction. If the statute restricts first amendment rights, is an interest
inherent simply in the fact that Congress reasonably believes there is an
international offense-or that there is in fact such an offense-sufficient
to save the statute?

question was whether Agee harmed the national security interests of the United States by
revealing the names of C.I.A. agents. Both of those questions are quintessentially political. By contrast, and almost tautologically, the determination that something is an offense
against the law of nations is a legal decision, appropriate for courts to review. Perhaps
most important is the fact that a statute enacted pursuant to the offenses clause will
almost certainly involve criminal penalties and will therefore affect a fundamental liberty
interest. The author is indebted to Jules Lobel for this point.
391. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 703 (1986) ("compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong") (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
392. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), a gender-discrimination case, the
Court articulated an intermediate equal protection test that fell between strict scrutiny
(which requires a compelling interest) and the deferential test applied to economic regulation (which requires only a legitimate interest). The Craig test requires an "important
governmental interest." Id. at 199.
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But "compelling"-or its surrogates-are meaningful only in context,
and that context is a challenge to federal or state action that infringes
either a fundamental rights93 or equal protection.3 94 The counterweight
to the allegedly compelling governmental interest flows either directly or
by implication from the Constitution. Thus, compelling must mean
something beyond "important"; it must express a value or values that
have roots in the community's broader interest. In general, interests that
have been found sufficient to justify restraints on speech have that element.39 5 Without something more, it would not appear that an international interest alone had that element, since it does not necessarily express values of the people the Constitution protects. Of course, the fact
that the interest is that of another nation does not preclude its having a
compelling status: the interest of United States citizens in the lives of
Ethiopians suffering from famine may be compelling. Moreover, the fact
that the interest finds its way into domestic legislation indicates that it
has some value to the domestic community. The question thus becomes
what characteristics such an interest must have to be "compelling"; more
specifically, is a "foreign affairs" interest sufficient?
1. Judicial Background
The cases provide some implicit guidance as to the weight of foreign
policy interests. Courts often couple those interests with "national security." In certain circumstances courts have indicated that a national security or military interest will justify an infringement of first amendment
speech or press rights.3 9 The Court's cases appear to place those defense
interests ahead of other interests, including foreign relations. 39 7 In no
393. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to interstate
travel); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (right to privacy).
394. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477-78, 491-92 (1980) (requirement that recipients of certain federal grants give 10% to "minority business enterprises"

affirmed as a legitimate method of remedying prior discrimination in awarding of federal
grants).

395. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 930 (1986)
(governmental interest in preserving quality of urban neighborhoods justified restriction

on location of "adult" theaters); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972)
(interest in preventing disruption at public schools justified total ban on picketing on

sidewalk adjacent to schools).
396.

See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 94-97

(1961) (where national security is involved and congressional decision not "unfounded or
irrational" and congressional appraisal not unentertainable, Court will not substitute its
judgment for congressional accommodation of "exigencies of self-preservation and the
values of [first amendment] liberty").
397. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (upholding all-male draft regis-
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case has the Court held that foreign affairs or foreign relations interests
are inherently "compelling."
When political branch actions in the foreign relations or related areas
directly infringe explicit constitutional rights, courts have not always deferred to them. 98 Perhaps the clearest example of that position is Reid
v. Covert.319 In Reid, the Supreme Court considered whether dependents
of United States military personnel could be tried in foreign countries by
military regulations and procedures. 0 0 Writing for the Court, Justice
Black held that, contrary to Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
regulations permitting such a trial, article III, section 2 and the fifth and
sixth amendments to the Constitution governed; therefore, trials pursuant to the UCMJ were unconstitutional. 40 1 The fact that the application
of the UCMJ was predicated upon the existence of an executive agree-

tration against equal protection challenge) ("The case arises in the context of Congress'
authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the
Court accorded Congress greater deference.").
398. Ironically, perhaps the most egregious examples of judicial deference, albeit
under the war power, occurred in cases involving individual rights. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
but see Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(carefully reviewing evidence and granting writ of coram nobis). Although Justice Jackson, a former United States Attorney General, must have known something about executive decision-making, he dissented in Korematsu. See 323 U.S. at 242 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
399. 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
400. Id. at 3.
401. Justice Black clearly stated the premise of his argument in Reid: "The United
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other
source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution." Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No. 78001A (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 179, 188, 192 (1980)
(everything United States officials do must be authorized by the Constitution; any matter
concerning the Government's operation of an occupied territory is not necessarily a political question). Tiede is discussed in Gordon, American Courts, InternationalLaw and
"Political Questions" Which Touch Foreign Relations, 14 INT'L LAw. 297 (1980);
Paust, Is the PresidentBound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-ForeignAffairs and
National Security Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 719, 723, 724 (1982).
The premise of Reid is directly contrary to Justice Sutherland's rationale in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Curtiss-Wright and Reid
cannot coexist very peacefully. If all of the political branches' power comes from the
Constitution, Justice Sutherland's somewhat mystical view of the flow of foreign affairs
power is unacceptable. It does not follow, however, that Justice Sutherland's practical
reasons in Curtiss-Wright for according discretion to the political branches thereby lose
their force. Indeed, one could argue that they are wholly distinct from the supposed
rationale.
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ment between the United States and Great Britain did not alter Justice
Black's conclusion.4" 2 The Court did not distinguish between treaties and
executive agreements.4 03 The Court also rejected the Government's argument that article 1, section 8, clause 14, which empowers Congress to
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces," gave Congress the power to enact the regulation at issue.40 4
In two other cases in which governmental authority rested on either
the foreign affairs power or the closely related war power, the conflict
between governmental authority and the first amendment was more direct, and the Court upheld first amendment challenges. In United States
v. Robel,4 °5 the Court found unconstitutional section 5(a)(1)(D) of the
Subversive Activities Control Act, which effectively made it a crime for a
member of the Communist Party to work in a "defense facility."408 The
Government argued that the statute was passed pursuant to Congress'
war power and was thus entitled to substantial deference."0 " Nevertheless, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, rejected the notion
that the war power was a "talismanic incantation" that would support
"any exercise of congressional power."40 8 Recognizing that Congress has
the authority to regulate in the area, the Court found the regulation at
issue overbroad.40 9
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided New York Times Co. v. United
States,410 better known as the Pentagon Papers Case. In that case, the
Court refused to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post
from publishing a classified study entitled "History of U.S. DecisionMaking Process on Viet Nam Policy."'41 The Government argued,

402. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 15 & n.29. Justice Black stated that "no agreement with
a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution." Id. at 16.
403. Id. at 17. In discussing the treaty power, the Court cited Geofroy v. Riggs, 133
U.S. 258, 267 (1890), for the proposition that it "would not be contended that [the treaty
power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids ... ." Reid, 354 U.S.
at 17.
404. Reid, 354 U.S. at 19-41. See also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (Congress has no inherent foreign affairs power and may not use such power to strip a person
of citizenship).
405. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
406. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, § 5, 64 Stat. 992 (1950), as amended
by Act of Aug. 24, 1954, 68 Stat. 777 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1982)).
407. Robel, 389 U.S. at 263.
408. Id. at 263.
409. Id. at 264-68.
410. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
411. Id. at 714.
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among other things, that the President's authority to protect against publication stemmed from the President's constitutional power over the conduct of foreign affairs and his power as commander-in-chief. 1 2 Justice
Black, writing for himself and Justice Douglas, rejected that argument.
Noting the breadth and vagueness of the word "security," he wrote:
The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic. The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the
need to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial
governments, sought to give this new society strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not be
abridged.

413

In the Pentagon Papers Case, of course, the Government believed that
publication of the report would prove embarrassing. In his concurrence,
Justice Douglas emphasized the congruence of that concern with the
concerns of seditious libel law, pointing out that one of the core functions
of the first amendment was to preclude precisely such statutes.414
This does not mean that the first amendment always prevails when
security issues are at stake. In Greer v. Spock, 41 5 the Court affirmed
Army regulations forbidding political speeches-in this case by minorparty presidential candidates-and the dissemination of literature, including newspapers and handbills, without prior approval on a military
base. The Court held that the base was not a public forum. 416 It then
found that the prohibition on political speeches, which was enforced
without discriminating among viewpoints, was justified by the military's
asserted desire to remain independent of partisan politics. 4 7 The prior-

412. Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
413. Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
414. Id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring). Indeed, only a few years previously,
the court had decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which
initiated the constitutionalization of libel law by relying upon the analogy between that
body of law and seditious libel. Yet, in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp.

990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), the district court enjoined publication of an article entitled "The
H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It." Notably, in Progressive,section 2274(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b), granted courts
authority to issue injunctions preventing the disclosure of some of the information at

issue in the article. In the Pentagon Papers Case, there was no such legislative authorization. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
415. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
416. Id. at 832-33, 838.
417. Id. at 838-39.
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approval regulation passed constitutional muster because the base commander could only disapprove publications that constituted "a clear dan'
In effect, the Court
ger to [military] loyalty, discipline or morale."418
deferred to the executive branch's primacy in military affairs to determine whether the speech would undermine discipline. The majority
opinion did not have to consider precisely how much deference the executive branch was entitled to, since the government may restrict speech as
it desires in nonpublic forums. In his concurrence, Justice Powell discussed the substantiality of the governmental interest and the breadth of
the restraint.419 He found the interest in political neutrality sufficiently
strong to justify the speech ban, especially in view of the fact that
soldiers could leave the base to obtain unrestricted access to information.420 Similarly, the military's interest in morale and a discipline justified the "more limited" prior-approval regulations. 421 Justice Powell relied on the "unique need of the military to 'insist upon a respect for duty
and discipline without counterpart in civilian life.'"422
Foreign affairs interests alone have not justified a speech-restriction
under a strict scrutiny test. However, danger exists in the facile linkage
between foreign affairs and national security that could lead to treating
them equivalently. Perhaps the best example of this is a series of cases
involving the right to travel internationally.42 3 In those cases the Court
has recently deferred to very general notions of "foreign affairs" and
"national security."
The sequence of cases actually began very well for free speech. In the
first case, Kent v. Dulles,4 24 the Court held that the Secretary of State
did not have "unbridled" discretion to grant or withhold passports, in
view of the conceded liberty interest in foreign travel. 25 In Aptheker v.

418. Id. at 840 (quoting from a Department of the Army letter, dated June 23,
1969). See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding regulations imposing a
prior restraint on the right to petition military personnel).
419. Greer, 424 U.S. at 847-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
420. Id. at 847 (Powell, J., concurring).
421. Id. at 848-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
422. Id. at 848 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738, 757 (1975)).
423. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); and
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984). The due process liberty interest in international
travel must be distinguished from the "virtually unqualified" constitutional right of interstate travel. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978) (quoting United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).

424. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
425.

Id. at 129. Justice Douglas also noted that no condition of war existed. Id. at
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Secretary of State,42 the Court explicitly linked the first amendment
and the fifth amendment liberty to travel."2 The dispute in that case
arose when the State Department revoked the passports of two prominent Communist Party officials under the Subversive Activities Control
Act,428 which made it a crime for members of the Communist Party to
apply for passports after a final order requiring the party to register. In
his opinion for the majority, Justice Goldberg wrote that the "freedom of
travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech
and association." 42 9 The Court accordingly reversed the revocations as
overbroad. 30
Since Aptheker, the Court has systematically drained any first amendment content from the right to foreign travel. In Zemel v. Rusk,4"' the
plaintiff challenged restrictions on travel to Cuba. Acknowledging the
impact on the flow of information from the passport restriction, the
Court held that the restriction did not infringe a first amendment right,
but only a fifth amendment due process right.3 2 The Court perceived
only "an inhibition of action. There are few restrictions on action which
could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data
flow. .

.

. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the

unrestrained right to gather information."4 3 Relying on CurtissWright,4 4 the Court held that the act had sufficiently definite standards
for the Secretary of State to formulate the travel controls at issue.43 5 The
Court thus accepted the view of the State Department, the agency

128.

426. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
427. Id. The Court had earlier recognized that interests in foreign travel have first
amendment overtones, such as the right of an American "to shape his own life as he
thinks best" and rights to obtain information. Kent, 357 U.S. at 126-27 (quoting Z.
CHAFFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONsTrTUTON OF 1787, at 197, 195-96
(1956)).
428. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, § 6, 64 Stat. 993, as amended, 68
Stat. 778 (1954) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1982)).
429. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 517. Professor Kalven writes that Justice Goldberg put
the argument less than persuasively: "The vice is not the interference with travel; it is
the interference with freedom of political association,.... The interference with travel is
relevant only insofar as limiting travel imposes partial sanctions on association." H.
KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 381 (J. Kalven ed. 1988) (emphasis in original).

430. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514.
431. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
432. Id. at 16.
433. Id. at 16-17.
434. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See supra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
435. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17.
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charged with the interpretation of the statute, that such restrictions were
permitted. 8
Sixteen years after Zemel, the Court decided Haig v. Agee,417 which
extended Zemel's holding on the scope of executive discretion. Philip
Agee was a former C.I.A. agent who began to expose other C.I.A. employees and sources in 1974.4S3 In an opinion by Chief justice Burger,
the Court noted that evidence in the record showed that Agee's activities
had "prejudiced the ability of the United States to obtain intelligence,
and [had] been followed by episodes of violence against the persons and
organizations identified." 4 9
In 1979, relying upon regulations issued pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §
211a, the same statute at issue in Zemel, the Secretary of State revoked
Agee's passport. Agee challenged the revocation. After setting forth the
statutory basis of the revocation, the Chief Justice wrote that the need
for deference to the administrator was "especially so in the areas of foreign policy and national security .. -4o
"..He then cited the "sole organ"
language from Curtiss-Wright and noted that "[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for
judicial intervention."44 1 The Court went on to find congressional acquiescence in the administrator's "policy" 442 and distinguished Kent because
the instant case involved conduct, as opposed to mere beliefs. 4
The Court picked up the speech-conduct distinction again when it
dealt with and rejected Agee's free speech claims. Citing old and probably incorrect dictum from Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen,44 4 the Chief
Justice noted that Agee's disclosures had in fact obstructed intelligence
operations and hindered recruiting of intelligence personnel. They were
thus not subject to first amendment protection. 44 5 Again distinguishing
Zemel on the speech-conduct ground, the Court wrote: "[W]hen there is

436. Id. at 7-12.

437. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
438. Id. at 283-84.
439. Id. at 284-85 (footnotes omitted).
440. Id. at 291.
441. Id. at 292-93.
442. Id. at 300.
443. Id. at 304-05.
444. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). Justice Linde has shown rather convincingly that the
Near dictum is a distorted reading of first amendment law. Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 MINN. L. REv. 171, 190-91 (1981).
445. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1981). The Court had earlier rejected
Agee's right to travel claim, again relying on Curtiss-Wright, this time to establish the
importance of the President's confidential sources of information. Id. at 306-08.
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a substantial likelihood of 'serious damage' to national security or foreign
policy as a result of a passport holder's activities in foreign countries, the
Government may take action to ensure that the holder may not exploit
the sponsorship of his travels by the United States."4 4
Under the umbrella of a broad "national security" or "foreign policy"
power, the Court grants the President (through the Secretary of State)
authority to interpret statutes in a way that impinges upon constitutional
rights, based solely on congressional acquiescence. Particularly in Agee,
the State Department was unable to demonstrate acquiescence in specific
acts; it could only demonstrate that acquiescence in a generalized "policy.' 447 The Court's analysis bleeds security concerns into foreign policy
concerns. However, it still does so in the context of a due process test
48
rather than a first amendment test."

446. Id. at 309.
447. See Agee, 453 U.S. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Farber has provided a detailed critique of the acquiescence argument. Farber, National Security, the
Right to Travel, and the Court, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 263, 277-82.
The Court's first amendment test is troubling. It can be read to impose much less of a
burden on the Government than the usual test for penalties imposed upon the advocacy
of illegal action. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the Court held Ohio's
Criminal Syndicalism Act unconstitutional. The act punished "advocat[ing] ...the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform." Id. at 444-45 (citing OHo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2923.13). The Court held that such advocacy cannot be punished unless it
is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." Id. at 447. Conceivably, the Court did not intend to cut back on
Brandenburgwhen it set forth the above test in Agee. The Court may have believed that
in view of the known past consequences of Agee's actions, further harm to United States
interests could safely be predicted. On the other hand, the Court may have felt that, in
view of the "national security or foreign policy" interests implicated by Agee's behavior,
less of a showing was necessary. If so, the case indicates far more than simply that the
Court is willing to extend broad discretion to Presidential interpretations of statutes in
the foreign affairs and national security context, but that the usual test for avoiding the
chilling effect of governmental action on speech is inapplicable if national security or
foreign affairs is involved. Justice Brennan dissented on delegation grounds and therefore
did not reach the first amendment issues. However, he indicated in a lengthy footnote
that he believed that those issues were substantial. Agee, 453 U.S. at 320-21 n.10.
448. In Agee, the Court relied on Snepp v. United States, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.
1979), rev'd in part, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). Snepp was a former C.I.A. employee who
signed a secrecy agreement that required him to submit any proposed publication to the
C.I.A. for its approval. Snepp later published a book, Decent Interval, without giving
advance notice to the C.I.A. Although the C.I.A. conceded that the book contained
neither classified information nor any other information not already made public, it nevertheless sued, seeking (1) a declaration that Snepp had violated contractual and fiduciary duties; (2) an injunction against future breaches; (3) damages; and (4) the imposition
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Finally, in Regan v. Wald, 49 United States citizens were prevented
from travelling to Cuba by Treasury Department regulations prohibiting
transactions involving property in which Cuba, or a Cuban national, had
any interest."' In rejecting a due process argument, the Court accepted
Zemel's rationale that the restrictions on travel at issue did not implicate
first amendment rights.4 1 Comparing Zemel and Wald, the Court noted
that both regulations at issue were "justified by weighty concerns of foreign policy."' 452 Therefore, the case represented "merely an example of
this classical deference to the political branches in matters of foreign policy." 53 Unlike the earlier cases, no security concern was implicated.
As a realistic matter, Agee involves punishment for speech; with Zemel
and Wald, it reveals that the Court is willing to give short shrift to
claims that might be thought to have first amendment implications in the
name of "foreign policy." It might push inference too far to conclude

of a constructive trust over all revenues Snepp received from the book. The Supreme
Court held for the Government. Relegating first amendment issues to a footnote, Snepp,
444 U.S. at 509 n.3, the Court declared that the Government had a compelling interest
in its need to protect the secrecy of "information important to our national security and
the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign
intelligence service." Id. While the case does not address questions of legislative or executive discretion, it does indicate that the Supreme Court will view some national security
interests as compelling, even though one of the supposed interests-protecting confidential information-was clearly bogus in view of the Government's concession. See Cheh,

JudicialSupervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expressionfor Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Information, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 690 (1984); see generally Medow, The First Amendment and the
Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 775 (1982). On the relationship among Snepp, Agee and United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.
1979), see Koffler & Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 816

(1984). See also Knoll, NationalSecurity: The Ultimate Threat to the FirstAmendment,
66 MINN. L. REv. 161 (1981). On considerations relating to the need for and limitation
of secrecy, see Futterman, Controlling Secrecy in Foreign Affairs in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLIcY 6 (F. Wilcox & R. Frank eds. 1976).
Snepp also relies on an idiosyncratic theory of fiduciary duty: under its analysis any
employment contract creates a duty to protect nonconfidential information. See Moss,
Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 179 Cal. App. 3d 124, 224 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) (only in
limited circumstances does law prohibit employee's use of employer's information).
Moreover, as Koffler and Gershman point out, the Court neglected the adhesive nature
of the contractual provisions. Koffler & Gershman, supra, at 847 n.134.
449. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
450. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1983).
451. Wald, 468 U.S. at 241-42.
452. Id. at 242.
453. Id. The court relied on United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936), and Harisiadas v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
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that the Court's repeated elections to consider those cases under due process analyses indicate that the governmental interests in them would not
justify restrictions on speech as such. But these cases do emphasize that
no case expressly has given that weight to foreign policy alone. 4 " Moreover, unlike offenses clause cases, the travel cases involve executive,
rather than congressional, action. Even if those decisions correctly
subordinate speech concerns to foreign policy concerns, they provide at
best tangential support for the proposition that congressional action such
as a statute enacted pursuant to the offenses clause is "compelling."
It is important to highlight precisely the distinction that the courts
have blurred. "National security" is not synonymous with "foreign policy" or "foreign affairs." In the past, courts understood this difference.
Both Justices White and Stewart, concurring in the Pentagon Papers
Case, held that a sufficient showing of immediate harm to national security interests might justify an injunction.4 5 5 Not all foreign relations
involve national security; the term encompasses everything from nuclear
arms control to commodities agreements. While sufficiently immediate,
irreparable national security interests may in extremely exigent circumstances justify restrictions on free speech or press; 4 absent those sorts of
concerns, it is hard to see that generalized foreign policy interests are
sufficiently compelling to justify speech restraints. Cases like Snepp,
Zemel and Agee implicitly make that point because in each the Court
attempted to base its holding on specific interests that purported to be
security interests, not simply foreign relations interests.
In addition, the argument that United States courts should eschew redressing violations of constitutional rights to avoid entangling themselves
in international problems proves too much to be a general proposition.
The Bill of Rights exists precisely to protect certain highly valued individual freedoms.457 Implicit in this idea is the judgment that those freedoms outweigh other, presumably socially-useful, goals. While the
habeas corpus clause458 permits derogation in times of rebellion or invasion when the public safety requires it, the first amendment contains no

454. See, e.g., Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 233 (1st Cir. 1984).
455. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727, 730 (1971) (Stewart,
J., concurring);

id. at 730, 731 (White, J. concurring).

456. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 197-99 (1982); but
see Knoll, supra note 448. Even Professor Schiuer foresees a detailed evaluation of the
national security interest to ensure that "the dangers to national security are highly probable, likely to be immediate and of great magnitude . . . ." F. SCHAUER, supra, at 199.
457. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; infra note 481 and accompanying

text.
458. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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such language. It is difficult to see that United States courts' discharging
their constitutional responsibility is a sufficient threat to the actual security interests of the country, rather than simply to nonspecific "foreign
relations" interests.
This is not to deny that some embarrassment or complication would
likely occur if Congress passed a law that was later nullified because it
violated the first amendment. However, that is precisely the kind of embarrassment the first amendment not only permits, but to some extent
encourages. If the Pentagon Papers Case means anything, it means that,
even where sensitive matters are involved, mere embarrassment is not a
sufficient reason to defer to the executive, or by inference the congressional branch.4 59 Only an immediate danger of substantial harm to the
country will support interference with first amendment rights.46 0
The close relationship between criticism of other governments and seditious libel provides a related reason to be wary of the embarrassment
argument in this particular case. In England, for example, the old mis461
demeanor of libelling other sovereigns was part of seditious libel law;
that criticism might sour relations between the English Crown and other
states. The notion persists. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland worried about the "delicate" relations between states.462 Diplomatic negotiations are, of course, conducted among elite groups in all societies. The
language of diplomacy is measured and nuanced; it does not contain epi-

459. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); see also supra
notes 410-14. Superficially, the holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1962), is contrary to this logic. Indeed, writing in Sabbatino, Justice Harlan
observed: "It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus
concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . . ." Id. at 428. Here, of course, the whole issue
arises when international law is unclear, at least in the eyes of a court. However, there
are important distinctions between Sabbatino and this situation. First, Sabbatino involved the application of international law to acts in another country; obviously, any
error regarding the application of international law to such acts contains more seeds of
embarrassment and interference in foreign policy than does the present situation, which
deals with application of international law within the United States. Second, in the event
that other states perceive some act to be a violation of international law by United States
citizens within the United States, there is nothing to prevent the political branches from
paying reparations for those acts. The pertinent issue is whether United States citizens
should be punished by the United States Government for their acts. That is a matter
between the United States and its citizens, once proper redress has been made to the
offended sovereign.*
460. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 724-26 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
461. See 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 190.
462. 299 U.S. at 319.
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thets like "baby-killers. 40 3 It is understandable and probably useful that
the members of these elites would prefer to minimize invective and acrimony; it is also understandable and inevitable that diplomats from one
country might work to shield their colleagues from another country's
verbal attacks because they identify with them. But it is precisely those
reasons that should cause courts to be suspicious of laws that inhibit free
speech. To the extent 464 that attacks on "dignity" interests are really
perceived as interfering with the stature and discretion of elite domestic
groups to control the conduct of foreign affairs, they are as suspect as
seditious libel laws.
Assuming that the Government asserts a national security interest, the
judicial inquiry is twofold: (1) whether there is an international law offense; and (2) if so, whether the national security interest justifies the
speech restraint. Since we are dealing with legislative, not executive, action, neither issue should be treated any differently than it would be for
any other statute: each is subject to searching scrutiny. In fact, that conclusion follows a fortiori because even the traditional justifications for
deference to the executive are largely inapplicable.
Labelling something an offense against the law of nations, however,
may not implicate traditional national security or even foreign affairs
concerns: it does not necessarily involve secret information, and it is extremely unlikely to be exigent. Indeed, even if the congressional process
moves quickly, any prosecution-which is likely to be the real goal of the
exercise-will not. Most important, perhaps, the principal actor is Congress, not the President. The question, then, is whether any heightened
judicial deference is appropriate when Congress defines an offense
against the law of nations.
2.

Determining the Strength of the Governmental Interest

One may generally state that Congress has some scope creatively to
define offenses, but acts prohibited by those definitions must not be permitted by other constitutional provisions, such as the first amendment.
We saw previously that Congress breaches the Constitution if it defines
an "offense" that is not an offense, and that its decision in that regard is
entitled to no great deference."6 5 The last section also shows that Con-

463. See 81 CONG. REC. 8486 (1937) (picketers carried signs reading "Mussolini
murders babies").
464. Realistically, in the present case, to a very minor extent.
465. See supra Part IV, B. It is no answer to say that the United States could enter
a treaty by which it committed to criminalize the behavior at issue, after which Congress
could pass executing legislation. If the legislation violated the first amendment, it would
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gress is given no more deference simply because the statute touches a
matter of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, external reasons may permit a
sufficiently narrow speech-infringing statute to stand. It is difficult to
suggest generally what such reasons might be, but several candidates are:
(1) the extent to which the norm reiterates a fundamental United States
interest; (2) the nature of the international legal norm itself; (3) the extent to which the norm protects national security; and (4) whether the
statute vindicates an interest of another state.
a.

Congruence of International Norm and Domestic
Interest as Justification for a Speech Restraint

If an international norm is congruent to or largely overlaps with a
domestic statute that justifies a restraint on speech, it might have sufficient weight to justify such a restraint. Certain international norms bear
dose relationships to United States governmental interests considered to
be compelling. International norms, for example, prohibit slavery and
racial discrimination. To the extent that a domestic statute embodying
such a norm were not redundant, the fact that the international norm is
congruent with the analogous domestic interest would add to the government's interest in enacting the law. Consider a domestic statute criminalizing certain behavior: the existence of an international offense might
justify a statute criminalizing the behavior beyond usual domestic jurisdiction, such as on the high seas or in outer space.
Admittedly, it is difficult to conjure up norms that affect speech. One
possible set of statutes could prohibit advertising that would lead to a
violation of the norm. For example, Congress might properly penalize
advertising for racially or sexually discriminatory jobs."" On the other
hand, although there is a norm against aggressive warfare, that notion is
probably not firmly enough embedded in our national consciousness to
justify laws against adverstising military aircraft.
b.

Nature of the Norm

Courts are perhaps more likely to defer when Congress singles out one
sort of international norm than when it singles out another. Consequently, violations of the international legal duty to inform other states

be void under the reasoning of Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956). See supra notes 40004.
466. Cf Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973) (upholding injunction against publication of gender-designated "helpwanted" ads).
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of potentially dangerous situations 46 7 may require different treatment
than violations of the norm against aggressive warfare. 6 8 It is now generally accepted that a hierarchy of international law norms exists. Thus,
there are ordinary, run-of-the-mill norms and there are certain norms
considered "peremptory" or jus cogens. 6 9 Peremptory norms include a
number of rules that protect human rights 470 as well as other rules that
protect the international system, such as a prohibition against aggressive
warfare.47 1 Peremptory norms differ from non-peremptory norms in that
they demand, in addition to uniform practice and opinio juris of their
existence, uniform acceptance of their fundamental character. 7
The notion of peremptory norms first achieved prominence in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that treaties in

467. Corfu Channel Case (U. K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4.
468. See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 169 (provisional measures), 392 (jurisdiction).
469. See generally Meron, On a Hierarchyof InternationalHuman Rights, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 14 n.56 (1986).
470. RESTATEMENT (TIRD), supra note 130, § 702. However, the Reporters'
Notes point out that not all human rights norms are peremptory. Id. Reporters' note 11.
471. Peremptory norms are, in fact, few in number. They recognize "certain principles which safeguard values of vital importance for humanity and correspond to fundamental moral principles ... ." De Arechaga, InternationalLaw in the Last Third of the
Century, 159 REcUEIL DES CouRs 9, 64 (1978-I). Most scholars believe that they include the prohibition or the use or threat of force, aggressive warfare, genocide, piracy,
the slave trade, racial discrimination and the taking of hostages. Id. De Arechaga also
lists terrorism as a peremptory norm, although many doubt this assertion. See, e.g., TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795-96 (1984) (Edwards, J.). Nevertheless, some writers go farther and state that jus cogens includes sovereignty over natural
resources, I. BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 513, and inviolability of diplomatic archives.
Ago, [1976] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 74. Another category consists of "fundamental
human rights." Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (New Application) (Bel.
v. Sp.) 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32. Typically, the rights in this category are set forth in international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U. S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3,
42. However, neither all human rights nor even all fundamental human rights norms are
peremptory. See Meron, supra note 469, at 14-15 n.58, 18-19.
472. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 130, at § 331, comment e. With respect to
nonperemptory norms, probably the strongest position one could take is that such norms
have the force of law, under the supremacy clause, such that they overcome prior statutes. See Henkin, supra note 4, at 1566. The cases do not appear to support Professor
Henkin's proposition but even if they did, such norms of customary international law do
not thereby overcome constitutional prohibitions. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956), held
that the treaties, also the supreme law of the land under the supremacy clause, cannot
violate the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 16. There is no reason to give nonperemptory customary norms higher authority.
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violation of such norms are void.4"' Most important for present purposes,
the violation of any peremptory norms may lead to international criminal responsibility, since all international criminal offenses are violations
of peremptory norms."4 The final important effect of a human rights
norm's peremptory character is its erga omnes effect: any state may enforce it.4 5
The elevation of some customary norms to the peremptory plane is not
free of dispute. Proving practice and opinio juris are difficult enough;
proving that states accept a given norm as peremptory is even harder.
For example, Professor Weil points out that the international community
apparently accepts the "decolonization" norm as jus cogens, while
France does not even accept it as an ordinary norm.4 6 Similarly, although many developing states may view sovereignty over natural resources as a peremptory norm, developed states might not see it as even
an ordinary rule. Limiting the group of peremptory norms to "fundamental human rights" is no solution because the concept of fundamentality is inevitably subjective. Moreover, what is fundamental in one age
may not be fundamental in another: while the antislavery norm is now
particularly strong, it was not always so. Finally, what is fundamental to
one polity may not be fundamental to another. Thus, even beyond a
mere difficulty of proof, a question arises whether specific norms are
fundamental for all nations. The fact that a particular right is expressed
in a document such as the Universal Declaration is also not conclusive;
many such instruments are of dubious law-making force. For all of those
reasons, there have been and remain dissenters from the generally broad

473. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/
27, reprinted in BAsIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 125, at 349, 370 and at 63 Am. J.
INT'L L. 875, 891 (1969). See generally C. ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT OF Jus COGENS IN
THE LAW OF TREATIES (1976); J. SZTUCKI, JUs COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVEN-

ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1974). Although it is by no means conclusively established, it may also be true that peremptory norms are nonderogable, generally. Lobel,
supra note 4, at 1136; Meron, supra note 469, at 19-20. The argument runs that it
would make little sense to forbid nations from entering treaties that violate peremptory
norms, which they are most unlikely to do anyway, but not to forbid them from violating
the norms unilaterally.
474. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413, 423-24 (1983). Judge Ago has pointed out that not all violations of peremptory
norms lead to international criminal liability. Ago, supra note 471, at 74.
475. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (new Application) (Bel. v. Spain)
1970 I.C.J. at 32; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 130, § 701, Reporters' note 3;
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985) (genocide punishable by
Israel, even though it was not in existence at time of crime).
476. Weil, supra note 474, at 430 n.68.
TION
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agreement on the existence of jus cogens.4 7
For present purposes, one may assume that some norms are peremptory. Should the interest in criminalizing behavior that violates those
norms be "compelling" for the purpose of first amendment analysis?
Even in the absence of an international consensus, a court is likely to
find human rights norms, such as the right to be free from torture, as
"substantial," "important" or "compelling." Preventing genocide, racial
discrimination, and hostage taking 478 would likewise implicate substantial governmental interests under any circumstance. Again, the important
issue is not that the norm is called peremptory, but how congruent it is
with compelling domestic United States interests. Given our stated national commitment to racial equality, a peremptory norm designed to
accomplish the same ends would be compelling. Similarly, were there not
already laws against slavery, a statute based on the international antislavery norm would be compelling, given the thirteenth amendment. In
contrast, norms of an economic character have less claim to additional
weight because domestic statues dealing with such interests are entitled
to no such weight.4 " The difficult issue-whether their status as peremptory norms add anything-arises with less morally-weighted norms,
for example, the asserted peremptory norm of sovereignty over natural
resources.
Peremptory status adds some weight to the argument that the governmental interest is an important one. The proponent of a statute can point
to the general agreement among other nations as an additional basis for
treating the norm as compelling.4 8 That goes to the weight of the Con-

477. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government
to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 916 n.9 (1986);
Schwarzenberger, InternationalJus Cogens, 43 TEX. L. REV. 455 (1965); Weil, supra
note 471. The American Law Institute has adopted a rather tentative position in its

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, noting that due
to the "uncertain scope of the doctrine, . . . [a] domestic court should not on its own
authority refuse to give effect to an agreement on the ground that it violates a peremp-

tory norm."

RESTATEMENT (THRD),

supra note 130, § 331, comment e.

478. See supra note 471.
479. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
the Supreme Court held that the right to education was not "fundamental." Yet that
right is recognized in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, March 20, 1952, E.T.S. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 282, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
December 16, 1966, art. 13, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). The international
recognition of that right could persuade a United States court to elevate it to "fundamen-

tal" status.
480.

It is conceivable that a statute is necessary to permit the offense to be tried in
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gressional interest in enacting the legislation. Given other factors demonstrating the weight of the legislation, this may lead to a finding that the
interest is compelling.
A number of weighty considerations suggest that peremptory status
alone will not render a governmental interest compelling. First, the history of the offenses clause implies that neither the framers nor the First
Congress intended that even international law interests recognized to be
strong in their day would muzzle speech.4 " Second, peremptory norms

federal courts. This is important for peremptory norms that create individual criminal
responsibility. Arguably, federal law preempts state law in the area of offenses against
the law of nations. The purpose of the offenses clause was, after all, to exclude states
from that function. The preemption doctrine prevents states from enacting legislation
contrary to federal regulation. See L. TRIBE, supra note 330, at 376-77. Because the
offenses clause precludes states from defining an offense against the law of nations, the
states may not do so, even if no federal law addresses the issue. Yet, in the area considered by this Article, state courts have acted. See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1
U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa. 0. & T. 1784); Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d
471 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981). If, however, states are excluded
and Congress does not enact legislation criminalizing specified behavior, then there could
be no prosecution in the United States. One might contend that the United States then
violates an international legal obligation to provide a forum to prosecute those who violate peremptory norms.
481. Madison had not advocated a bill of rights at the Convention. Id. See Letter
from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 58, at 319, and in 2 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at
996, 997. With Jefferson's encouragement, he eventually became the guiding force behind the Bill of Rights. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20,
1787), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 438-42 (Boyd ed. 1958),

and in 1 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at 605-08. See also Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 6, 1788), 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra, at 568-69, and in 1 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at 610, 611 (lack of declaration of rights Constitution's "principal defect"). Madison introduced it in the First
Congress. See 2 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at 1023. In one form or another, various state ratifying conventions had recommended that the Constitution be amended to
include a bill of rights. The delegates repeatedly mentioned the need to protect freedom
of speech and press. For example, an important minority report of the Pennslyvania
Convention offered several propositions, including one that looks much like the first

amendment's speech and press clause. PENNSLYVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITU454-83 (1970), reprintedin 2 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at 662, 665. The

TION

Virginia Convention's majority proposed a bill of rights, including speech and press protection. 2 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 842. An important Maryland Convention committee made a similar proposal. Id. at 734-35. New York debated, but did not pass, a similar recommendation. Id. at 872, 911-18. North Carolina did not even ratify the
Constitution. Id. at 977. Instead, it submitted, verbatim, Virginia's proposed declaration
of rights, plus several additional ones. Id. at 966-71. The first order of business of the
First Congress was, of course, to pass the Bill of Rights.
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of international law are not necessarily fundamental in our system. The
United States has chosen, through its Constitution, to erect certain norms
as fundamental; for example, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the
right to a jury trial, and freedom from racial discrimination. Nothing in
the Constitution indicates that customary international law outweighs
constitutional restrictions on governmental actions; indeed that is precisely why constitutional restrictions exist. Obviously, the offenses clause
is as subject as any other congressional power to the command that
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging freedom of speech." Values
expressed by the international community may or may not be consistent
with values established by the Constitution. Indeed, there is no assurance
that this country had any role in the formulation of the international
norms.""' In the absence of congruence with fundamental norms of our
system, there is no logical reason to treat external norms as compelling
governmental interests that can restrict constitutional freedoms. Third, at
least for the time being, the problematic status of the concept of jus
cogens, the fluid and expanding list of suggested fundamental norms,4 83
and the possibility that ordinary norms, and even non-norms, will percolate up to peremptory status urge caution in using peremptory norms as
compelling governmental interests.
We might consider the following situation. Recall, the question is

482. Even peremptory norms may achieve their status without participation by all
members of the legal community. See Weil, supra note 471, at 430. One might respond
that international law, including peremptory norms, "is part of our law." The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Professor Lobel has written persusasively that the natural
law roots of the Constitution imply the incorporation of peremptory norms into our law,
at least to the extent of circumscribing contrary executive branch citation. See generally
Lobel, supra note 4. If that were the case, peremptory norms would arguably have a
fundamental status domestically and would be compelling. There appear to be several
difficulties with that position. First, it is difficult to accept the notion that because that
they believed in natural law, the framers intended to smuggle by implication a body of
law they would never know into a positivist document such as the Constitution, in a way
that would undermine other express provisions. Second, even if the framers believed some
international norms were so much a part of natural law that they migrated into the
Constitution, it is hard to say which ones. It may be that only those international norms
that we have expressly recognized as fundamental are so much a part of natural law as
to be compelling; that is, the framers probably did not think of sovereignty over natural
resources as a part of natural law. Third, it would again seem that the best test for the
compelling status of an international norm is whether it is understood domestically as
compelling. Finally, even assuming a temporal inflation of the number of peremptory
norms that are part of natural law, why should we be bound when we have no input into
the norm?
483. See Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposalfor Quality Control, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1984).
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whether a governmental interest is compelling, so that a narrowly drawn
statute may restrain speech. Assume a peremptory norm against advocating racial discrimination and a statute forbidding such advocacy. While
no case has raised this issue under international law, 4 " it seems reasonably clear that courts would hold that the first amendment protects advocacy of racial discrimination against such a challenge.48 5 Despite the importance of the interest, the political nature of the speech would protect
it from infringement. Whether the decision to prevent that sort of advocacy is good or bad is not the issue; other nations have decided differently. 86 If the violation were likely, speech intended to incite imminent
violation of the norm might be beyond first amendment protection. That
prohibition, however, would be consistent with current first amendment
doctrine. 8
In short, where the international norm represents a fundamental value
in the United States, the governmental interest in it is likely to be compelling. Where the norm establishes economic and social rights, the interest is unlikely to be compelling even though it is peremptory. Of
course, if trends in this country move toward recognition of those rights,
as they have in Western Europe, there is no reason the interests might
not be given substantial weight in the first amendment context.
c.

National Security

As discussed above, courts have given national security interests great
deference. 4s8 Some international norms, such as the norm against aggressive warfare and that against hostage taking, reflect security concerns. It
would seem that if Congress enacted a statute criminalizing behavior

484. United States law will, of course, be interpreted not to conflict with international law. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
485. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978) (striking down ordinance making it a misdemeanor to disseminate any material
promoting and inciting racial or religious hatred). See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND

EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); A.

NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE

RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979); Bollinger, Book Review, 80 MICH. L. REv. 617 (1982);
Village of Skokie v. Nationalist Socialist Party, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978); see
also American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986) (striking down Indianapolis ordinance that treated pornography as sex
discrimination).
486. See Kommers, supra note 328, at 668-69, 686-92.
487. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
488. See supra Part II.
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that violates these norms, they would be found to be compelling because
of their close association with security and defense matters. In view of
Congress' existing authority over military affairs, its determination that
certain closely-related behavior should be forbidden would probably receive a high level of deference.
d.

Foreign Nations' Interests

In Boos v. Barry, Justice O'Conner raised the issue of when a foreign
nation's dignity interest can be compelling for first amendment purposes."' 9 Without being too facetious, the answer may be "Never." Domestically, it seems clear that the first amendment protects oral or written indignities, except for a few very narrowly drawn categories, such as
obscenities. One must add something to the analysis for foreign dignity
interests to make them compelling. We saw above that international law
does not now, if it ever did, add that ingredient.4 90 On the other hand,
there may be specific cases, for example, hostage situations, in which the
damage to human life is so explicit and immediate that it might justify a
speech restraint. That is not, however, an interest of the other nation,
but is more akin to a domestic security interest or a humanitarian
interest.
In general, a foreign nation's interest is unlikely to be compelling
when measured against the first amendment, unless that interest involves
something like the domestic interests given great weight, such as loss of
life or threat to the national security of an ally. More amorphous interests, unless they simultaneously involve a cogent domestic interest, would
not seem to be compelling.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has not sought to argue that we are today bound to the
framers' limited conception of the law of nations. The way that law develops has changed dramatically in 200 years; there is no reason to believe that the framers would not have supported an evolving definition of
offenses against the law of nations. And, even if they did not, an
originalist interpretation of the offenses clause is still not warranted. Nor
has this Article argued that Congress has no leeway in defining offenses;
its points are less strict.
When Congress determines that a certain set of actions constitutes an
offense against the law of nations, it is doing more than establishing a
489.
490.

See Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988).
See supra Part III.
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domestic crime. It is putting its imprimatur on certain international
practice and saying that that practice has reached a level at which it is
binding upon nations. Congress has every reason to be especially careful
before reaching such a conclusion. Obviously, if Congress bestows legal
status on rules that lack the requisites of a norm-practice and opinio
juris-international law suffers. It is hard enough to convince people of
the reality of international law without debasing it by giving a false status to some "rules." Moreover, where the proposed norm undermines a
fundamental right granted by the Constitution, Congress should be wary
of codifying its transient views of international practice or the domestic
practice of nations with different fundamental values. One of the ironies
of Boos is that, now that many nations have begun to march to the beat
of the United States' drummer, 491 the United States in one-albeit quite
small-way is arguing that it must turn around. Why Congress should
deviate from a fundamental domestic norm to achieve at best a minimal
foreign policy objective is totally unclear.
Determining the norms of customary international law is a complex
and often indeterminate enterprise. Congress must exercise its best judgment in making that determination. But there is no reason in theory or
practice for the courts to defer to Congress' determination, especially
when the resulting laws conflict with the first amendment.

491. See Keller, Freed to Criticize, Some Criticize Freedom, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10,
1988, sec. 4, at 1, col. 1 (discussing opposition to the Soviet policy of glasnost).

